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**Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy Nominees
Profiled**

90UN0913A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 12 Jan 90 p 1

[Unsigned report: "On the Nomination of Candidates
for People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR"]

[Text] The nomination of candidates for People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR has ended. The Central Electoral Commission for the Election of People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR reports that the necessary conditions were created at assemblies and meetings of organs of social organizations to permit the nomination of an unlimited number of candidates.

According to the latest data, 3653 persons have been nominated as candidates for People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR in 450 electoral districts—i.e., an average of eight per seat [mandat]. In 294 electoral districts, 4 to 10 candidates were nominated; in 80 districts, 11 to 16; and in several, 24 to 45. In 21 electoral districts 2 candidates were nominated for each seat.

Candidates for People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR include representatives from all social strata in the republic. Most of the nominees are workers in science, culture, public education, health care, and specialists in the national economy—a total of 1351 persons (37.0 percent). Nominees also include 780 managers of enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes (21.0 percent); 357 workers and rank-and-file kolkhozniks (9.8 percent); 405 party officials (11.0 percent); and 432 officials in soviet

organs (12.0 percent). They include 469 non-party members (12.8 percent); 286 women (7.8 percent); and 164 young people aged 30 or under (4.5 percent).

In the course of the elections of People's Deputies to the USSR, which took place in the spring of 1989, 650 candidates were nominated from the republic representing 175 territorial and national-territorial districts. These nominees included 234 workers and kolkhozniks (36.0 percent); 213 workers in science and culture, public education and health care, and specialists in various sectors of the national economy (32.8 percent); 90 managers of enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes (13.8 percent); 56 party officials (8.6 percent); and 10 officials of soviet organs (1.5 percent).

Among candidates for People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR only 10 percent consist of workers and rank-and-file kolkhozniks. In some districts, however, they are heavily represented. In Voroshilovgrad Oblast's 55th and Dnepropetrovsk Oblast's 99th electoral districts, for example, every second candidate for People's Deputy to the Ukrainian SSR is a worker.

Under conditions of democratic, open nomination of candidates, and in the absence of the so-called "command appointment" system [roznaryadka] of the past, a great many labor collectives in industry, construction, and agriculture gave preference to representatives of the national intelligentsia, thereby manifesting their confidence in them.

These are the latest results of nominations of candidates for People's Deputies to the Ukrainian SSR.

Registration of the candidates in the republic began on 4 January.

Shafarevich Decries 'Russophobia,' Jewish Nationalism*90UN0831A Moscow NASH SOVREMENNIK
in Russian Jun, Nov 89 pp 167-192*

[Article by Igor Shafarevich: "Russophobia"; first two paragraphs are unattributed source note]

[No 6, Jun 89 pp 167-192]

[Text] About the author: Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich, born 1923, mathematician, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Lenin Prize winner, member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the London Royal Society, the Leopoldine German Academy, and the National Academy dei Lincei (Italy), honorary doctor of the University of Paris, and winner of the Heinemann Prize (FRG).

The author of basic works on algebra, numbers theory and algebraic geometry, as well as on issues in sociology and history. The article published here was written in the early 1980s, but as the reader will see, it has not lost any relevance.

1. Purpose of the Work

How is our people's spiritual life presently going? What sort of views, sentiments, sympathies and antipathies are there, and in which of its strata is people's attitude toward life being formed? To judge from personal impressions, the scope of the explorations (and, could it be, castings back and forth?) is exceptionally broad: one hears about Marxists, monarchists, Russian *pochvenniki* [those who affirm the primacy of the Russian "soil," or indigenous traditions], Ukrainian or Jewish nationalists, supporters of theocracy or free enterprise, etc., etc., and, of course, about numerous religious schools. But how is one to know which of these views is more widespread than others, and which merely reflect the opinion of a lone, active individual? Apparently no sociological studies are being done on this topic, and it is doubtful that they would provide an answer, anyway.

But here the unforeseen has happened: in the 1970s an explosion of activeness occurred precisely in this area. In a flood of articles that were passed from hand to hand here or published in Western magazines, authors disclosed their world view and their views on various aspects of life. It's as though fate lifted the pot lid in which our future was being cooked and gave us a peek into it. Consequently, an absolutely unexpected picture was revealed: amidst a primordial chaos of the most diverse opinions, which for the most part contradicted one another, one clear-cut concept was delineated that can naturally be considered the expression of the views of an established, cohesive school. It has attracted many authors; it is supported by most Russian-language emigre magazines; it has been accepted by Western sociologists, historians and the mass media in their assessments of Russian history and our country's

present-day situation. Upon taking a closer look, one can note that these same views are widespread in our life: they can be encountered in the theater, cinema, the songs of bards, the tales of variety-stage story-tellers, and even in jokes.

The present work arose as an attempt to explain to myself the causes that gave rise to this school of thought and the goals that it sets for itself. However, as will be evident later on, here we inevitably encounter a certain question that has been placed absolutely off-limits in all present-day humanity. Although no ban on it can be found in any codes of law, although no such ban has ever been written down anywhere, or even stated, everyone knows of it, and everyone submissively stops his thoughts before the forbidden line. But things will not always be that way; humanity will not eternally wear such a spiritual harness! It is in hope of a possible reader, if only in the future, that this work has been written (it has also been written partly for myself, in order to sort out my thoughts).

The school of thought that interests us has been reflected in the most clear-cut, complete form in literary works, and they are what we will draw on most frequently as a source. Let us indicate more specifically what sort of literature we are talking about. It is very vast and keeps growing with every year, so we will name only the principal works, in order to trace its outlines. The appearance in *samizdat* of a collection of essays by G. Pomerantsev¹ and an article by A. Amalrik² at the end of the 1960s can be considered the beginning. The basic propositions, which have subsequently been repeated in almost all the other works, were developed more fully in four pseudonymous articles written here and published in the Russian magazine *VESTNIK RUSSKOGO STUDENCHESKOGO KHRISTIANSKOGO DVIZHENIYA*, which is published in Paris. Explaining the general theoretical, programmatic nature of these works, an editorial article anticipated: "These are not voices, but a voice, and they are not just speaking generally about what is happening in Russia, but offering a profound reflection on its past, future and present in light of Christian revelation. It is necessary to emphasize the exceptional importance of this event, as one would like to call it...." As the flow of emigration picked up, the center of gravity shifted toward the West. B. Shragin's book "Protivostoyaniye dukha" [The Challenge of the Spirit]³, A. Yanov's books "Detente After Brezhnev" and "The New Russian Right,"⁴ and several collections of articles came out. Kindred views have been developed in most of the works of contemporary Western specialists in Russia's history. We shall take as an example R. Pipes's book, "Russia Under the Old Regime,"⁵ which is especially closely related to the school of thought that interests us in terms of its basic precepts. Finally, numerous articles in the same vein have appeared in magazines founded in the West by recent emigres from the USSR: *SINTAKSIS* (Paris), *VREMYA I MY* (Tel-Aviv) and *KONTINENT* (Paris), as well as in Western magazines and newspapers.

Here is a very condensed exposition of the basic propositions expressed in these published works.

Russia's history, starting with the early Middle Ages, has been defined by certain "archetypal" Russian traits: a servile mentality, the lack of a sense of self-worth, intolerance toward foreign views, and a lackeyish mixture of feelings of malice, envy and admiration toward foreign power.

Running parallel to Russian history, ever since the 15th century, there have been dreams of some sort of role or mission for Russia in the world, the desire to teach something to others, point out some sort of new way, or even save the world. This is "Russian messianism" (or more simply, "universal Russian arrogance"), the origin of which our authors see in the concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome," which was expressed in the 16th century, and whose present-day stage they see in the idea of the world socialist revolution begun by Russia.

As a result, Russia has continually found itself in the power of despotic regimes and bloody cataclysms. The proof lies in the ages of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Stalin.

But Russians are unable to understand the reasons for their misfortunes. Looking with suspicion and hostility on everything foreign, they are inclined to blame everyone conceivable for their woes—Tatars, Greeks, Germans, Jews—as long as it is not themselves.

The 1917 revolution stemmed naturally from all Russian history. In essence, it was not a Marxist revolution. Marxism was distorted by the Russians, altered and used to restore old Russian traditions of a strong regime. The cruelties of the revolutionary era and the Stalinist period are attributed to the distinctive features of the Russian national character. Stalin was a very national, very Russian phenomenon. His policies were a direct continuation of Russia's barbarous history. Stalinism is traced at least four centuries back in Russian history.

The very same tendency continues to manifest itself even now. Freeing itself from the alien Europeanized culture it has never understood, the country is coming to increasingly resemble the Muscovite kingdom. The chief danger looming over our country at present lies in the attempts that are being revived to find some sort of unique path of development of our own—this is a manifestation of age-old "Russian messianism." Such an attempt will inevitably result in an upsurge of Russian nationalism, the revival of Stalinism, and a wave of anti-Semitism. It is mortally dangerous not just for the peoples of the USSR, but for all humanity. The only salvation lies in recognizing the pernicious nature of these tendencies, eradicating them, and building a society according to the exact model of the present-day Western democracies.

Some authors belonging to this school of thought express an uncompromisingly pessimistic viewpoint that rules out any hope of any sort of sensible existence for Russians: they never had any history at all, they merely had an

"existence outside of history," and the people turn out to be an illusory magnitude; Russians have only demonstrated their historical impotence, and Russia is doomed to imminent collapse and destruction.

This is the very crudest outline. Further on in the course of our investigation we will have to quote, very frequently, the authors belonging to the school we are examining. One must hope that the reader will then be able to get a clearer feeling for the spirit of these works and the tone in which they are written.

Such vigorous literary activity accompanied by clearly delineated views unquestionably reflects the attitudes of a much wider circle: it expresses the ideology of an active, sizeable school. This school has already conquered Western public opinion. By proposing clear, simple answers to central questions associated with our history and future, at some moment it may also exert decisive influence on our country's life. Of course, history is not moved by theories and concepts, but by much deeper and less rational experiences connected with the people's spiritual life and its historical experience. Most likely, the attitude toward the history and destiny of one's people, the real-life dispositions that are most important to our future have been maturing for centuries, are continuing to be developed even now, and are stored somewhere in the depths of the soul. But until all these national character traits, traditions and feelings find an outlet in the sphere of reason, they will remain amorphous and relatively ineffectual. They must be given concrete expression and connected with the real problems of life. On the other hand, a clear-cut, categorical, vividly formulated schematic idea may temporarily grip the people's consciousness—even though it be utterly alien to its spiritual makeup—if that consciousness is unprotected and has not been prepared for the encounter with schematic notions of this sort. That is why it would be so important to understand and assess this new school of thought in the realm of world view. It is that school itself and the social stratum that has given rise to it that will be of principal interest to us, and the literature it has created will be drawn in merely as material to help us analyze the school. The authors who we will quote are scarcely widely known even now, and in 10 years it is possible that no one will know them. But the social phenomena reflected in their works will undoubtedly have a powerful influence on our country's life for a long time yet to come.

The work plan is this. The views set forth above are grouped around two topics: the assessment of our history, and the assessment of our future. We will analyze them, dividing them up in this way, in the following two sections. In the remaining part of the work we will attempt to understand the origin of these views: What sort of spiritual school could give rise to them, and why?

2. View of Russian History

One must begin, of course, with a discussion of the specific arguments with which the authors of the school

that is under examination support their views. Such a discussion has already been undertaken repeatedly, and that makes my task easier. Let us make a brief survey of the ideas that have been expressed in the process.

It is difficult to find any facts to back up the thesis proclaimed by many authors concerning the Russian's "servile soul" and the notion that his sense of self-worth has been less developed than inhabitants of the West. Pushkin, for example, believed that the correlation was just the opposite. The views of visiting foreigners who saw Asiatic despotism in Russia and saw its inhabitants as slaves can be countered with the views of other foreigners who were struck by the Russian peasant's sense of self-worth, or even saw in Russia "an ideal land full of honesty and simplicity." Most likely, both groups of visitors knew the real Russia very little.

The attitude toward authority in Muscovite Rus in no way tallies with "slavish submission." The term "autocrat" [samoderzhavets], which was part of the Russian tsar's title, did not signify recognition of his right to arbitrary actions and unaccountability, but merely expressed the idea that he was the Sovereign and owed tribute to no one (specifically, not to the khan). According to the notions of that time, the tsar was answerable before God and religious and moral norms, and a tsar who violated them was not supposed to be obeyed, even if it meant that one had to endure torments and death. A vivid example of the condemnation of a tsar is the judgment of Ivan the Terrible expressed not just in the chronicles but in folk legends, one of which, for example, says that "The tsar deceived God." Similarly, among the people Peter I was known as the Antichrist and Aleksey as a martyr for the faith.

The concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome," which was formulated in the early 16th century by the Pskov monk Filofey, reflected the historical situation of that time. After the union of Florence with Catholicism and the fall of Constantinople, Russia remained the only Orthodox Christian kingdom. The author was calling on the Russian tsar to recognize his responsibility in that new situation. He recalled the fate of the First Rome and the Second (Tsargrad), which in his view had perished because of their defection from the true faith, and he predicted that the Russian kingdom would stand forever if it remained faithful to Orthodox Christianity. This theory had no political aspect and did not urge Russia toward any sort of expansion or Orthodox missionary role. In the popular mind (for example, in folklore), it was not reflected at all. The claim that the idea of the "Third Rome" and 20th-century revolutionary Marxist ideology constitute a single tradition belongs to Berdyayev, who evidently was particularly captivated by the consonance of Third Rome with Third International. But neither he nor anyone else attempted to explain how that concept had been passed on over the course of 400 years without manifesting itself in any way during that time.⁶

It is impossible to discover any hatred of foreigners and foreign influences that is specific to Russians and distinguishes them from other peoples. Fears for the purity of their faith, and suspiciousness toward Protestant and Catholic missionary activities were strong. In this one may see a certain religious intolerance, but that trait in no way distinguishes Russia of that time from the West, whose level of religious tolerance is characterized by the Inquisition, Bartholomew's Night and the Thirty-Years War.

Reducing the entire prerevolutionary history of Russia to Ivan the Terrible and Peter I is a schematization that completely distorts the picture. It is the same thing as representing the history of France as consisting solely of the executions of Louis XI, Bartholomew's Night, the persecutions of the Protestants under Louis XIV, and the revolutionary terror. Such a selection of facts pulled out of context cannot prove anything. It cannot even prove the thesis that the revolution was a specifically Russian phenomenon and natural consequence of Russian history. And if that were the case, how could one explain the revolutions in China or in Cuba, Marxism's sway over the minds of the Western intelligentsia, or the influence of the Communist Parties of France and Italy?

To these arguments, borrowed from the aforementioned works, I shall add several of my own, in order to call attention to one very important aspect of the question.

1. Just how little the attitude toward the regime in the Russian pre-Petrine age resembled "slavish submissiveness" and "an urge to think and feel just as it did" is demonstrated by the Schism, when minor and dogmatically insignificant changes in rituals that were introduced by the regime were rejected by the majority of the nation, and people fled by the thousands into the forest and endured torture and death and self-immolation—and in 300 years the problem has not lost its controversial nature. It is interesting to compare that to a similar situation in the classic country that has affirmed the principle of personal freedom and human rights—England. Henry VIII created an **utterly new religious faith** by taking something from Catholicism and something from Protestantism, and he even altered it several times, so toward the end his subjects did not even know clearly what they were supposed to believe in. And yet Parliament and the clergy proved submissive, and the majority of the people accepted the faith that had been concocted out of political and personal considerations. Of course, in Western Europe in the 16th-17th centuries religious divisions played no less a role than they did in our country, but they evidently were more interwoven with political and material interests. Thus, R. Pipes is struck: "The secularization of church lands (in 18th-century Russia—I.Sh.), which was probably the greatest cause of the European Reformation, took place in Russia as calmly as if nothing were involved but a simple bookkeeping operation." The situation codified in the religious Peace of Augsburg, which was expressed in the formula, "cuius regio, eius religio" (he who holds the power determines the religion), whereby the faith of

the subjects was determined by their secular rulers, would have been inconceivable in Russia of that time. Some authors belonging to the school we are analyzing believe that the subordination of the church to the state in the form of the synodal administration of the church introduced by Peter I is a particularly vivid manifestation of the servile traits of the Russian national character. In the book by R. Pipes that has been cited, one chapter is in fact titled along these lines: "The Church as the Handmaiden of the State." A. Shragin writes: "The Russian psychological predisposition toward unanimous obedience was reflected most vividly and, so to speak, archetypically⁷ in the church's subordination to the state in the forms it took during the synodal period." If anyone, they—a historian and a philosopher—should know perfectly well that these forms of subordination of church to state arose in the Protestant countries, from which Peter I copied them exactly. So not only is there nothing "archetypical," there is nothing even typical of Russians in them.

2. Another interesting observation is connected with the view that R. Pipes expresses. He believes that the legislation of Nicholas I served as a model for Soviet legislation, from which Hitler, in turn, supposedly copied the laws of the Third Reich (!), so in the final analysis the legislation of the times of Nicholas I turns out to be the source of all the 20th century's antiliberal tendencies. He even proclaims that the importance of Nicholas's legislation to totalitarianism is comparable to the importance of the Magna Carta to democracy! R. Pipes's concept, of course, is nothing but an anecdote, albeit one that is typical of his entire book, but it is interesting that a closer examination of this question leads to conclusions that are directly opposite of those toward which he tends. The entire concept of a totalitarian state (in both its monarchist and its democratic variants) that places not only its subjects' economic and political activities, but their intellectual and spiritual life, as well, under its control, was fully developed in the West—and had it not been so thoroughly developed, it could not have found embodiment in life.⁸ Thus, back in the 16th century Hobbes portrayed the state in the form of a single creature, the Leviathan, an "artificial person," a "mortal God." To it he applied the words from the Bible: "There is none on earth to compare to him; he is created fearless; he looks boldly on everything lofty; he reigns over all the sons of pride." And more specifically, the Sovereign possesses power that is totally unconditional. Everything that he does is just and right. He may dispose of his subjects' property and honor, and he may be judge of all teachings and ideas, including matters of religion. Among the chief dangers to the state, Hobbes counted the views ("diseases") that held that a private person was the judge of which actions were good and which are bad, and that everything a person did against his own conscience was a sin. In his view, the subjects' attitude toward the Sovereign was best expressed in the words "you will be his slaves." In that same century Spinoza was demonstrating that moral categories were, in general, inapplicable to state authority, that the state could

not, in principle, commit crimes, and that it had the complete right to violate treaties, attack its allies, etc. In turn, any decision by the state as to what was just and unjust was supposed to be the law for all its subjects. In the 18th century Rousseau developed the democratic version of that concept. He believed that the supreme authority belonged to the people (also called the Sovereign), and now IT formed a "collective being" in which all separate individuals were completely dissolved. Once again the Sovereign possessed unlimited power over the citizens' property and persons, it could not fail to be right, etc. From the Sovereign, every individual "receives his life and his existence." The Sovereign was supposed to exchange a person's "physical existence" for "partial existence."

"It is necessary for it to take a person's own forces away and given him, in exchange, others, which for him are alien and which he cannot utilize without the assistance of other people." Just what could be added here by the legislation of Nicholas I, which appears pale against this background?! Yet one can precisely trace how these principles were borrowed in Russia from the West. The proposition to the effect that the subjects renounce their own will and give it to the monarch, who may order them to do anything he wants, is expressed in "The Truth of the Monarch's Will," composed by Feofan Prokopovich at Peter's instruction. It quotes Hobbes almost verbatim and contains all the principal elements of his theory, such as, for example, his notion of the "contract" that the subjects conclude among themselves, giving up their own will and turning it over to the monarch.

3. "Messianism," that is, the belief by a certain social group (nation, church, class, party) that it is destined to determine the fate of humanity and become its savior, is a very old phenomenon. The classic example, from which the name itself is derived, is the teaching contained in Judaism concerning the Messiah (the Anointed King) who will establish the "Chosen People's" rule over the world. Such a concept has arisen in a great many social movements and doctrines. The Marxist doctrine concerning the special role of the proletariat belongs to the tradition of "revolutionary messianism" that developed in Europe in the 19th century. Recent very thorough research into this tradition describes its various stages (Saint-Simon, Fourier) up to and even including the concept of the "Third Rome" (Mazzini's "Roma Terzio"), but it mentions Russia only at the very end of the book in connection with the fact that toward the end of the century Western "revolutionary messianism" also swamped Russia.

4. Finally, the thesis that holds that the revolution in Russia was predetermined by the whole course of Russian history must be verified with regard to the question of the origin of Russian socialism, since without that ingredient, such a radical change in the entire social and spiritual way of life would be impossible—something that is demonstrated by numerous precedents, such as our Time of Troubles, to name just one. Yet socialism, evidently, had no roots in Russian tradition right up

until the 19th century. In Russia there were no authors of the type of More and Campanella. The radical sectarianism that was the breeding ground for socialist ideas in Western Europe played a much smaller role in Russia, and only in exceptionally rare cases does one encounter, in heretical teachings, views that could be considered forerunners of socialist concepts (for example, the desire for property to be held in common). This is even more true of attempts to realize such views in practice: there was nothing in Russia remotely resembling the "Muenster Commune." Another source where one might seek the embryos of socialist ideas—folk social utopias—also provides nothing that socialist tradition could have been based on. They are striking by virtue of their gentleness and lack of militant aggressiveness. They offer the condemnation of Evil, the opposition of Truth to Falsehood, dreams of the "kingdom of Truth," appeals for the brotherhood of all men in Christ, and the proclamation of love as the supreme law of the world.

Socialism was entirely brought into Russia from the West. In the 19th century it was so unambiguously perceived as something foreign that, in speaking about the socialist doctrines that were contemporary to him, Dostoyevskiy often referred to them as "French socialism." And the movement's founders were two emigrants—Bakunin and Herzen, who started developing socialist ideas only after they emigrated to the West. On the other hand, Western society of the new, post-Renaissance type was born with the dream of socialism reflected in More's *Utopia* and Campanella's "City of the Sun," and a whole flood of socialist literature.

Thus, many phenomena that the authors of the tendency we are examining proclaim to be typically Russian prove to be not only not typical of Russia but altogether *non-Russian* in origin, imported from the West: that was the payment, as it was, for Russia's entry into the sphere of the new Western culture.

Many more such arguments could be brought in, but these are probably enough to provide an assessment of the concept we are analyzing: IT COMPLETELY COLLAPSES IN THE FACE OF ANY ATTEMPT TO COMPARE IT TO THE FACTS.

Let us take note of yet another feature of the works we are examining: their indifference to the factual aspect of the matter, and their use of remarkably superficial arguments, so that a moment's reflection should have shown the author's their obvious invalidity. For example, Pomerants cites as an example of how the Russia soul "was intoxicated by the cruelty of power," the "Povest o Drakule" [Tale of Dracula], which was disseminated in manuscript form in the 16th century, when in fact it was concerned with the *exposure* of cruelty, and in some manuscripts Dracula is called the devil. One work devoted to the criticism of this concept points out this circumstance. But in an "anticriticism" that came out subsequently in samizdat, Pomerants declares that he does not particularly insist on his interpretation of the tale. On the other hand, he says, he knew one author who

signed his samizdat works with the pseudonym "Skuratov." And so the Russians' devotion to cruel authority is proven all the same!

From one of R. Pipes' discussions it follows that he supposes that in Muscovite Rus there was no private property! In another place in his book he cites the proverb, "Another person's tears are water" as proof of the "cruel cynicism" and selfishness of Russian peasants. Evidently he understands it not as a condemnation of selfishness but as a moral maxim. And he claims that in pre-Petrine Rus there were no schools, and the vast majority of the servant class was illiterate. Yet back in 1892 A.I. Sobolevskiy wrote: "We are accustomed to thinking that among Russians of that time (15th-17th centuries) there were very few literate people, that the clergy was relatively uneducated and part of it entirely illiterate, that in the higher social class literacy was not very widespread, and that the lower class constituted an illiterate mass." He cites numerous calculations from which it follows that the secular clergy was universally literate, and that the literacy level was at least 75 percent among the monks, at least 50 percent among the landowners, 20 percent among the tradespeople, and 15 percent among the peasants, and that there were numerous "academies" for instruction in reading and writing throughout the entire country. D.S. Likhachev believes that the level of literacy in 17th-century Russia in all strata of the population was no lower than in the West. And here a prejudice that was refuted 90 years ago is presently being repeated by a leading U.S. specialist in Russian history!

Such places are especially numerous in the works of A. Yanov (possibly for the reason that he draws in specific arguments more frequently, while the other authors mainly limit themselves to declarations). Thus, he believes that the "GULAG Archipelago" was a constant companion of Russian history that would appear in it on a regular basis, and he points to 1825 as the date of its previous appearance. At first you do not even realize that he is referring to the Decembrists' uprising—an attempt at armed overthrow of the government and assassination of the tsar (and according to some plans, to destroy the entire royal family), in which Petersburg's Governor-General Miloradovich was killed—as a result of which 5 people were executed and about 100 exiled. And this is when at the same time in Spain, Naples, Sicily, Piedmont and Lombardy the same sort of attempts at military coups were made (1820-1823) and were accompanied by the same sorts of executions after they had been suppressed. In England in 1820 the Thistlewood conspiracy, which aimed at assassinating cabinet members, was uncovered. The conspiracy's five leaders were executed and the rest of its participants were sent to do hard labor in a penal colony. So there is nothing typical of Russian history here. It was not "backward" Russia but "advanced" France that showed how to deal with such disturbances! Thousands were shot following the suppression of the uprising in Paris in 1848, and tens of thousands after the suppression of the Paris Commune.

Or, wishing to show that even Russian national tendencies, such as Slavophilism, that may at first glance seem innocent lead to the Black Hundreds and pogroms, he examines for proof, as followers of the Slavophiles, only Danilevskiy, Leontyev, a third-rate public-affairs essayist of the early 20th century named Sharapov, and a very shady intriguer named V.I. Lvov (whom he for some reason calls a prince), the chief procurator of the Synod in the Provisional Government who emigrated and then returned and, toward the end, joined the Union of Militant Atheists. But if he had considered that the Slavophiles' ideas were developed by Dostoyevskiy as a writer, Solovyev as a philosopher, Tikhomirov as a public-affairs essayist, and A. Koshelev, Yu. Samarin and other figures of the reform era, and later, D. Shipov as politicians, he would have come up with an entirely different picture; and if he had made yet another selection—yet a third picture. Here's a device one can use to prove absolutely anything one wants!

In discussing the question of the acceptability for Russia of a democratic form of government, Yanov deflects indications of certain shortcomings of that system with the argument that "democracy as a political invention is still a child. It is not 1,000 years old, but barely 200." It is hard to imagine a person who is discussing history and has not heard of democracy in Greece, Rome or Florence, and who has not read the pages devoted to it in Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Polybius and Machiavelli! Finally—an utterly curious case—Yanov classifies Belinskii among the "classic Slavophiles"! For such an answer a schoolchild would receive a "D," yet this is written by a candidate of philosophical sciences and current professor at the university of Berkeley.

We are inescapably coming to the question on the answer to which the entire further direction of our reflections depends: *Are these authors interested in the truth at all?* It is an unpleasant question: there are "rules of the game" according to which one should discuss arguments and not the conscientiousness and motives of one's opponent. It has become equally tiresome to raise the questions, "Who does it benefit?" and "Whose mill is it grist for?" But on the other hand, a debate with authors who are interested in neither facts nor logic really does turn into some sort of game. Therefore, before going further, let us check our doubts once again using one example: the assertion encountered in nearly all the works we are examining concerning the cruelty and barbarism that are supposedly specific to all Russian history.

As though a people existed that could not be reproached for that! The Assyrians covered the walls of the cities they conquered with the skins of their residents. We read in the Bible:

"And they committed to destruction everything in the city, the men and the women, the young and the old, the oxen, the sheep and the asses, destroyed (everything) with the sword." (Joshua, VI, 20)

And about King David:

"And he led out the people who were in it, and he put them under the saws, under iron hammers, under iron axes, and he cast them into kilns. Thus he acted with all the cities of the Ammonites." (2 Kings, XII, 31)

Even the radiant and beautiful ancient Greeks, during the time of their internecine wars, destroyed the populations of whole cities (on their scale—states): they killed all the men and sold the women and children into slavery. And thus it goes throughout all of History: not only in the dark Middle Ages, but in the age of the triumph of Reason, as well. Cromwell destroyed a third of the population of Ireland, and only the uprising in Scotland prevented him from carrying out his original plan of putting an end to the Irish as a nation. In the United States the pious Puritans destroyed the Indians like wolves: a bounty was placed on their scalps. And what about the slave trade, in which kings participated and which Parliament defended, citing human rights, and which cost Africa 100 million lives! And the French Revolution, the number of whose victims some contemporaries placed at a million—and that was when France's whole population numbered 28 million! And finally Hitler! Of course, there have also been many cruelties in our history, yet one must completely abandon conscientiousness in order to ascribe cruelty to the Russians as some sort of specific trait! No, it seems, there is not a single one of the aforementioned authors who has failed to triumphantly mention the oprichina! But a present-day historian who specially studied the number of the oprichina's victims writes: "Traditional notions of the scale of the oprichina's terror need to be revised. The figures on the death of many tens of thousands of people are extremely exaggerated. According to the church records on the disgraced, which reflected authentic oprichina documents, during the years of mass terror about 3,000-4,000 people were destroyed." (This refers, of course, to the number of killed. Famine, epidemics, raids by the Crimeans and flight from unbearable taxation reduced Central Russia's population by hundreds of thousands.) And on Bartholomew's Night, which was close in time, more people were destroyed in *several days* (in Paris and the province).

The authors examine Russian history exclusively on the plane of present-day consciousness, totally ignoring the requirements of *historicism*. Yet they are all people with an education in social science and the humanities, and the facts that we have recalled should be perfectly well known to most of them. One must admit that we are dealing here not with sincere efforts to understand the meaning of Russian history, and not with "historical-philosophical reflections." What we are confronting is activity of an entirely different type: it is *public-affairs journalism and propaganda* that strives to instill certain preconceived ideas and feelings in the reader. But in that case, it must be studied as propaganda. And all propaganda has a definite purpose. We are coming to an extremely important question: just what is the PURPOSE of all this literature, and why was it necessary to

impress a view upon readers according to which *Russians are a nation of slaves who have always worshiped cruelty and grovelled before powerful authority, hated everything alien, and been hostile to culture, and Russia is an eternal hotbed of despotism and totalitarianism that is dangerous to the rest of the world.*

It would be possible to avoid puzzling over this question if we were dealing simply with the feelings of emigres. But we will later be persuaded that such is not the case. We are simply seeing the tip of the iceberg: the fact that the literature we are considering has for the most part been published in the West is attributable only to the fact that it is safer and easier to publish there. And these attitudes themselves have their roots there; granted, they also manifest themselves here, albeit not so straightforwardly. After all, one must recognize that if that concept inculcates itself in the national consciousness, that would be tantamount to spiritual death: a people that assesses its own history IN THAT WAY cannot exist. We are dealing here with a phenomenon that vitally affects us inhabitants of this country.

3. Plans for Russia

The examination of a second group of views developed by the authors belonging to the tendency that interests us—how they assess the present situation in the country and what course they propose for the future—will help answer the question raised in the previous section. If the proposition we have stated is correct—that interest in Ancient Rus, the elder Philofey, Ivan the Terrible, Peresvet, etc. stems not from the authors' penchant for historical research, but from certain interests and feelings that are highly relevant to the present day—it is obvious that their opinions concerning the present day should particularly clarify their motives.

All of the viewpoints that have been stated here are concentrated for the most part around two propositions: the dangerousness and impermissibility of the Russian national principle's influencing the life of the state, and the need to precisely follow the model of the present-day Western democracies in building society.

Our authors react very sharply and with great distress to any attempts to look at life from a Russian national viewpoint, that is, to approach present-day problems from the viewpoint of Russian spiritual and historical traditions.

"...Not a national revival but a struggle for freedom and spiritual values should become the central creative idea of our future" (Gorskiy, a pseudonym). The same author warns:

"The new national consciousness should not be built on unconscious patriotism..." (as it was evidently built for the 20 million who laid down their lives in the past war). The author considers reflection on the MEANING of

Russia's existence, that is, the very presumption of the INTELLIGIBILITY of Russia's destiny, to be a dangerous temptation. He says with condemnation:

"The Russian person, if he is even capable of thinking independently, still agonizes over the question: What is Russia? What is the meaning of its existence? What is its purpose and place in World History?" (It is interesting that, according to the meaning of this statement "Gorskiy" does not count himself among "Russian people," at least not among those who "think independently"!)

Yanov regards the anonymous authors whose works appear in the VESTNIK RSKhD [RUSSKOGO STUDENCHESKOGO KHRISTIANSKOGO DVIZHENIYA], No 97 ("Gorskiy" et. al.) with great sympathy. He even believes that Russia's future depends to a considerable degree on which political orientation is adopted by the "Russian Orthodox Renaissance" movement. Here he distinguishes two tendencies: one, which is kindred to him in spirit, he calls the "liberal-ecumenical." It is hard to invest this cautious and tactful turn of phrase with any content besides *nationally neutral*. In fact, in the preface to another book by Yanov, Breslauer emphasizes that Yanov's sympathies are with the COSMOPOLITAN stratum of Soviet society. One must find a name for the other tendency in the "Orthodox Renaissance"; in essence it is NATIONAL, but here Yanov does not sustain the role of a professor dispassionately analyzing an interesting social phenomenon; he loses patience: it is "TATAR- MESSIANIC" and a threat to the "world political process."

In this opposition Yanov sees the basic problem of present-day Soviet life: "The decisive watershed passes between the *nationalists* and the *non-nationalists*." It is superfluous to make the qualification that the "nationalism" he has in mind is not Armenian, Lithuanian or Jewish, but only Russian. And it is obvious which side of the watershed the author stands on. Moreover, he makes the charge against his opponents that if their ideas concerning Russia's future were realized, there would be no place there for the ANTIRUSSIAN OPPOSITION! I shall not attempt to judge whether this charge is fair, but it very vividly demonstrates the author's concerns.

Yanov's concepts manifest themselves with maximum clarity in his debate with the samizdat magazine VECHE, which was published in the early 1970s. As an illustration of "blind refusal to see what is going on," he cites an article from that magazine: "Even the problem of civil rights in the USSR is LESS important at the given historical moment than the problem of the perishing Russian nation." It is instructive to recognize just what Yanov's own position is. If that viewpoint is incorrect, and the "problem of the perishing Russian nation" is less important, just what will happen if we concentrate our efforts on the more important problem, and the nation perishes? (The article he cites asserts that the number of Russians is declining.) For whose rights will one fight them? It's certain that it won't be for the rights of Russians!

Finally, this problem is discussed once again on a higher level. Concerning a certain samizdat article, Yanov writes: "At the risk of profaning the article's metaphysical enthusiasm, let us formulate its meaning simply: humanity is quantized, so to speak, not into separate individualities, as the 'humanistic consciousness' has hitherto naively supposed, but into nations."

However, "profaning metaphysical enthusiasm" is completely beside the point here; what Yanov does has a much simpler name: the substitution of one idea for another. An excerpt from the article under discussion, which Yanov himself cites before the passage quoted above, states: "nations are ONE level in the hierarchy of the Christian cosmos..." (my emphasis, I.Sh.), that is, to use Yanov's terminology, humanity is quantized INTO NATIONS, TOO. The converse viewpoint, which Yanov evidently holds, is that humanity is quantized ONLY INTO SEPARATE INDIVIDUALS, and not into nations. It is not a new viewpoint. Humanity dispersed (or "quantized") into individual units that are totally unconnected to one another—such, evidently, is Yanov's ideal.

But there exists a yet more radical tendency of thought. Instead of struggling against nationalism and warning of its dangerousness, it claims that there is actually nothing to argue about, since THE PEOPLE DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL. We have already quoted the assertion: "the people turns out to be an illusory magnitude" ("Gorskiy"). This idea has been developed in particular detail and particularly lovingly by Pomerants:

"The people no longer exists. There is a mass that has preserved the vague memory that at one time it was a people and bore God within itself, but is now absolutely empty.

"The people in the sense of the god-bearer, the source of spiritual values, does not exist at all. There are neuras-thenic members of the intelligentsia, and there are the masses.

"In our country only traces of the people remain, like traces of snow in the spring.

"What is usually called the people in our country is not the people at all, but the philistines [meshchanstvo]."

And so, if in the past the Russian people had no history, in the present there is no Russian people at all.

These thoughts naturally flow from the concepts examined in the preceding section. Our authors see nothing in Russian history but tyranny, slavery and senseless, bloody convulsions. Pomerants explains:

"That's how, in general, history is made in Russia. The Russian people trembles and grovels before the dread autocrat, who cuts the people into parts, like Ivanushka, and fuses it together again. Then, when it is fused, it acknowledges its master as its own and serves him faithfully."

Or Galich puts it in poetic form:

"Every year's a time of troubles,
Every liar's a Messiah."

If you accept this view, it is true that any attempt to build the future on the foundation of SUCH traditions could end only in another disaster. The opinion of one author that "Russia had no history" might possibly be rejected by the others as a polemical exaggeration, but in essence all their views come to this conclusion: Russia, according to their viewpoint, had no history in the sense of the womb in which the people's future is developed. What, then, can the country's future be built on? The answer is provided by the second basic thesis advanced by the literature we are examining: on the basis of someone else's experience, by borrowing modern Western multiparty democracy as a model. It is precisely the fact that this is *someone else's* experience that has not developed organically from Russian history that makes it attractive, since this provides a guarantee that it has not been corrupted by the poisons with which the authors believe our entire past is suffused. Conversely, the search for any sort of path of our own will inevitably result, they believe, in a chain of new disasters. Yanov, for example, believes this to be the principal question "that now, as it did many generations ago, divides the Russian dissident movement—is Russia a European country, or does a special path of development exist for it that is uniquely its own...."

Thus, it is precisely the SEARCH for our own path (of course, without any restriction on its direction, so the result, for example, could turn out to be some sort of form of democracy of our own) that is rejected here. The reason, in these authors' view, is that *in general, only two solutions exist, and a choice must be made between only two options: modern Western-type democracy, or totalitarianism*. In speaking of the same basic question as in the excerpt cited above, Yanov asks:

"Doesn't it consist in the search for an alternative to European democracy? And doesn't that search inevitably lead even noble and honorable thinkers into the embraces of authoritarianism, for so far history has never known any sort of "special" Russian alternative democracy. Furthermore, doesn't the logic of the struggle against democracy (as doctrine and as political reality) ultimately lead to the justification of the most extreme, totalitarian forms of authoritarianism?"

Let us note this characteristic trait that will later be useful in analyzing our authors' views: they presuppose a choice between only two possibilities: either "European democracy," or "authoritarianism"—"authoritarianism," moreover, in its "most extreme, totalitarian" forms. Real life hardly fits such an oversimplified pattern. In society there have been and presently are so many forces—the monarchy, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and other classes, the church or churches, corporations, parties, national interests, etc., etc., that a continuous spectrum of state forms, and not just those two EXTREME points between which it is proposed that we

choose, is capable of arising (and continually does arise) from combinations of these forces. And often the mechanism that is used to form the state authority turns out to be by no means the most important distinguishing feature of society. Otherwise, we would have to recognize the Roman empire in the "Golden Age of the Antonines" and the Chinese empire of Qin Shi Huang Di, with its universal slavery, corruption and burning of books, as kindred regimes. In our century, present-day Yugoslavia and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge are both single-party states, while both South Africa and Switzerland are multiparty states. The system that existed in England when it defeated Louis XIV, withstood a quarter of a century of wars with revolutionary France and Napoleon, and became the "workshop of Europe" and model of a free society was so different from present-day democracy that it hardly makes sense to unite them under a single term. It was based on very limited suffrage. Parliament consisted of people who were closely associated by common interests and even kinship; debates in it were of a technical nature; and demagoguery and the attempt to influence public opinion played no significant role. [Zombart] compares it with the board of a joint-stock company that discusses how to run an enterprise in whose success everyone has an identical stake, and about whose affairs everyone is more or less well informed. Most members of Parliament were, to all intents and purposes, appointed by the large landowners, and seats were also often bought. Nonetheless, the court of History has shown that this Parliament to some extent received the people's support. Just as in 1912 the Russian people, evidently, unanimously supported the autocratic regime, and the American people, during the Vietnam war, which required comparatively few sacrifices of them, refused to support a government that had been elected according to all the canons of Western democracy. And how is one to judge which expressed the will of the American people to a greater extent: the party machine that had nominated presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, who carried on the Vietnam war, or the leftist circles that, relying on the mass media, brought about the president's resignation and capitulation in that war?

Here a very profound problem arises. The search for a better means of identifying the people's will tacitly presupposes that such a concept as "will of the people" exists and is interpreted in the same way by everyone. Yet it is precisely this supposition, which is almost never discussed, that requires close analysis. Speaking in contemporary scientific jargon, the people is a "large system." But by no means every large system has a property that can be called "will." For example, it is known that a computer, no matter how complex it may be, does not have one; and it is absolutely unclear whether will can be ascribed to living nature as a whole, or to an individual species, or to a biocenosis—and only with regard to an individual human being or the higher animals do we have no doubts as to the existence of will. In real life the people manifests itself not through the formulation of its will but through uprisings or an

upsurge of economic activity, through a rise or fall in the birth rate, through the flourishing of culture or the spread of alcoholism and drug abuse, through steadfastness and sacrifice in war, or easy capitulation. It is precisely the endless combinations of such features that show whether the popular organism is healthy. Of course, working out the form of state system that is most organic for a given people at a given moment in its history is a necessary condition for the people's healthy existence. But it is by no means the sole condition, and often not the most important.

As for Western-type democracy, which the authors we are analyzing so insistently propose as the universal solution to all social problems, *in its present condition* it raises a number of doubts that must be thoroughly discussed before recommending it without qualification as the only solution to our problems. Let us cite a few of them.

1. This system is evidently not all that natural. The transition to it has usually been associated with an agonizing and bloody cataclysm: obviously, some sort of violence to the natural historical process is required. Such was the civil war in England. In France the civil war and terror were only the beginning. For almost a century after that, the country was shaken as though it were in a fever: the Napoleonic wars, revolutions, the Second Empire, the Commune. In our country the attempt in February 1917 to introduce this system proved unsuccessful. In Germany such an attempt, made during the Weimar Republic, resulted in the victory of National Socialism, as a reaction. (In his memoirs, such a disciple of democracy as Churchill expresses the opinion that Germany's fate would have been different if the monarchy had been preserved in 1918).

Can we now undertake the risk of yet another such cataclysm in our country? Is there any chance that it would endure it? Yet our authors propose this course with an ease that raises the suspicion that these apprehensions do not concern them in the least.

2. The founders of Western liberal thought (for example, Montesquieu and the authors of the U.S. Constitution) proceeded from the concept of *limited power*. This concept traces its roots to the medieval religious world view. In the age of absolutism, the doctrine of unlimited power was developed—first with respect to the power of an unlimited monarch, and then with respect to unlimited popular sovereignty (compare the ideas of Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau cited in the previous section). Attempts were made to achieve a limitation of power on the basis of the principle of separation of powers: when, for example, the legislature is not subject to the power of a constitutional monarch, or the judiciary is not subject to the will of the people. But in order for such a system to function, there needs to be a power limiting all these branches, and for that to happen, there must exist in a society norms of behavior, traditions, and moral and religious, which are often unwritten and even unconscious, that occupy a higher place in the scale of values

than the authority of any power, so that actions by the regime that contradict them are perceived as illegal. And that is the only reliable means of limiting power in principle. The lack of such values that stand above the authority of the regime automatically gives rise to a society of the totalitarian type. That is precisely why states based on unlimited popular sovereignty so easily give rise to totalitarianism: in Germany, the Weimar Republic, or in France the regime of the Constituent Assembly in 1789-1791. This law was noted a very long time ago. Plato wrote that democracy degenerates into tyranny. Both he and Aristotle believed that unlimited popular sovereignty cannot be considered a form of state system at all. Edmund Burke, who observed the initial stage of the French Revolution, wrote that unlimited democracy is just as despotic as unlimited monarchy. Yet the present-day Western democracies are based entirely on the principle of unlimited popular sovereignty: any decision adopted by the majority of the population is legal. (And that spirit has been captured by the authors we are examining; for example, in the introduction to the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" [Democratic Alternatives], "democracy in the realm of law," i.e., the subordination of the law to the decision of the majority, is proclaimed.) Many liberal critics of present-day democracy see in this a sign of its decline and the failure of the attempt undertaken 200 years ago to build a free society based on the principles of popular sovereignty. At the present, in their judgment, in Western society liberties exist by dint of inertia, and not as the result of the principles on which that society was built.

3. Our authors recommend Western-type democracy as an alternative to the single-party communist state. But is it capable of being such an alternative? After all, one system will not be replaced by the other with a wave of the magic wand; evidently, some sort of competition is presupposed. And is the democratic system in its present form capable of such competition? Increasingly, Western democracy has been yielding, again and again, to its antagonist. Whereas the part of humanity inhabiting countries with a single-party communist system was 7.5 percent in 1920 and 8.5 percent in 1940, it amounted to more than 45 percent in 1960 and is presently no less than half. And the process has been going in only one direction! The time is long past when the Western democracies were a dynamic force, when the number of countries following that path was growing, and when they were imposing their principles on others, as well. Now everything is just the opposite! Hardly a single one of the newly arisen states has chosen a state system of the Western type. And in the Western democracies themselves the number of opponents of their state system is steadily growing. On the other hand, its supporters usually resort to the argument that no matter how bad it may be, the rest are even worse. Such an argument can hardly inspire anyone to defend that system. That is not the sort of thing that was being said 200 years ago! If you take classical democracy for comparison, we will see that it was a short-lived form. 200 years was its maximum life

span. But that is precisely how long multiparty democracy has existed in Western Europe and the United States. By all indications, the Western multiparty system is a social system that is on its way out. Its role in History might be assessed very highly: it brought with it the guarantee of domestic peace, protection against government terror (but not against the "Red brigades"), and a rise in material well-being (and the threat of environmental crisis). But to return all humanity to it is as hopeless as dreaming of a return to an Orthodox Christian kingdom or to Kievan Rus. History is clearly refashioning this system into something new. One can attempt to influence what it is refashioned into and by what means, but reversing this process is hopeless.

And do these authors we are analyzing have a definite concept of the "Western democracy" that they are proposing we take or reject in ready form, without allowing us to discuss possible variations of it and alternatives to it? It seems to follow from their works that this concept is extremely vague in their minds. It often seems that they have the classical form of multiparty democracy in mind, such as the one that currently exists in the United States (for example, Shragin and Yanov). But then, for example, Krasnov-Levitin⁹ wants to introduce "full property equality," while L. Plyushch¹⁰ claims that state planning should be preserved all the way up until the attainment of communism: yet present-day Western democracy by no means sets such goals for itself! Furthermore, Plyushch writes:

"I do not understand you, if you do not sympathize with the terrorists who destroy their people's hangmen. Individual terror is immoral, if it is directed against innocent people."

Yet it is impossible to assume that the author suffers from such a degree of intellectual underdevelopment that he has failed to ask the question of just WHO will distinguish between the "innocent" and the "guilty." To this day terrorists have never resorted to a court of arbitration, but have carried out such judgment themselves. Most likely the Basque terrorists (whose example Plyushch cites with sympathy) believe when they fire at a policeman that he is guilty, if not personally, then as a representative of a guilty state. Yet any class or racial terror is based on such views. Obviously, we have here an apology—granted, still a timid one—for political terror. But how, then, is that to be linked to the ideals of Western democracy? Moreover, most of the authors in the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" express their attachment to socialism, and the collection concludes with the document, "Russian democratic socialists abroad." What we evidently have here are some sort of different democrats: *socialist* ones. Yet that is no longer present-day Western democracy, but some sort of ALTERNATIVE to it, that is, precisely what Yanov so passionately fights against. How, then, is one to understand his participation in this collection? If he believes that the argument that "so far history has never known any sort of special Russian alternative democracy" is so decisive, shouldn't he first of all address that argument

to those who share his views and his coauthors in the collection? For after all, so far history unquestionably has never known a synthesis of Western-type democracy with socialism (for example, with "full property equality").

And so, evidently it is not an attraction to democracy, which they understand in widely diverse ways, that unites these authors. What they really all have in common is annoyance at the thought that Russia might SEEK some sort of path OF ITS OWN in history, and the desire to use every means possible to prevent the people from taking a path that it works out and chooses for itself (of course, not with the help of the secret ballot, but through its own historical experience). It is a dream of turning Russia into a mechanism, a robot that has been deprived of all the elements of life (historical traditions, some sort of goals for the future) and is controlled by a program that has been developed on the other side of the earth and installed in it. And democracy plays the role of such a "program," a "control unit" that has no organic connection whatsoever with the country. So if one were to make the fantastic supposition that the authors turned to the Americans with their ideas, they would have to demand of them the unqualified acceptance of monarchy.

The very same schematic idea, the same notion of the phantasmal nature of our life as merely the pale reflection of real, Western life assumes a somewhat grotesque character in Pomerant's article in the collection titled "Samosoznaniye" [Self-Consciousness]. Interpreting the development of the culture of ALL the world's countries except Britain, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and France as mere COPIES of the latter's culture, the author emphasizes what distortions, omissions of entire stages, and mergers of several stages into one occur in this connection. But he does not attempt to discuss his axiom. Yet if he had taken as an axiom the notion that European poetry is a distorted copy of Persian, he would probably have had to resort to cleverer constructions in order to explain why Firdousi, Omar Khayyam and Hafiz are reflected in such distorted fashion in the form of Dante, Goethe and Pushkin.¹¹

All these issues—both plans for Russia's future and their national aspect—are presented in a somewhat simplified but very vivid form in the theory that Yanov has advanced and expounded in a number of articles and two books. In the classical spirit of the "analysis of the alignment of class forces," he divides our society into two strata—the "establishment" and the "dissidents." Each of them gives rise to both "leftist" and "rightist" tendencies. The author pins all his hopes on the "leftists." The "establishment left" (the author's term) consists of the "party aristocracy" or "elite" and the "cosmopolitan managers." It requires reconstruction and the "modernization of their archaic ideology," and to that end, it needs to form an alliance "with Russia's most brilliant minds, which are presently concentrated in the dissident movement," that is, in the "dissident left." For that to happen, it is necessary to overcome the "intelligentsia's egalitarian and moral maximalism" and "the

intellectually and ethically flawed new class's arrogant intolerance." But—and here the author comes to the central point of his concept—THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF DOING THAT ON THEIR OWN.

"However, that contradiction has gone so far that it is impossible to resolve it without an arbiter whose authority is acknowledged by both sides. Western intellectual society may serve as such an arbiter. It can work out a precise and detailed program in order to reconcile all the USSR's positive sociopolitical forces, a program that will unite them for a new step forward...."

So here is Yanov's secret, his basic concept. And in order to express it more comprehensibly, the author proposes as a model—OCCUPATION:

"This is an undertaking of enormous, one might say, historic complexity. However, in essence it is analogous to that which MacArthur's 'brain trust' encountered at the end of World War II.¹²

"Was it likely that the autocratic Japan could be transformed from a dangerous potential enemy into a friendly business partner without a fundamental reorganization of its internal structure? Let's apply the same principle to Russia...."

Yanov also very precisely characterizes the stratum on which this "enormous undertaking" will rely within the country, citing as an example the hero of a certain satirical novella. It involves a parasite who has preserved almost no human features (other than purely superficial ones) and whose entire efforts are directed at preventing real life from breaking through the barrier of bureaucracy anywhere. For him, genuine life consists of trips to the West and the purchases he brings back from there. His dream is to bring some sort of extraordinary "stereophonic toilet bowl" back from America. "Let's suppose that he wants a stereophonic toilet bowl," Yanov reasons, "is it likely that he wants a world war?"

You can't deny the boldness of this picture: spiritual (for the time being) occupation by the "Western intellectual community," which will become our arbiter and teacher, relying within the country on the stratum of "cosmopolitan managers," who are supplied, in return, with an abundance of stereophonic toilet bowls! This can be taken as a laconic and vivid resume of the ideology of the school we are examining.

4. The Lesser People

The views examined in the two previous sections merge into a single system. Moreover, they are based on a whole philosophy of history—a particular view of the nature of the historical process. It is a question of whether history is an organic process similar to the growth of a living organism or to biological evolution, or whether it is deliberately designed by people, like some

sort of mechanism. In other words, the question is how society is to be viewed—as an organism or a mechanism, as living or dead.

According to the first viewpoint, human society developed as a result of the evolution of “behavioral norms” (in the broad sense, technological, cultural, moral and religious norms). These “behavioral norms,” as a rule, were not deliberately invented by anyone but arose as the result of a very complex process in which each new step is based on all previous history. The future is the child of the past and of history, and by no means of our own designs. Just as a new organ of an animal did not arise because the animal realized its usefulness in advance, so a new social institution was usually not created deliberately, for the attainment of a specific goal.

The second viewpoint claims that society is built logically by people, out of considerations of expediency, on the basis of a decision made in advance. Here it is perfectly possible, and often necessary, to ignore historical traditions, the character of the people, and the value system that has been developed over the course of centuries. (Voltaire’s statement was typical: “You want good laws? Burn up your own and write some new ones.”) Instead, the decisive role is played by those who possess the necessary knowledge and skill: these are the true creators of History. They are the ones who are supposed to first draw up the plans and then force intractable life to conform to those plans. The entire people turns out to be mere material in their hands. Like a carpenter working with wood or an engineer working with reinforced concrete, they take that material and erect a new structure, the design of which they have drawn up in advance. Obviously, according to such a view, there is a gap between the “material” and the “creator,” and the “creators” cannot regard the “material” as people like themselves (which would prevent them from working it), but are fully capable of feeling antipathy and irritation toward that material if it refuses to understand its role correctly. The choice of one concept or the other forms people of two different psychological types. Adopting the first viewpoint, a person feels himself to be a helper and collaborator of forces that far surpass him. Adopting the second, he feels himself to be the independent creator of history, a demiurge, a small god and, ultimately, a rapist [nasilnik]. This is a path on which a society emerges that is lacking all freedom, no matter what democratic trappings such ideology might be furnished with.

The views we have examined in the two previous sections represent the consistent application of the second viewpoint (society as a mechanism) with regard to our country’s history. Let us recall how much effort has been expended to denigrate our people’s history and whole character. One can see what annoyance is aroused in our authors by the fear that our future will be based on this country’s historical traditions. Practically foaming at the mouth, they try to prove to us that Western-type democracy is absolutely alien to the spirit and history of our people—and they insist with equal fervor that we

adopt precisely that form of state. The project that Yanov develops for spiritual occupation by the “Western intellectual community” is visually embodied in the image of Russia as a vehicle onto whose driver’s seat a nimble driver leaps and turns on the ignition, and the vehicle tears off. It is also typical that for our future a choice is offered between just two possibilities: “Western-type democracy” and “totalitarianism.” Neither the growth of an organism nor the behavior of the living world as a whole has ever been based on a choice between two possibilities; rather it has always been based on a choice among an infinite number of alternatives that merge continuously into one another. On the other hand, the element of a computer must be designed precisely in such a way that it can be in only one of two states: on or off.

And here is the necessary conclusion from that concept: the singling out of a “creative elite,” and the view of the people as a whole as material for that elite’s creativity are very vividly reflected in our authors. Let us cite several examples of how they characterize their circle’s attitude toward the rest of the population. In this connection, we shall encounter the following difficulty—these authors use various terms to characterize the circle with which they plainly identify themselves: intelligentsia (usually), dissidents (less frequently), elite, “chosen people,” etc. I propose completely ignoring this terminology temporarily and proceeding on the assumption that we have here a stratum that for the time being is unknown to us, certain features of which we wish to establish. As to this stratum’s relation to the intelligentsia, dissidents, etc., we shall return to that question later, once we have a clearer picture of it.

And so, here is how “Gorskiy” understands the situation:

“...The old contradiction between the ‘rootless intelligentsia’ and the people appears today as a contradiction between the creative elite and the stupefied and corrupted masses, which are aggressive in their attitude toward freedom and higher cultural values.”

Moreover, at the same time:

“It is also necessary to note that the new opposition intelligentsia, for all their divorce from the popular masses, nonetheless represents the masses that have given rise to them and are the organ, as it were, of their awareness.”

Shragin’s viewpoint is the following:

“Besides a thin layer of European-educated and democratically inclined intelligentsia, the roots of the dissident movement have come up against a thick stratum of permafrost.”

Moreover:

“The member of the intelligentsia in Russia is a sighted person among the blind, a responsible person among the irresponsible, a sane person among the insane.”

And so, the "European-educated and democratically inclined intelligentsia" has matured to the point of declaring the majority of the people to be INSANE! And what place is there for the insane but a psychiatric hospital?

Finally, Pomerants's view:

"Religion has ceased to be a trait of the people. It has become a trait of the elite." "Love for the people is much more dangerous (than love for animals): here there is no threshold preventing it from descending to all fours." "Something new will replace the people." "Here ...the backbone of a new people is taking shape." "Only around a new intelligentsia can the masses crystallize anew into something people-like."

For the author the concept of an elite, a "chosen people" is an undiscussed dogma; the only thing that is discussed is where the elite is to be found:

"The reason I count on the intelligentsia is by no means that it is good...Intellectual development, in and of itself, only increases the capacity for evil...My chosen people is bad, and I know it...but the rest are even worse."

Along this path our authors must inevitably encounter an obvious logical difficulty, so you wait impatiently for them to run into it. After all, if the Russian consciousness is so suffused with servility, worship of cruel authority and the dream of a Master, and if legal traditions are absolutely alien to us, just how can a democratic system be inculcated in such a people *by democratic methods*, and in the near future, to boot? But it turns out that there is no difficulty for our authors here, either. In that case, it is simply necessary to make the Russians democratic, even though it be done by *nondemocratic methods*. (Rousseau calls that: *forcing people to be free*.) As Shragin writes:

"Under despotisms it is not the majority that decides. Of course, that contradicts the ideals of democracy. But even the best of ideals degenerates into a utopia when it lacks room to accommodate reality."

And that statement, which is so striking for its candor, seemingly drew no reaction whatsoever in the emigre press, which so emphatically stresses its democratic nature in other cases!

We are confronted here with some sort of stratum that is very clearly aware of its unity, which is emphasized particularly vividly by the sharp contrast between itself and the rest of the people. It typically thinks in antitheses: the creative elite versus the stupefied and corrupted masses; the chosen people versus the philistines; the European-educated and democratically inclined intelligentsia versus the permafrost; the sane versus the insane; a tribe of giants versus the human pigsty (this last antithesis comes from a samizdat article by Semen Telegin titled "What Is to Be Done?") This stratum is united in the awareness of its elite status and the certainty of its right and ability to determine the country's

destiny. Evidently, it is in the existence of such a social stratum that the key to understanding the ideology we are examining lies.

This social phenomenon would probably become more comprehensible if it could be placed in a broader historical context. And indeed, in at least one historical situation, the age of the Great French Revolution, a similar phenomenon has been described in vivid detail.

One of the most interesting students of the French Revolution (in terms of both the freshness of his ideas and his remarkable erudition), Augustin Cochin paid special attention in his works to a certain social, or spiritual, stratum he called the "Lesser People." In his opinion, the decisive role in the French Revolution was played by a circle of people that had been established in the philosophical societies and academies, Masonic lodges, clubs and sections. The specific features of that circle consisted in the fact that it lived in its own intellectual and spiritual world: the "Lesser People" among the "Greater People." He could have said the *antipeople* among the people, since the world view of the former was based on the principle of the obverse of the latter's world view. It was there that the type of person necessary for a revolution was developed, a person for whom everything that constituted the nation's roots, its spiritual backbone—the Catholic faith, honor of the nobility, loyalty to the king, pride in one's own history, and attachment to the distinguishing features and privileges of one's native province, one's estate or one's guild—was alien and disgusting. The societies that brought together the representatives of the "Lesser People" created a kind of artificial world for their members, a world in which their entire life took place. Whereas in the ordinary world everything is tested by experience (for example, historical experience), there the general opinion decided everything. What was real was what others believed; what was true was what they said; what was good was what they approved of. The ordinary order was reversed: doctrine became the cause, rather than the effect, of life.

The mechanism by which the "Lesser People" is formed is what at that time was called "liberation from the dead weight," from people who were to subject to the laws of the "Old World": people of honor, deeds and faith. To that end, "cleansings" (corresponding to the "purges" of our era) were continually being conducted in the societies. As a result, an increasingly pure "Lesser People" was created, a "Lesser People" which was moving toward "freedom" in the sense of increasing liberation from the concepts of the "Greater People": from such superstitions as religious or monarchical sentiments, which can be understood only through the experience of spiritual communion with them. Cochin illustrates this process with a fine example—the image of the "savage" that was so widespread in the literature of the age of the Enlightenment: Montesquieu's "Persian prince," Voltaire's "Huron," Diderot's "Tahitian," etc. Usually this was a person who possessed all the material accoutrements and formal knowledge represented by civilization,

but who had absolutely no understanding of the spirit that gave all of that life, and for that reason everything in life shocked him and seemed stupid and illogical. In Cochin's view, this image was not an invention but was taken from life, except that these "savages" were found not in the forests of Ohio but in the philosophical academies and Masonic lodges; this was the image of the sort of person whom they wanted to create, a paradoxical creature for whom the environment in which he lived was a void, just as for others it constituted the real world. He saw everything and understood nothing, and abilities among these "savages" were measured precisely by the depth of their incomprehension.

A truly marvelous existence awaited a representative of the "Lesser People" if he traversed the entire path of his education: all the difficulties and contradictions of real life vanished for him; he was seemingly liberated from the chains of life, and everything seemed simple and comprehensible to him. But that had its obverse side: he no longer could live apart from the "Lesser People"; in the world of the "Greater People" he suffocated like a fish out of water. In this way, the "Greater People" became a threat to the existence of the "Lesser People," and the struggle between them began: the Lilliputians tried to tie up Gulliver. That struggle, in Cochin's opinion, occupied the years preceding the French Revolution and the revolutionary period. The years of the Revolution (1789-1794) were five years of the "Lesser People's" power over the "Greater People." The "Lesser People" called only itself the people and formulated only its own rights in the "Declarations." This explains the paradoxical situation whereby the "victorious people" found itself in the minority, and the "enemies of the people" in the majority. (This assertion was constantly found in the language of the revolutionaries.)

We are encountering a world view remarkably similar to the one that has been the subject of our analysis in this work. This includes the view of one's own history as complete savagery, coarseness and failure—all those "Henriades" and "Maids of Orleans." And the desire to break all the ties, even external ones, that linked one with historical tradition: the renaming of cities, the change in the calendar. And the conviction that everything rational had to be borrowed from without—at that time, from England; this conviction suffuses, for example, Voltaire's "Philosophical Letters" (sometimes called "Letters from England"). And, in particular, the copying of a foreign political system—English parliamentary government.

I think that this remarkable concept is not only applicable to the age of the French Revolution but sheds light on a much wider range of historical phenomena. Evidently, at every critical turning point in a people's life there emerges the same sort of "Lesser People" whose essential beliefs are OPPOSITE to the world view of the rest of the people. For whom everything that has organically grown up over the course of centuries, all the roots of the nation's spiritual life—its religion, its traditional state system, its moral principles and its way of life—are

all hostile and seem to be ridiculous and dirty superstitions that need to be relentlessly eradicated. Being totally cut off from any spiritual connection with the people, the "Lesser People" regards it solely as material and regards its processing as a purely TECHNICAL problem, so its solution is not restricted by any moral norms, compassion or pity. This world view, as Cochin notes, is vividly expressed in the fundamental symbol of the Masonic movement, which played such a role in paving the way for the French Revolution—in the image of the construction of the Temple in which individual people appear in the role of stones that are mechanically laid side by side according to the "architects'" blueprints.

We shall now cite several examples in order to support our guess that we really are dealing here with a universal historical phenomenon.

1. In turning to the age that preceded the one Cochin studied, we encounter CALVINISM, which, in the form of the Huguenots' movement in France and the Puritans' movement in England, had such an influence on the life of 16th- and 17th-century Europe. In its ideology, especially in the case of the Puritans, we can readily recognize the familiar features of the "Lesser People." Calvin's teaching asserted that even before the creation of the world God had predestined some people for salvation and others for perdition. A person could not influence this decision, which had already been made, through any of his deeds. Only a few had been elected: a tiny group of "holy" amid a sinful and suffering humanity that was doomed to eternal torment. But no sort of communication with God was accessible even to the "holy," "for the finite can never have contact with the infinite." Their elect status was manifested only in the fact that they became the *tool* of God, and the more faithful their election was, the more effectively they acted in the sphere of their worldly activity, casting aside attempts to understand the meaning of that activity.

This striking doctrine, which was really a new religion, created among the "holy" a sense of complete isolation from and opposition to the rest of humanity. Their central experience was a sense of their elect status, and even in their prayers they thanked God that they were not the same as "the remaining mass." The idea of emigration played a colossal role in their world view. Partly because of the fact that the Puritan movement was originated by a group of Protestants who were fleeing persecution in the period of the Catholic reaction under Mary Tudor: in a state of complete isolation and disconnection from their homeland, they laid, under the influence of Calvin's teaching, the foundations of the theology and psychology of Puritanism. But it was also partly because even after they had returned to England they remained emigrants, aliens, in terms of their views. A favorite image in their literature was the wanderer, the refugee, the pilgrim.

The narrow communities of the "holy" were continually subjected to purges and excommunications, which at times encompassed the majority of the communities.

Even the "doomed," according to the Puritans' views, were supposed to be subjected to the discipline of their church, and here compulsion was perfectly permissible. The gap between the "holy" and the "doomed" left no room for mercy or help for the sinner—all that remained was hatred for the sin and its bearer. Peasants who had lost their land and been sent by the throng to the cities in search of work, often turning into vagrants, were a particular object of denunciation and hatred in Puritan literature. The Puritans demanded increasingly strict laws: they extolled whipping and branding with a hot iron. And the main thing was that they demanded that the "righteous" be protected from contact with the poor vagrants. It was precisely the spirit of Puritanism in the 18th century that gave rise to the terrible system of "work houses," in which the poor were kept practically in the position of prisoners.

The Puritans' literature strived to divorce the "holy" from historic traditions (which were the traditions of "people of the world"), and for the "holy," all established customs, laws and national, dynastic or estate attachments had no force. It was in its very principle a nihilistic ideology. And indeed, the Puritans really did call for a complete remaking of the world and all existing "laws, customs, statuses, ordinances and constitutions." A remaking, moreover, according to a plan known to them in advance. The appeal to "build on a new foundation" was backed up in their case by the image, which is already familiar to us, of the "building of the Temple"—this time, the restoration of the Temple of Jerusalem after the Jews' return from captivity.

As Max Weber asserts, Calvinism's real role in economic life consisted in destroying the traditional system of farms. In the English revolution its decisive role consisted in the fact that, by relying on the Puritans and even more extreme sects, the new stratum of the wealthy succeeded in overthrowing the traditional monarchy, which until then had enjoyed the support of the majority of the people.

2. In the age that followed the French Revolution, one can observe a very similar phenomenon. Thus, in the '30s and '40s of the 19th century in Germany all spiritual life was under the influence of philosophical and political radicalism: "Young Germany" and "left Hegelianism." Its purpose was the destruction (as it was put at the time: "merciless criticism" or "revolutionizing") of all the foundations of German life of that time; Christianity, philosophy, the state, society. Everything German was renamed "Teutonic" or "Prussian" and became the object of abuse and mockery. We encounter assertions, which are familiar to the reader, to the effect that Germans lacked a sense of their own dignity, that they were characterized by hatred for everything foreign, that their history was a chain of base acts, and that it was difficult, in general, to consider them human beings. After Goethe, Schiller and German romanticism, [Ruge] wrote: "We Germans are so profoundly backward that we have yet to create a human literature."

German patriotism was identified with reactionarism; conversely, everything Western, especially French, was worshiped. The term "pro-French antipatriotism" was in vogue. Hopes were expressed that the French would once again occupy Germany and bring it liberty. Emigration to France was popular, and 85,000 Germans lived in France. Heine was a typical representative of this tendency. The primary object of his continual, malicious, often dirty and, for that reason, no longer witty, attacks was Christianity. For example, the following artistic image: "Certain spiritual insects emit a stench if you crush them. That's the way with Christianity: that spiritual bedbug was crushed 1,800 years ago (the crucifixion of Christ?), and it is still poisoning the air for us poor Jews." And the second object was the German character, culture and history: thus, at the end of the narrative poem "Germany is a Winter Tale," he compares Germany's future to the foul odor that emanates from a chamber pot. And not because he was simply such an irritable, skeptical person: He worshiped Napoleon to the point of idolatry, and he admired everything French and even called himself the "leader of the French party in Germany."

3. In Russia in the second half of the 19th century the same features are very distinctly evident in the liberal and nihilistic tendency. V. Zaytsev, the well-known public-affairs writer of the 1860s wrote about Russians: "Abandon any hope; slavery is in their blood." The same Zaytsev was responsible for the following idea:

"...They want to be democrats, and that is all, and it makes no difference to that there are only beasts in a human image to replace the aristocracy and bourgeoisie...The people are crude, obtuse and, consequently, passive. Therefore, good sense requires that, without being confused by the grand pedestal onto which the democrats have elevated the people, we act vigorously against them."

As we see, Shragin's idea that under despotisms it is the minority that should make decisions, and that "the principles of democracy lack room to accommodate reality" had already been stated back then. Moreover, Dostoyevskiy relates:

"'The people will not permit it,' a person who was speaking with a fervent Westernizer said two years ago about a certain matter. 'Then destroy the people,' the Westernizer replied calmly and majestically."

A remarkably contemptuous attitude toward their own culture, such as German radicals had in the 1830s, was combined with the admiration of Western, especially German, culture. Thus Chernyshevskiy and Zaytsev declared Pushkin, Lermontov and Gogol to be untalented writers who had no ideas of their own, and Tkachev added Tolstoy to that list. Saltykov-Shchedrin, mocking the "Mighty little heap," portrayed a certain natural-born composer (Musorgskiy!) as poking his fingers at the keys at random and then finally sitting down

with his whole rear end on the keyboard. And these were not exceptional examples: that was the general style.

In his "Diary of a Writer" Dostoyevskiy is constantly carrying on polemics against a certain, clearly-defined ideology. And when you read him, it seems that he has in mind the very literature that we have been analyzing in this work: there is so much coincidence in everything. There is the assertion about the Russian muzhik's servile soul, about how he loves the rod, the claim that "the history of our people is absurd" and, consequently, that "it is necessary that a people such as ours have no history, and what it has had under the guise of a history, it should completely forget, in its entirety, with revulsion." And the goal is to get the people "to feel ashamed of its past and curse it. Whoever curses his past is ours, that's our formula!" And the principle that "besides the European truth," "there is no other truth and can be no other." And even the claim that "in essence, there is no people, but there is and continues to exist that same inert mass," as though Dostoyevskiy had taken a look into the works of Pomerants. And finally, emigration, the reason for which, according to that ideology, was that "the blame lies with those same Russian ways of ours, our clumsy Russia, in which a decent man to this day can do nothing." How contemporary are Dostoyevskiy's own ideas!

He expresses a frightening supposition: that separation, "breaking away from" one's country leads to hatred, that these people hate Russia, "so to speak, naturally, physically: for its climate, its fields, its forests and its ways, for the emancipation of the muzhik, for Russian history, in short, for everything; they hate it for everything."

L. Tikhomirov, who followed the course of a terrorist up to the point of becoming one of the leaders of People's Will, and then left that tendency, paints a very similar picture in his last works. In his words, the world view of those circles of young people from whom terrorists came was based on a break with past culture. They proclaimed the dethronement of all authorities and the following of their "own reason" alone, which led, to the contrary, to the domination of the most base and primitive authorities. The significance of materialism and antinationalism was elevated to a religious level, and the epithet "renegade" was a boast. These circles' ideas were so limited that young people emerged who claimed that there was no need to read anything at all—they were called "troglodytes." And indeed, all they could take from the literature that was offered them was the confirmation of ideas with which they were already familiar. Consequently, emotional emptiness and depression developed. There were numerous cases of suicide; they "felt that they were confronting darkness." They were prepared to throw themselves into anything at all, and they threw themselves into terror.

"Do not expect from them any concessions to either common sense, or human feeling, or history. It was

indignation against real life in the name of an absolute ideal. He cannot rest easy, because if his ideal is impossible, then there is nothing on earth worth living for. He would rather exterminate 'all evil,' that is, the entire world and everything that exposes his chimera, than give in."

The repetition of such a particular set of ideas over the course of 400 years in various European countries can hardly be accidental—we are obviously dealing with a very specific social phenomenon which constantly arises in a persistent, standard form. One may hope that this observation will help us to understand this contemporary problem, to which this work is dedicated.

The last centuries have greatly narrowed the scope of those concepts, which we are able to use in discussing historical and social questions. We readily acknowledge the role in society's life of economic factors or political interests, we cannot help acknowledging (albeit with a certain perplexity) the role of international relations, and we will agree, at least, not to ignore the role of religion—but mainly as a political factor, for example, when religious discord manifests itself in civil wars. In actuality there are evidently far more powerful forces of a spiritual nature that are active in history—but we are unable to discuss them, and our "scientific" language does not grasp them. Yet they are precisely what accounts for whether life is attractive to people, and whether a person can find his place in it, and they are what gives people strength, or deprives them of it). In particular, it is from the interaction of such factors that the enigmatic phenomenon of the "Lesser People" arises.

5. The Present-Day Version of the 'Lesser People'

What grounds are there for believing that this phenomenon of the "Lesser People" manifests itself in our country? In the first place, of course, the literature that we have been analyzing. The whole standard complex of ideas of the "Lesser People" is represented in it: belief that the people's future, like a mechanism, can be freely designed and restructured; in this connection, a contemptuous attitude toward the history of the "Greater People," up to and including the assertion that it has not existed at all; the demand that the basic forms of life be borrowed in the future from outside, and that we break with our own historical tradition; the division of the people into an "elite" and an "inert mass," and the firm belief in the right to use the latter as material for historical creativity; and finally, outright revulsion toward representatives of the "Greater People" and their psychological makeup. And these traits are manifested in our present-day "Lesser People" no less vividly than in its previous versions. For example, never before has one encountered such a vivid symbol of the "Lesser People's" domination of the "Greater People" than in the model of occupation proposed by Yanov. And Pomerants's subtle image—"...the intelligentsia's place is always at the half-way point...Spiritually, all present-day members of the intelligentsia belong to a diaspora.

Everywhere we go we are not entirely foreigners. Everywhere we go, we are not entirely at home"—splendidly conveys the world outlook of the "rootless people" who make up the "Lesser People."

Dicta from the literature of the present-day "Lesser People" often coincide to such an extent with the ideas of their predecessors that it seems that the former are quoting the latter. This is especially striking when one compares the present-day "Lesser People" with its predecessor 100 to 120 years ago, which developed within the liberal, nihilistic, terrorist and revolutionary movement in our country. After all, it is strange, indeed: in the literature of the present-day "Lesser People" one can encounter ideas that are practically quotations from Zaytsev, Chernyshevskiy or Trotskiy, although at the same time its representatives speak out as dedicated Westernizing democrats who completely reject the ideals and practice of the "revolutionary age" of Russian history, assigning all that to the traditions of "Russian totalitarianism."

Thus, Zaytsev and Shragin, separated from one another by a century, are completely unanimous in recognizing that in relation to the people as a whole, the framework of democracy is "excessively narrow." "Slavery is in their blood," says Zaytsev, and Pomerants repeats: "a lackeyish mixture of malice, envy and worship of authority."

And if the poet O. Mandelshtam's widow N. Ya. Mandelshtam, condemning those who avoid the struggle for spiritual freedom, wrote in her memoirs, "One must not drink to the point of senselessness... One must not collect icons and pickle cabbage," and Trotskiy (in "Literature and Revolution") referred to the peasant poets (Yesenin, Klyuyev, et. al.) as "playing the muzhik" and said that their nationalism was "primitive and reeks of cockroaches," after all, in both cases it is one and the same attitude that is being expressed. When Pomerants writes:

"The intelligentsia is the measure of social forces—progressive and reactionary. Opposed to the intelligentsia, the people as a whole merges into a reactionary mass," this is practically a repetition (it would be interesting to know whether conscious or unconscious) of the proposition in the famous Gotha Program.

"In relation to the proletariat, all the rest of the classes merge into a single reactionary mass."

It is obvious that there is something more here than a coincidence of individual turns of phrase and ideas. After all, if we squeeze out the basic core of the literature of the present-day "Lesser People" and attempt to reduce its ideas to several basic thoughts, we obtain the very familiar concept of the "cursed past" and of Russia as the "prison of peoples," and the assertion that all of our present-day woes are attributable to "vestiges" and "birthmarks"—granted, not of capitalism but of "Russian messianism" or "Russian despotism," and even of the "devil of Russian tyranny." On the other hand, "great-power chauvinism" as the chief danger is literally

preserved, as though it had been borrowed by the literature of the "Lesser People" from the reports of Stalin and Zinoviev.

Here is yet another specific confirmation. Shragin declares that he does not agree that our people's consciousness has been crippled by brain-washing aimed at forcing it to be ashamed of its own history and forget about that history's existence, a process in which Russia was represented as the "gendarme of Europe" and the "prison of peoples," and its history was reduced to the notion that "it was continuously beaten."¹³ "Everyone has forgotten the time when that was done," he says, "Just let someone try getting those words—'gendarme of Europe'—past the present-day Soviet censor, even though they applied to the Russian past."

But on that same page he himself writes: "Was Russia the 'gendarme of Europe'? Was it conceivably not? Was it the 'prison of peoples'? Who will have the conscience to deny it? Was it continuously beaten for its backwardness and boastful complacency?—It's a fact."

So "the time when this was done" has not been forgotten at all, particularly by Shragin himself. Only the soloist has been changed—what we have before us is like a well-rehearsed orchestra in which the melody, developing, shifts from one instrument to another. And at the same time, the picture is painted for us of two antagonists, two paths that are, in principle, mutually exclusive. And we are offered only a choice between those two paths—for, as we are assured, there is no third way. Once again, a very familiar situation!

Never, in no incarnation of the "Lesser People," has such complete conviction in one's own ability and right to determine the life of the "Greater People" stopped at the purely literary level. Thus, Amalrik already compares the current emigration with the "emigration of hope" that preceded 1917. And of course, one can rest assured that in the event of any crisis they would once again be here in the role of ideological leaders who had earned the right to leadership by suffering the torments of exile. It is no accident that the legend is so stubbornly upheld that they were all "exiled" or "expelled," even though they spent a long time pestering the visa department trying to get their visas.

Another indication of the existence of a certain stratum that is suffused by elitist, cliquish feelings, has no desire to enter into contact with the main social strata of the population, and even shuns them can be derived, I think, from the observation of our societal life and from various speeches, declarations, etc. I have in mind the remarkable characteristic that they are very, very often directed at the problems of a MINORITY. Thus, the question of freedom to emigrate, which may be relevant for a few hundred thousand people, at the most, has aroused an incredible intensity of passions.¹⁴ In the nationality area, the fate of the Crimean Tatars draws far more attention than the fate of the Ukrainians, and the fate of the Ukrainians—more than the Russians. If it is

the persecution of believers that is being reported, much more is said about representatives of relatively small religious tendencies (Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostalists) than about Orthodox Christians or Muslims. If it's the situation of prisoners that is being discussed, it is almost exclusively the situation of political prisoners, although they hardly constitute more than one percent of the total number. One might think that the plight of the minority really is harder. That is absolutely untrue: the problems of the majority of the people are in no way less acute, but one must take an interest in them, of course; if one ignores them, it's as though they won't exist. And perhaps the most striking example is a statement made several years ago to foreign correspondents to the effect that children of the intelligentsia are prevented from receiving a higher education (it was broadcast over several radio stations). And this is when, to the contrary, the opportunity to enter higher school is greater for children of the intelligentsia, especially in big cities, than for others: because of the attitude instilled in them in the family that one must obtain a higher education, because of the family's greater level of culture, which compensates for the inadequacies of the secondary schools, and because of the opportunity to hire tutors. What a disgrace such a statement would have seemed in the eyes of the intelligentsia of the previous century, which believed it owed a debt to the people! Now, however, the objective is to grab a place for one's own children at the people's expense.

There is yet another sign pointing in the same direction—it is the "cult of emigration." The attention that is given to freedom of emigration, and the declaration that the right to emigrate is "first among equals" cannot be explained simply by the fact that the protesters themselves want to leave, since in some cases that is not the case. Here emigration is perceived as a certain principle, a philosophy of life. First and foremost, as a demonstration of the fact that "it is impossible for a decent person to live in this country." But even more, as a model of an attitude toward life here, a feeling of disgust with it and of isolation and divorce from it. (Dostoyevskiy noted of Herzen that some people exist who were born emigrants and are capable of living their entire lives that way, without even necessarily ever going abroad.) The following two examples show how sensitive, even painful, this topic is.

1. At one press conference the idea was expressed that emigration, all the same, is no heroic exploit, and that the people who leave are those who have severed their spiritual ties with their homeland and, for that reason, are hardly capable of making a great contribution to its culture. Rebuttals and protests absolutely poured out in the Western and emigre press and on the radio. One writer living here wrote a huge article for the well-known French newspaper LE MONDE in which he asserted, in part, that "separation from one's homeland" is always a heroic exploit and that "we(?) who remain have blessed those who have left."

2. The Russian-language magazine KONTINENT, which is published in Paris, in its first issue, which presents the magazine's program and proclaims its intention to speak on behalf of the "Continent of Eastern Europe," carries an article by one of its founders and an influential member of its editorial board A. Sinyavskiy¹⁵ (under the pseudonym Abram Terts). "Emigration is presently on the agenda," the author writes. He understands it broadly. "But everyone keeps fleeing"—not just people, for example; it coincides with the fact that "manuscripts keep leaving Russia." And the article ends with a picture:

"When we were leaving, and we were doing it on the quiet, along with the Jews, I saw books jumping about on the board floor of the truck in the direction of customs. The books were jumping about in a bundle like frogs, and I caught sight of titles: 'Poets of the Renaissance,' 'Saltykov-Shchedrin.' By that time I had already shaken everything off myself. But they just kept jumping...The books were also leaving.

"I felt only glad, looking at the packet of brown books, that Mikhail Evgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin himself, tucking in his ears, was leaving together with me.

"We were leaving forever. Everything was finished and forgotten...The way ahead was open to our adventures. And the books were jumping. And Mikhail Evgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin himself, in person, tucking up his ears, was hopping to it!"

This is a kind of hymn to emigration, an apotheosis of flight: the author himself, "had shaken everything off myself," but that was not enough—not only people but manuscripts and books were fleeing, and even great Russian writers—Russian Literature—were "hopping to it."

And we can constantly observe that same psychology of the "Lesser People" in our own life. Popular singers, famous story-tellers—from tape recorders, television sets and the stage—hammer into our heads the image of the Russian as alcoholic, scum, "beast with a human face." A fashionable theater with a reputation for liberalism stages a play from the Russian past. The understanding public subtly exchanges glances: "how bold, how keenly observed, how it alludes to the present day; it's true, in this country it has always been that way and cannot be otherwise." In the cinema we see films in which our past is represented now as unrelieved gloom and horror, now as a farce and comic operetta. Moreover, at every step one can encounter this ideology. For example, in the following verse, which sets forth the concept of the Revolution in four lines:

What a pity, that Marx's legacy
Landed in the Russian baptismal font,
Where the end justifies the means,
And the means circum...ed the end.

Or in the joke about how two worms, a newborn and its mother, crawled out of a dung heap into the world. The

newborn liked the grass and sun so much that he said: "Mama, why are we digging around in the dung? Let's crawl over there." "Shush," his mother answered, "that's our Homeland!" These anecdotes themselves are not born; someone thinks them up, and for some reason.

The arguments set forth above lead to the following conclusion: *the literary school that is being examined in this work is the manifestation of the ideology of the "Lesser People" and a reflection of its war against the "Greater People."*

This viewpoint explains all the traits of this literature that we have noted throughout our work: the antipathy for Russia (the "Greater People") and Russian history; the annoyance that is aroused by any attempt to look at life from a Russian national viewpoint; the insistent demand to break with our past ideologically and design a future without reference to our own historical experience. Here Cochin's image seems particularly appropriate: the Lilliputians creeping up on the tied-up Gulliver and strewing him with poisoned arrows.

This conclusion, however, immediately gives rise to another question: who does this "Lesser People" consist of, and which strata of our society does it inhabit? In this section we shall do only the preparatory work, looking at the terms that the ideologists of the "Lesser People" themselves use when they speak about the social strata with which they identify themselves. Two such terms, which are at least a little bit concrete, are used: "intelligentsia" and "dissident movement."

Unquestionably, the authors of the works we have been examining are "writing" people and therefore belong to the intelligentsia by any understanding of that word. Similarly, the people whom they are addressing are the readers of samizdat or people who are capable of obtaining Russian magazines published in the West and who also, most likely, belong to the intelligentsia. Therefore, it is plausible that our "Lesser People" consists of a certain part of the intelligentsia. However, there are no grounds for identifying it with an entire social group of "educated people"—for example, "people with a higher education." Millions of teachers, physicians, engineers, agronomists, etc. have entirely different views on life. But unfortunately, we have inherited from the 19th century a bad habit of regarding the intelligentsia only as a unified whole. One example of such a sweeping judgment was the concept of the "intelligentsia, which opposed itself to the people." If that judgment were taken precisely, one would have to dismiss from the intelligentsia the Slavophiles, Dostoyevskiy, Solovyev, Musorgskiy (and moreover, practically all Russian music) and Mendeleyev (who, because of his nationalistic, conservative views, was not even chosen as an academic). Yet they wrote for someone, and had their readers and audience, so won't it turn out that the majority of the intelligentsia does not belong to it? In Russian public-affairs writing the term "order" was often applied to the intelligentsia (by P. Annenskiy, F. Stepun, N. Zernova). For example, Annenskiy wrote:

"The intelligentsia represents a militant order that has no written charter but knows all its members scattered throughout our land, and that by some sort of agreement has always gone against the entire current of contemporary life."

It would be very strange to apply that image to the district doctors, high-school teachers or engineers. Isn't it natural to assume that the author had in mind a certain very specific circle within the educated part of society, one which highly resembles the "Lesser People"? It is interesting to see how this question is treated in the famous collection "Vekhi" [Landmarks], which is subtitled: "Sbornik statey o russkoy intelligentsii" [A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia]. P. Struve makes the qualification that he has in mind not the entire intelligentsia, but a certain part of it that is characterized by a "disdainful rejection of the state"—a feature very similar to the characterization of the "Lesser People." Berdyayev mentions at the beginning of his article that he has in mind the "intelligentsia that belongs to circles," and he even proposes a new term for it: "intelligentshchina." He says: "a strange group of people, alien to the organic strata of Russian society." Hershenson's characterization: "a throng of sick people, isolated within their own country." Frank calls the member of the intelligentsia a "militant monk in the nihilistic religion of atheism," and the intelligentsia "a little bunch of monks who are alien to the world and contemptuous of it."

The "Vekhi" collection evoked a stormy reaction from the liberal part of the intelligentsia. As a reply, the collection "Intelligentsia v Rossii" [The Intelligentsia in Russia] was published, to which prominent representatives of the liberal tendency contributed: Kovalevskiy, Milyukov, Tugan-Baranovskiy, etc. And just how do they interpret the term "intelligentsia"? Milyukov considers the "intelligentsia" the *nucleus* of the "educated class"; "the initiative and the creativity belong to it." Characterizing it, he writes: "Practically from the time of its very emergence the Russian intelligentsia was antigovernment"; it "formed its own patriotism of a state within the state, a special camp surrounded by enemies." He notes the "emigrant attitude" of the intelligentsia. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy writes about the member of the intelligentsia of non-noble birth [raznochinets]: "He looks with extreme revulsion on the historical forms of Russian life, amid which he feels himself to be an utter renegade."

It would seem that these traits identify a certain, very narrow and specific stratum or tendency. But sometimes authors quite definitely assign them to all "educated society." The question of "just who is the intelligentsia?" is somehow circumvented, and there is no definite viewpoint on it. Evidently, the collection's authors were confronting a social phenomenon that was very hard to define. They vaguely sensed its uniqueness, but they did not even set themselves the task of characterizing it more precisely. Subsequently even that sense disappeared. A

very amorphous, undifferentiated concept of the "intelligentsia" that reflected a complex real-life situation in a very distorted fashion took root. Unfortunately, this stereotype was preserved, has survived until our time, and is preventing a correct assessment of our reality. In particular, one must admit that the term "intelligentsia" provides an utterly incorrect interpretation of the "Lesser People" phenomenon that interests us. But one should remember that this term is nonetheless widely used in the literature of the "Lesser People" itself and, when encountering the term "intelligentsia" in the literature that is being analyzed, we can understand it as the "Lesser People."

Shragin and Yanov (and, it seems, only they) sometimes use the term "dissidents" to designate the school of thought with which they identify themselves. This term is even less specific than "intelligentsia." And it has been put into common use by foreign correspondents who understand very little about our life. But by any understanding of it, you would never call either Yanov or Shragin dissidents: as long as they lived here they were typical "ideological-sector workers." Nor are the four anonymous authors (who have still not identified themselves) in Issue No 97 of the VESTNIK RSKhD dissidents, and R. Pipes certainly is not.

Other terms, which are used, for example, by Pomerants—"elite," "chosen people"—are even vaguer. So, I think, the terminology that the ideologists of the "Lesser People" themselves use offers no possibility of pinning down this "people" in a way that is at all precise. We must seek some other ways of accomplishing this task.

6. The National Aspect

The direction in which this solution must be sought can be indicated by one very distinct feature of the literature we are examining: its saturation with national and, above all, anti-Russian emotions. The authors, while ostensibly writing as objective researchers and thinkers—historians, philosophers or sociologists—who are seeking the truth, often cannot sustain their line and burst into purely emotional attacks against not just Russian history, but Russians in general. The reader may have already noted this specific feature of the quotations that have been offered above ("universal Russian arrogance," "Russians' lack of a sense of their own self-worth," "lackeyish mixture of malice and envy," "archetypically Russian psychological predisposition to unanimous obedience," and "the Russian soul was intoxicated by the cruelty of power"). Here are just a few examples, which could be put together under the heading THEM ABOUT US:

"Russia has brought more evil into the world than any other country" (N.N.)."

"An age-old stench of desolation in a holy place disguised in the garb of messianic 'election,' the centuries-old arrogance of the 'Russian idea'" (same author).

"The people has turned out to be an illusory entity, fit today only for myth-making" ("Gorskiy").

"Their own national culture is absolutely alien to the Russian people" (same author).

"The unfinished work of Byzantium and the Tatars (regarding pre-Petrine Russia)" (Pomerants).

"(In Rus), Christian depths were practically always interwoven with the abysses of moral vileness" (same author).

"A country that for centuries has risen and spread out like sour dough, and that sees no other tasks for itself" (Amalrik).

"A country without faith, without traditions and without a culture" (same author).

"And the fact that Russians themselves are worse off than anyone in that prison is both logical and just" (Shragin).

"(In prerevolutionary Russia) the 'working masses' were suffused with an acquisitive spirit of the worst bourgeois sort in combination with a moral cynicism and political reactionaryism" (Pipes).

"...Fulfillment of the dream of 'order' and a 'Master' that already stirs the people's minds" (Yanov).

"...the people's traditional devotion to a 'Master'" (Yanov).

(The mixing up of the population in the USSR is good for the fact that) "it knocks the ground from under the Russophiles' feet." It is proposed that the words "Russia" and "Russian people" be abandoned are replaced by the terms "Soviet nation [narod], Soviet people [lyudi], etc. (Belotserkovskiy).¹⁶

In general, in the literature of this school only the Russian people, of all the peoples, is the target of complaints. For example, Russian implies "nationalism," with no qualifications whatsoever (see, for just one example, the selection of quotations titled "The Spectrum of Neonationalism" in "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" [Democratic Alternatives]). And in this connection Plyushch even declares: "I think it abnormal to calculate who has played what percentage of dirty tricks on the Russians over a thousand years." This is in the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy," where such "calculations" and reproaches are directed only at the Russians!

In order to avoid creating the impression that the word plays some sort of special role here, let us cite two examples where the same feelings are conveyed through painting.

1. A picture by the artist Vlad Ovchinnikov is reproduced on the cover of the magazine TRETYA VOLNA [Third Wave] (No 6, 1979), which is published by A. Glezer. A little hut and muzhik are portrayed against the

background of a cemetery covered with crosses. The picture is titled "Dog Cemetery."

2. The lavishly published catalogue for an exhibit titled "Contemporary Russian Painting" contains the reproduction of a picture by Aleksandr Zlotnik titled "Heavy Sky." The picture depicts some sort of headless creature standing with legs spread and giving birth to a monster with three dog's heads. From the first creature urine, a whole lake of urine, is flowing, giving rise to a river, which is flowing into the church of St. Basil's, which is serving as a chamber pot.

The peasants arouse special distaste in these authors. We have already mentioned R. Pipes's view of the Russian peasants' proverbs, the meaning of which, in his opinion, is "primitively simple: think only of yourself and do not think of others." Meyerson-Aksenov¹⁷ says the following about their religion:

"...the belief in magic and the superstition of peasant Orthodoxy" (and this is written by a person who has been ordained as an Orthodox Christian priest!).

Pomerants has the following opinions:

"The peasant cannot be reborn except as a character in an opera. Peasant nations are hungry nations, and nations in which the peasantry has disappeared (sic!) are nations in which hunger has disappeared."

A. Amalrik writes:

"And if language is the fullest expression of the spirit of the people, then who is more Russian—the 'little Negro' Pushkin and the 'little Jew' Mandelshtam, or the muzhik in the beer hall who, wiping his spittle across his unshaven cheeks, bellows: 'I'm a Russian!'"¹⁸

This list could be continued endlessly.¹⁹ It is difficult to characterize the feelings that move the authors as anything other than RUSSOPHOBIA (whereby both meanings invested in the term "phobia"—fear and hatred—are perfectly apt). And hatred for one nation is usually associated with a heightened sense of one's belonging to another. Doesn't this make it likely that our authors are under the influence of some sort of powerful force rooted in their national feelings? I propose taking this thesis as a working hypothesis and seeing whether it doesn't help us understand the entire phenomenon.

If we adopt this "working hypothesis" and ask, JUST WHOSE national feelings are manifesting themselves here, for a person acquainted with our country's life there can be no doubt as to the answer. There is only one nation whose concerns we hear about almost daily. Jewish national emotions are putting not just our country but the whole world into a feverish state: affecting disarmament negotiations, trade contracts and international ties among scientists, causing demonstrations and sit-in strikes, and coming up in practically every conversation. The "Jewish question" has assumed an incomprehensible power over minds, obscuring the problems of the Ukrainians, Estonians, Armenians and

Crimean Tatars. And apparently the existence of a "Russian question" is not recognized at all.

The fact that the authors we are examining are often under the influence of strong Jewish national feelings is confirmed by many features of this literature. For example, by the place that is occupied in it by questions that concern only the Jewish national movement: the problem of exit, and the fear of anti-Semitism—they surface in practically every work. Another feature is even more universal and characteristic. The works under consideration might give the impression that the national aspect of life, in general, is alien to their authors, and that they even regard it with antipathy. But here is what is striking: although the authors are for the most part Jews, they NEVER try to apply to their own people and its state the criticisms that they level at Russians and Russia. For example, practically all the authors accuse Russians of "messianism" and of the arrogance of feeling themselves to be a "chosen people." Whether Russians have such feelings and how strongly they have manifested themselves is a debatable question. But after all, "Messiah" is not a Russian word! Berdyayev said that any messianism is only an imitation of Jewish messianism. It is precisely among the Jews that the notion of themselves as the "Chosen People" and the anticipation of the Messiah constitute the indisputable basis of their religion, and that religion—the basis of the state of Israel; and not a single one of our authors sees anything morbid or unnatural about THAT.

These aspects emerge most clearly in the works of Yanov (in the preface to one of Yanov's books, Breslauer, believing it to be a very important feature in characterizing Yanov, stresses the fact that he is a Jew). He very sincerely depicts his confusion and perplexity in the 1960s when "new and strange times" began in the USSR: instead of vacationing in sanatoriums in the Crimea and Caucasus, members of the intelligentsia started to wander around from village to village collecting icons and even expressing concern over the fact that the peasant population was disappearing! How he strived to persuade all "honest and thinking people" that by inclining toward Russian nationalism they were embarking on a dangerous and dark path! But evidently it did not seem strange to him that his fellow tribesmen were at the same time setting off not for a nearby village, but for a remote tropical country—not on vacation, but forever—and that they were drawn not by the icons to which their fathers and grandfathers had prayed, but by a Temple that had been destroyed nearly 2,000 years ago! Or in one case Yanov depicts a Russian nationalist group that proclaimed in its program the inviolability of individual liberty, freedom for all methods of disseminating the truth, demonstrations and rallies, etc. Nonetheless, Yanov believes that this is the beginning of a path that will inevitably lead to despotism—only because they have spoken about spiritual rebirth and the Russian way, using the term "Great Russia," and have proposed to provide a special role for Orthodox Christianity in a future Russia. Yet all these traits—and not in

the form of the dreams of 30 young people, but in reality—can be observed in the state of Israel! Does Yanov believe that it will inevitably embark on the path to despotism? However, Israel is mentioned only once in his works—and as the example of a democratic state. Yanov believes that Russians' traditional way of thinking consists in asking, with regard to any matter that comes up, "who is to blame for it?", and to try to dump the blame on others in "the presumption of national innocence." (His conclusion is not absolutely persuasive—after all, one also frequently notes an inclination toward *repentance* that is typical of Russians and is expressed in the personality types of the "penitent member of the gentry" and "penitent member of the intelligentsia," in the assistance Russians gave to the Polish uprising in 1863, etc.) On the other hand, in his books and articles, the concept of "anti-Semitism" plays an exceptionally large role. Yet the content of this concept is expressed best of all by his term: "presumption of national innocence," by the question, "who is to blame?" for the misadventures of the Jews, and by the answer—everyone else, from the inhabitants of the ancient Elephantine or classical Alexandria, to present-day Russians. And Yanov sees no parallels whatsoever here! Some arguments are such that they only make sense at all if they are addressed to people of the same views who look at all questions from the standpoint of Jewish nationalism. Thus, Yanov introduces as a document that is supposed to show the negative features of Russian nationalism a letter disseminated among the staff of a certain Western radio station. The letter's authors claim that most of the staff of the Russian editorial bureau are Jews who are conducting a policy of Russophobia. (Yanov borrows this information from an article by Belotserkovskiy, the same one who wanted to "knock the ground from under the Russophiles' feet." He reports nothing about the content of that article.) But what can an impartial reader see in the letter that is reprehensible? Yanov himself believes that the chief evil is to introduce moral judgments into politics, and he acknowledges as democrats only those who fight for their rights "in the economic and political spheres." So here are Russians fighting for their rights in a Russian editorial bureau! After all, the recent criticism by the Jewish Antidefamation League that the percentage of Jews employed in the American banking business is insufficiently high did not arouse indignation! Yanov indignantly notes that the author goes so far as to "investigate blood (that is, racial origin)," evidently believing that it is impermissible to speak about that (Although why? In the "open society" whose strength, we are assured, is that *everything* is discussed and nothing is kept quiet?) But at the same time Yanov proves that he himself can do the same thing, only better, when he corrects the author: two of those he has named as Jews are actually not.

Only the supposition of a nationalistic Jewish underpinning can explain the mystery of why Yanov's article about the Slavophiles was published in Tel Aviv! Alas, few people in Moscow are interested in the Slavophiles, so who cares about them in Tel Aviv? But from the

proposed point of view the situation becomes understandable. The author wants to say: "Do not trust the freedom-loving, spiritual visage of the Russian national movement! In the final analysis it will lead to results that are harmful to us. That is what happened before, and that is how things will always be." And indeed, the motif of "anti-Semitism" comes up on the last page of the article.

Finally, if one uses the translation we have noted, whereby "intelligentsia" equals "Lesser People," the ideologists of the "Lesser People" frequently make statements that assume the meaning of proclaiming the special, central role that the Jewish nucleus plays in our present-day "Lesser People." Thus, N. Ya. Mandelshtam (the poet's widow) writes:

"Today's Jews and half bloods are a newly arisen intelligentsia." "All lives in our age are multifaceted, and it occurs to me that every true member of the intelligentsia is a little bit Jewish...."

Evidently this is no chance idea, since we encounter it in other authors. For example, Boris Khazanov (a pseudonym; the author indicates that he lives here) says:

"Such is the situation of the Russian Jewry, as it seems to me. I see no contradiction between my 'blood' and the fact that I speak Russian; between the fact that I am a Jew, and the fact that I am a member of the Russian intelligentsia. To the contrary, I find that combination natural. I am convinced that to be a member of the Russian intelligentsia at the present time inevitably means being a Jew."

The author does not accept emigration as a way out (at least for himself). Nonetheless, he declares:

"...I triumphantly place a cross on the theory of assimilation, the philosophy of assimilationism...I accept as something natural the fact that I am alien here, and therein lies my liberation...I do not recognize myself as a prodigal son for whom the time has come to return to his father's home; my home is with me, no matter where I wander; I have no need to recognize myself as a Jew; I am a Jew, anyway, from head to foot. You say: and your soil? How can you live with an abyss under your feet? But the lot of Russian Jews is to walk on water."

Declaring that he does not intend to emigrate, the author says:

"Patriotism in the Russian understanding of the word is alien to me. The Russia that I love is a Platonic idea that does not exist in nature. The Russia I see about me I find repulsive."²⁰

At the same time, the author undertakes to point out a certain mission, a certain role for Russian Jewry (or at least a certain part of it):

"Filling the vacuum formed by the disappearance (!) of the Russian intelligentsia, Jews themselves have become that intelligentsia. At the same time, they have remained

Jewish. Therefore, it is given to them to experience the situation from within and simultaneously see it from the outside. Russian people lack that advantage, as they have repeatedly demonstrated."

Shragin also emphasizes the national coloring of his understanding of the intelligentsia ("Lesser People"):

"The national makeup of the member of the Russian intelligentsia has little in common with the national makeup of the peasant, worker or bureaucrat." "Hershenson noted back in his time that the member of the Russian intelligentsia was even anthropologically a different type than the man of the people."

And Yanov, in expounding his project for the spiritual occupation and transformation of Russia by the "Western intellectual community" does not forget to add that a "new Baruch or Marshall" will be needed to carry out this grandiose plan.

An idea expressed by Pomerants seems to me to be especially instructive:

"Even Israel I would like to see not as a purely Jewish state, but as a refuge for every 'displaced person,' for every person who has lost his homeland, as the center of a universal international diaspora (which is growing and widening). If after 3,000 years of history the Jewish people has a certain role, it is rather in that than in simply surviving and being like all the rest."

It would be interesting to understand just who these "displaced persons" are. Most likely the image is not used literally; for example, it is not the Arab refugees from Palestine. Rather it implies persons who have lost their native soil on the analogy of "people who have lost their homeland." The image of Israel as a capital or Vatican uniting an international diaspora of "rootless" people who have lost their native soil and homeland accords fully with the concept of the "Lesser People," which in our era exists under the dominant influence of one of the schools of Jewish nationalism.

Obviously, Jewish national feelings are one of the principal forces presently motivating the "Lesser People." So, can it be that what we are dealing with is a purely national school? It seems that this is not the case—the matter is more complex. The mentality of the "Lesser People"—wherein a crystal-clear concept relieves a person of the burden of choice and of personal responsibility before the "Greater People" and gives him a sweet feeling of belonging to the elite—that mentality is not directly connected with any social or national group. However, the "Lesser People" "embodies itself": it utilizes a certain group or stratum that at a given moment has a tendency toward spiritual self-isolation and a tendency to oppose itself to the "Greater People." It may be a religious group (the Puritans in England), a social group (the Third Estate in France), or a national group (a certain school of Jewish nationalism in our country). But just as the nobility in France also played a prominent role in the revolution, so in our country one can

encounter Russians or Ukrainians among the leading public-affairs writers of the "Lesser People." The strength of that mentality actually consists in such openness: otherwise the entire movement would become isolated in a narrow circle and could not exert such influence on the entire people.

Evidently, the Jewish influence plays an exceptionally great role in the life of the "Lesser People" that currently inhabits our country: judging from the extent to which all the literature of the "Lesser People" is suffused with the views of Jewish nationalism, it is natural to think that the central nucleus around which this stratum crystallizes consists precisely of nationalistic Jews. Their role can be compared to the role of a catalyst that accelerates and directs the process of the formation of the "Lesser People." However, the category itself of the "Lesser People" is broader: it would exist even without that influence, although its activeness and its role in the country's life would probably be much smaller.

Conclusion

We see that today's situation has its roots far in the past. Terrifying memories of the more recent past are being imposed onto traditions of 2,000 years of isolation, and they are oppressing the present-day consciousness, which strives to reject them and reorient the feelings that arise on their basis. That is what gives rise to the morbid national complex to which one must evidently attribute the harshest overtones in the present-day literature of the "Lesser People" and the irritated attacks against Russians and Russian history.

But for us—Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians—this cluster of painful questions is of burning relevance to the present day and can in no way be reduced solely to a judgment of our history. It manifests itself most tragically of all in the situation of young people. Unable to find points of view that would help them sort out the problems put forward by life, they hope to find fresh ideas and learn new facts—from foreign radio. Or they try to get hold of a ticket to a fashionable theater with an aura of independence in order to hear words of truth from its stage. In any event, they play tapes of the songs of Galich and Vysotskiy. But from there pours and is imposed on them, as the only view that is at all conceivable, that same ideology of the "Lesser People": an arrogantly ironic, derisive attitude toward everything Russian, even Russian names; the concept that "in this country that's how it has always been, and there can't be anything good," and the image of Russia as a "Land of fools."²¹

And in the face of this refined technique of brain-washing that has been tested in practice and improved through long experience, confused young people find themselves ABSOLUTELY DEFENSELESS. For, after all, no one who might be an authority for them will warn them that what they are dealing with is simply a new version of propaganda, albeit a very toxic one, that is based on an extremely fragile factual basis.

Once again the ominous silhouette of the "Lesser People" is emerging on our horizon. It would seem that our historical experience should have developed an immunity against it, sharpened our vision, and taught us to discern this image—but I fear that it has not taught us. And one can understand why: the connection among generations has been severed; experience has not been transmitted from one generation to the next. And so now we face the threat that our experience will not become known to the next generation.

Knowing the role that the "Lesser People" has played in history, one can imagine the potential danger of its new manifestation: such distinctly proclaimed ideals are being realized: the establishment of the mentality of the "displaced person" and of a life without roots, and "walking on water," that is, THE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL FOUNDATIONS. And at the same time, at the first opportunity, a heedless and decisive manipulation of the people's destiny. And as a result—a new and final disaster, after which there will probably be nothing left of our people. The appeal cited at the very end of the previous section sounds timely: to make a choice between the status of foreigners without political rights and citizenship based on love for the homeland—it is logically addressed to the entire "Lesser People." Every one of those whom we have so often quoted, from Amalrik to Yanov, has the right to despise and hate Russia, but beyond that they want to determine its destiny, are drawing up plans for it, and are prepared to undertake their implementation. Such a combination is typical in the history of the "Lesser People" and is precisely what brings it success. The isolation from the psychology of the "Greater People" and inability to understand its historical experience, things which in ordinary times might be taken as primitive traits and defects, provide, in situations of crisis, the possibility, of severing and cutting up its living body in especially bold fashion.

With what can we counter this threat? It would seem that one could combat ideas with ideas and words with words. However, the matter is not so simple. From just the examples of the literature of the "Lesser People" that have been cited in our article, one can see that this literature is by no means the result of objective thought and does not appeal to real-life experience and logic. What we are encountering here is some sort of different form of conveying ideological concepts, a form, moreover, which has been characteristic of all the historical variants of the "Lesser People."

Such very specific efforts to "direct public opinion" were evidently already being established in the 18th century and were described by Cochin. They include, for example, a colossal but short-term concentration of public attention on certain events or people, and usually on the denunciation of certain aspects of surrounding life—from the Calas trial, when the monstrous injustice of the sentence, exposed by Voltaire, shocked Europe (and concerning which historians assure us that there

was no judicial error at all), to the Dreyfus and Beylis cases. They also include the fabrication and support of authorities who are based exclusively on the power of hypnosis. "They create reputations and force people to applaud the most boring authors and false books, if only they are their own," says Cochin. People can be forced to watch a poor play thanks to a *claque*. "This *claque*, planted by the 'societies,' is so splendidly trained that it seems sincere, and so well distributed throughout the hall that the members of the *claque* do not know one another, and often every member of the audience takes them for the ordinary public." "At present it is hard to imagine that the moralizing of Mably, the political investigations of Condorcet, the history of Raynal and the philosophy of Helvetius—that vacuum of tasteless prose—could sustain publication and find even a dozen readers; yet everyone read them or at least bought them and talked about them. One may say that that was the fashion. Of course! But how does one understand this proclivity for heavy-handedness and pomposity in the age of taste and elegance?" In precisely the same way the influence of Freud as a scientist and the fame of the composer Schoenberg, the artist Picasso and the writer Kafka or poet Brodsky will be beyond the comprehension of our descendants.

Thus, logic, facts and ideas alone are powerless in such a situation, as the whole course of History shows. Only a people's individual historical experience can help distinguish the truth from falsehood. But if such an experience exists at all, it is precisely our people that has it! And therein, of course, lies the main guarantee that we will be able to resist the new manifestation of the "Lesser People." Our experience—tragic but also extremely deep—has unquestionably altered the deep underlying layers of the people's psyche. It is necessary, however, to BECOME CONSCIOUS OF IT—to put it in a form that is accessible not just to the emotions but to thought, and to work out, relying on it, our attitude toward the main problems of the present day. It seems to me that this is precisely the chief task of Russian thought today.

Therefore, we simply have no right to allow the barely inchoate yearning to interpret our national path to be trampled down and reviled, to allow it to be shoved onto the road of strident journalistic polemics. How, then, shall we protect our national awareness and, especially, young people's awareness against the "we-are-doomed" complex that is being forced upon it, against the view that is being impressed on it according to which our people is capable only of being the material for someone else's experiments?

The people's spiritual character is formed and organically interrelated customs of social existence develop over the course of many centuries, and only by relying on them can historical evolution create stable forms of life that are natural for that people. For example, the essayists of the "Lesser People" often emphasize that a strong state played a great role in Russian history, and in that regard they are evidently right. But that means that if, following their advice, the role of the state were to

somehow suddenly be eliminated, leaving totally unrestricted economic and political competition as the only forces operating in society, the result could only be rapid and complete collapse. The very same arguments lead to the obverse conclusion: that the state should evidently play a large role in our country's life for a long time yet to come. Just what sort of role, specifically, only life itself can tell. Of course, certain functions of the state could be limited and transferred to other forces. But in and of itself, the powerful influence of the state is by no means necessarily ruinous—just as it is not necessarily fruitful. The state contributed to the enslavement of the peasants in Russia in the 17th-18th centuries, but it also carried out the emancipation of the peasants in the 19th century. One can cite numerous examples of indisputably positive, important actions that have been taken thanks to the strong influence of the state on life. For example, the labor legislation introduced in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was on a par with contemporary Western legislation, and if one compares it to the phase of the country's industrial development, it was far ahead of it and was drawn up much faster. Only England and Germany had more progressive laws, while in France and the United States the legal status of workers was worse. The state, like other forces operating in the people's life—parties, churches, national movements, etc.—has its danger and the potential for morbid development (or the temptation). For the state, that means the attempt to subject the citizens' *souls* to its power. But it is fully capable of remaining strong while avoiding that morbid path. The picture is the same with regard to almost every question—it is always possible to find a way out that does not represent a break with historical tradition, and only that way will lead to a viable, stable solution, since it rests on the wisdom of traits and customs of the popular organism that have developed over the course of many centuries and been tested, selected, and ground to fit into one another. The concrete awareness of this viewpoint is precisely the force with which we can counter the "Lesser People" and which will protect us against it.

A thousand years of history have forged such national character traits as a belief that the destiny of the individual and the destinies of the people are inseparable in their deepest underlying layers and, at fateful moments of history, are merged; and such traits as a bond with the land—the land in the narrow sense of the word, which grows grain, and the Russian land. These traits have helped it endure terrible trials and to live and work under conditions that have at times been almost inhuman. All hope for our future lies in this ancient tradition. And it is what is being fought for against the "Lesser People," whose creed was divined by Dostoyevskiy: "Whoever curses his past is already ours—that is our formula!"

A person is born and dies, as a rule, amidst his people. Therefore, he perceives his surroundings as something perfectly natural, and they usually raise no questions in him. But in actuality the people is one of the most

striking phenomena and mysteries on our Earth. Why do these communities arise? What sort of forces support them for centuries and millennia? So far all attempts to answer these questions have so clearly missed the mark that we most likely are dealing here with a phenomenon to which present-day science's standard methods of "understanding" are completely inapplicable. It is easier to point out why individual people need peoples. Belonging to his people makes a person a participant in History and privy to the mysteries of the past and future. He can feel himself to be more than a particle of the "living matter" that is for some reason turned out by the gigantic factory of Nature. He is capable of feeling (usually subconsciously) the significance and lofty meaningfulness of humanity's earthly existence and his own role in it. Analogous to the "biological environment," the people is a person's "social environment": a marvelous creation supported and created by our actions, but not by our designs. In many respects it surpasses the capacity of our understanding, but it is also often touchingly defenseless in the face of our thoughtless interference. One can look at History as a two-sided process of interaction between the individual and his "social environment"—the people. We have said what the people gives the individual. For his part, the individual creates the forces that bind the people together and ensure its existence: language, folklore, art, and the recognition of its historical destiny. When this two-sided process breaks down, the same thing happens that happens in nature: the environment turns into a dead wilderness, and along with it the individual dies, too. More specifically, the individual's interest in work and in his country's fortunes disappears, life becomes a meaningless burden, young people seek a way out in irrational outbursts of violence, men turn into alcoholics or drug addicts, women cease to bear children, and the people withers away...

Such is the end to which we are being urged by the "Lesser People," which is working incessantly on the destruction of everything that supports the existence of the "Greater People." Therefore, the creation of weapons for spiritual defense against it are a question of national self-preservation. Only the people as a whole is capable of accomplishing such a task. But there is a more modest task that we can accomplish only as individuals: TO SPEAK THE TRUTH, to pronounce, finally, words that have been kept quiet in fear. I could not die in peace without attempt to do that.

From the Editors

The article is published in abbreviated form. In order to save space, its scholarly apparatus has also been reduced. However, let us inform readers that all the quotations were checked by the author against their original sources.

[No 11, Nov 89 pp 162-172]

[Text] *The magazine has received numerous letters of gratitude for the publication of I. Shafarevich's article "Russophobia" (No 6, 1989). At the same time, readers*

have reproached us for the cuts we made in it. They are right—at a time of glasnost, texts, especially those that have already acquired renown, should be published in full. Fulfilling readers' wishes, we are publishing the chapters previously omitted. We realize that they will draw a mixed reaction. It may be that the absurd charge of anti-Semitism, which was recently heard from a high rostrum, will surface once again. However, in our view the elimination of "blank spots" in internationality relations is the guarantee that an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill.

7. A Painful Question

But even if one accepts the premise that the heightened Russophobic nature of the literature of the "Lesser People" is attributable to the influence of some sort of Jewish nationalist tendencies, the question still remains: why can a certain school of Jewish nationalism be suffused with such irritation, not to say hatred, toward Russia, Russian history, and Russians in general? The answer will be obvious if we pay attention to the problem that practically every work of Russophobic literature touches on in one way or another: WHAT SORT OF INFLUENCE ON THIS COUNTRY'S FATE HAS BEEN EXERTED BY THE UNPRECEDENTED INFLUX OF JEWISH NATIONAL FORCES INTO ITS POLITICAL LIFE IN PRECISELY THE ERA OF THE GREATEST CRISIS IN ITS HISTORY? This question should be very painful for the Jewish nationalist mind. Indeed, there has hardly ever been another case in the history of any country in which people from the Jewish part of its population have had such an enormous influence on its life. Therefore, in any discussion of the role of Jews in any country, Russia's experience should be one of the principal arguments. And especially in our country, where we are doomed for a long time yet to come to try to untangle the knots that were tied in this era. On the other hand, this question is becoming increasingly relevant throughout the entire world, especially in America, where right now the Jewish nationalist "lobby" has attained such inexplicable influence: whereby, in principal issues of policy (for example, relations with the USSR or the petroleum-producing countries) decisions are influenced by the interests of a numerically small group of the population, or whereby congressmen and senators reproach the president for the fact that his actions may weaken the state of Israel—and the president, instead of reminding them that they are supposed to be guided by American, rather than Israeli, interests, apologizes and tries to prove that he will not do any damage to Israel. In that sort of situation a natural desire may arise to take a look at the consequences that a similar influence has produced in another country's fate.

As far as I know, this problem has never yet been raised by the Russian side (here, and not in emigration). But it clearly concerns the other side and constantly surfaces in the literature of the "Lesser People" and in the works of the latest emigres. Although the problem is often cited, it is either formulated in such a way that the absurdity and

inappropriateness of the question itself become perfectly obvious, or discussion of it is immediately shut off with the help of the first argument that turns up. For example, "the revolution was not the work of Jews alone," asserts one anonymous author, brilliantly refuting the view that the "revolution was the work of Jews alone" (which, however, no intelligent person could have expressed). Another author in KONTINENT admits the participation of Jews in the revolution at the level of 14 percent (!)—"and so, let us answer for those 14 percent"! Here is another example: the play "Utomlennoye solntse" [Weary Sun] (which is remarkable, in general, for its seething hatred for Russians), which was published in a Russian-language magazine that comes out in Tel Aviv. The author is Nina Voronel, a recent emigrant from the USSR (could it be that the play was actually written here?). In the play the coward and scoundrel Astrov argues with the pure, principled Venya. Astrov screams: "...you bear no responsibility, but you arrange a revolution for us, abolish our god, destroy churches." "And what are you worth, if someone else can arrange a revolution for you!" parries Venya. Many authors reject the idea of a strong Jewish influence on Russian history as offensive to the Russian people, although that is the only point on which they are prepared to show such tactfulness toward Russians. In a recent work Pomerants keeps circling around this "cursed question." First he asks whether the Jews who took part in the revolutionary movement were really Jews, and he admits that the question is unresolved: "And just who was Vrangeli? (that is, was he a German?), or Trotskiy? That depends on your political views, reader." Then he discovers a universal law of Russian life—that non-Russians have always played the leading role in it. "Even in the novels of Russian writers, what sort of surnames do the businesslike, energetic people have? Konstanzhoglo, Insarov, Stolz... Right here a place for Levinson was prepared in advance." He even poses the following "mental experiment": if the member of the oprichina Fedka Basmanov were transferred to our age and appointed people's commissar of railroads, under him, the author claims, the trains would unfailingly derail, while "under the scoundrel Kaganovich the trains ran on schedule (as they had earlier under Kleynmikhel)." Although the author should recall the primordial chaos that reigned on the railroads when they were under the management of the "iron people's commissar"! And finally he hints that if there was something that was, well, not quite humane, there, it is the Russians who are to blame, since that's the sort of country they have: "A Blyumkin who draws up a list of people for the firing squad while drunk is unthinkable in Israel: there is neither drunkenness nor firing squads" (with the exception, perhaps, of the firing squads that execute Arab peasants, as in the village of [Deyr-Yasin]?—I. Sh.). This last argument can be detected as a subtext in all the Russophobic literature: if there was something, it is the Russians themselves who are to blame for it all; cruelty is in their blood; that's what their whole history is like. This is precisely the leitmotif that gives such a vivid anti-Russian tinge to the ideology of our present-day "Lesser People," and that is

precisely why the need arises to prove the cruelty and barbarism of Russians again and again.

However, there is nothing specifically Jewish about that sort of reaction: in the past of every individual and every people there are episodes that they do not care to recall, and it is much easier for them to tell themselves that there is nothing to recall. What is a greater cause for human amazement is that there actually have been honest and courageous attempts to sort out what took place. One such attempt was the collection "Russia and the Jews," which was published in Berlin in 1923. There have been other such attempts, as well. They give us hope that relations between people can be determined not by selfishness and mutual hatred, but by repentance and goodwill. They lead to the important question: do we need to reflect on the role of the Jews in our history, and don't we have enough of our own sins, mistakes and problems? This is unquestionably the higher point of view, and there is no getting away from our own historical mistakes, no matter how hard it may be, especially in the face of malicious and unscrupulous attacks such as those that we have cited in abundance. But it is perfectly obvious that humanity is far from sufficiently mature yet to limit itself to that path alone. If we are confronting a painful problem on the understanding of which the fate of our people may depend, the sense of national self-preservation does not permit us to turn away from it and forbid thinking about it in the hope that others will solve it for us. Especially since that hope is very fragile. After all, even the attempts to analyze relations between the Jews and other peoples that we have mentioned failed to draw any wide response. The authors of the collection "Russia and the Jews" very vividly describe the hostile attitude that they encountered in the Jewish emigrant milieu; people wrote that they were the "dregs of Jewish society." And the same sort of thing is true now; for example, A. Sukonik, who published a short story in KONTINENT in which an unlikable Jew was depicted was immediately accused of "anti-Semitism."

It would be possible simply to disdain all this, if it were a question of the fate of each of us individually, yet we are also answerable to our people, so no matter how painful this problem may be, it is impossible to evade it.

And it is not easy to discuss it. Life in a country where so many nationalities clash and national feelings have been strained to the limit develops, often even unconsciously, the habit of cautiously circumventing nationality problems and not making them the subject of discussion. In order to express one's views on this matter, one must overcome a certain inner resistance. However, the choice has already been made—by the authors whose views and statements we have cited. Indeed, it is impossible to suppose that one people and the distinctive features of its history, national character and religious views would be discussed (often, as we have seen, in an extremely nasty and unceremonious matter), while the discussion of others would be impermissible.

But here our path is blocked, as though by a huge boulder, by the deeply rooted and instilled prohibition that makes any attempt to analyze this question almost hopeless. It consists in the fact that any idea that at some time or place the actions of any Jews caused harm to other peoples, or even any sort of objective research that does not rule out from the very outset the possibility of such a conclusion, is declared reactionary, unfitting to a member of the intelligentsia, and indecent.

Relations between any nations—the Germans and the French, the English and the Irish, or the Persians and the Kurds—may be freely discussed, and one may objectively point out cases in which one side suffered at the other's hands. One may speak about the selfish position of the gentry, about the bourgeoisie's pursuit of profits, or about the deeply rooted conservatism of the peasantry. But with regard to the Jews, any such discussions from that standpoint, regardless of whether they are warranted, are forbidden in principle. Such a prohibition, never clearly stated and never written, is strictly observed by all of present-day civilized humanity, and this is all the more striking the more free and "open" a society claims to be, and most striking of all in the United States.

A vivid example of the naked application of this principle occurs in a recent article by Pomerants. In one article he discovers the sentence: "The apparatus of the Cheka [Extraordinary Commission] abounded with Latvians, Poles, Jews, Magyars and Chinese," and in this regard he writes:

"He lists, with no partiality, Latvians, Poles, Jews, Magyars and Chinese. The *dangerous* word is stuck in in such away that it could not be pulled out for quotation."

The emphasis on the word "dangerous" is mine. One would very much like to understand how Pomerants explains why it is precisely that word, "stuck in the middle," that is dangerous, and not, for example, the word that stands at the end, although there are 50 times more Chinese in the world than Jews. And it would not be dangerous at all for him to call Russians "ne'er-do-wells" and "lackeys." It is very typical that Pomerants by no means disputes the fact itself; he is even ironic about the author's cautiousness:

"However, is it possible that Jews really played such a tertiary role in the Russian revolution? Less than Poles and greater than Magyars? Contemporaries took a different view of these things...."

He is simply warning that the author is approaching the boundary that it is impermissible to cross.

And in that regard Pomerants is right—the "word" really is dangerous! The charge of "anti-Semitism" comes down on anyone who dares violate the aforementioned

ban. The candid Yanov makes this threat in an especially overt fashion. Mentioning the "nationalists," he says:

"...they will object to me that anti-Semitism is the atomic bomb in their opponents' arsenal. But if that is the case, they why not deprive their opponents of their chief weapon by publicly renouncing...." and so forth.

This "chief weapon" of the "opponents of nationalism," whom Yanov does not identify more precisely, really is a "weapon of deterrence" comparable to the atomic bomb. It is not for nothing that in our time the dangerous topic is skirted by the most principled thinkers and that the bravest people fall silent here.

And just what does that "atomic bomb" represent? Everyone knows that anti-Semitism is dirty and uncouth, and that it is the shame of the 20th century (as, by the way, of all other centuries). It has been attributed to the savagery and undeveloped nature of capitalist relations—or, conversely, to the decay of capitalism, or, beyond that, to the envy of less talented nations for a more talented one. Bebel considered it a special variety of socialism: the "socialism of fools," while Stalin called it the "vestiges of cannibalism." Freud attributed it to the antipathy aroused by the circumcised in the uncircumcised (who subconsciously associate circumcision with the unpleasant idea of castration). Others have considered it a vestige of the Marcionite heresy, which was condemned by the church in the second century, or as blasphemy against the Virgin Mary. But no one has ever explained what one should seemingly begin with: what is anti-Semitism, and what does the word imply? In essence, what is involved here is that same ban: do not allow even the hypothesis that the actions of certain Jewish groups, tendencies or individuals could have negative consequences for others. But one cannot, of course, formulate it so openly. Therefore, it is also vain to try to get an answer; none will be given, for herein lies the explosive power of the atomic bomb: in the fact that the question is removed from the sphere of reason to the realm of emotions and suggestion. We are dealing with a symbol, a sign whose function is to mobilize irrational emotions and arouse, on signal, a tide of aggravation, indignation and hatred. Such symbols or stereotypes that are the signals for a spontaneous reaction are a well-known element of the control of mass consciousness.

And usually the stereotype of "anti-Semitism" is used precisely as a means of influencing emotions while deliberately ignoring logic and attempting to escape any contact with it. Vivid examples can be encountered in an author who, in general, is greatly concerned with this topic: A. Sinyavskiy. In the article that we have already cited in Issue No 1 of KONTINENT he writes:

Here it is appropriate to say a few words in defense of anti-Semitism in Russia. That is: what is well concealed in a psychological sense in the Russian unfriendliness, to put it mildly, toward Jews."

And he explains that no matter how many disasters a Russian has caused, he is simply incapable of comprehending that all of this has resulted from his own actions, so he heaps blame on some sort of "wreckers"—in particular, the Jews. But further on, rising to an emotional pitch, the author exclaims regarding Jewish emigration (to which, of course, the Russians have brought the Jews): "Mother Russia, Bitch Russia, you will answer, too, for this latest child, reared by you and then cast onto the rubbish heap (?)."

You see, the author even takes Russians under his protection and tries, to the extent it is possible, to excuse their anti-Semitism and even find something "good" in it, for after all, they know not what they do, or in more modern terminology, are insane (although Bitch Russia will still answer for that and for some other things, too). And from such a defender the reader takes on faith, without the least bit of proof, the assertion that the Russians' "unfriendliness" toward the Jews as a nation really does exist, and does not reflect on whether Jews are always "friendly" toward Russians.

On what other issue would someone get by with such a trick? Yet here those ideas are deemed so important that they are conveyed to the American reader in an English translation.

A later article by the same author cites several statements by "the writer N. N.," such as the statement that anti-Jewish pogroms even existed at the time of Monomakh, or that Jews presently constitute 80 percent of the Moscow Organization of the Writers' Union. Making no attempt to assess the accuracy of such a figure, or what influence such a state of affairs might have on the development of Russian literature, the author asserts that N. N. calls to "gird ourselves with Monomakh and begin the pogroms," and he even claims that "we are dealing ... with Orthodox fascism." It is obvious that the goal is to divert the reader from a ground of facts and reflections that is uncomfortable for the author. Instead, an attempt is made to instill the image of Russians as practically insane half-educated people, and any unpleasant statements are painted as calls for a pogrom. In the Russophobic literature we have encountered such confident accusations that Russians lack respect for other people's opinions! The authors have so frequently proclaimed "pluralism" and "tolerance" that we seemingly might count on finding such traits in them themselves. However, when they encounter questions that are painful for them, they not only show no tolerance and respect for the other person's opinion, they come right out and call their opponents fascists and practically murderers. Yet it is only in difficult and painful situations that "pluralism" and "tolerance" are really put to the test. If one attempts to use this model to understand what the authors mean by freedom of thought and speech, it may seem that they understand it as freedom for *their own* thought, and freedom of speech only to express it!

In a more rational and carefully argued fashion, the same prohibition is expressed in the following form: any judgment about an entire people is unwarranted; it

denies the autonomy of the human individual, and some people become responsible for the actions of others. But if we accept that viewpoint, we should reject any application of general categories at all—estate, class, nation, state—in history. However, for some reason such objections are not aroused by such ideas as that “Russia has brought more evil into the world than any other country,” or by the demands that have recently been heard in the United States (by Jewish authors) that more treatment be given to Jews’ contribution (positive, of course) to American culture (which is also, after all, a judgment concerning an entire nation!).

But the main thing is that there is no negation of individuality here at all. For example, we have cited arguments above to support the contention that the Russophobic literature we have been examining is under the strong influence of Jewish nationalistic feelings. Yet not all Jews contribute to that literature! There are also those who object to it (some of whom we have named above). So full freedom for the manifestation of one’s individuality remains here, and no one is being saddled with responsibility for actions he has not committed.

Since we have spoken the word “responsibility,” let us allow ourselves one more explanation. In this work we reject, in general, all “value judgments” derived from asking the question “who is to blame?” (and to what extent). In what follows we shall attempt only to understand: just what has happened? How has the role that certain strata of Jewry played in the course of the “revolutionary age”—from the mid-19th to mid-20th centuries—been reflected in our country’s history?

8. The Jewish Influence in the ‘Revolutionary Age’

At the end of the 19th century the stable, isolated life of the religious communities to which practically all the Jews living in Russia belonged started to rapidly fall apart. Young people were quitting the religious schools and patriarchal home and entering into Russian life—the economy, culture and politics—and exerting an increasing influence on it. By the beginning of the 20th century this influence had reached such a scale that it had become a significant factor in Russian history. If it was great even in the economy, it was especially striking in all the currents that were hostile to the way of life of that time. In the liberal-denunciatory press, in the leftist parties and terrorist groups, Jews occupied a position in terms of both their numbers and their leadership role that was absolutely disproportionate to their numerical share of the population.

“...an undeniable fact that must be explained but that is senseless and pointless to deny,” objective Jewish observers have written about this (in the collection “Russian and the Jews” that is cited above).

Naturally, the whole process became especially intensified when the revolution broke out. In the same collection we read:

“Now the Jew is in every corner and on every rung of power. A Russian sees him at the head of the original capital Moscow, at the head of the capital on the Neva, and at the head of the army, the most highly perfected mechanism of self-destruction. He sees that St. Vladimir Prospect bears the glorious name of Nakhimson, and that the historic Liteynyy Prospect has been renamed as Volodarskiy Prospect, and Pavlovsk renamed as Slutsk. The Russian now sees the Jew as judge and hangman....”

Nonetheless, the idea that the “revolution was the work of Jews alone” is nonsense, which was probably invented in order to make it easier to refute. Moreover, I see no arguments for the notion that Jews, in general, “made” the Russian revolution, that is initiated it, even in the form of a leading minority.

If one begins the history of the revolution with Bakunin, Herzen and Chernyshevskiy, there were no Jews at all among the people who surrounded them, and Bakunin regarded Jews, in general, with antipathy. When the first revolutionary proclamations (“To young Russia,” etc.) came out in the period of “going to the people,” and when a turn toward terror occurred after its failure, Jews were the rare exception in the revolutionary movement. At the very end of the 1870s there were several Jews (Goldenberg, Deych, Zundeleovich, Gesya and Gelfman) in the leadership of People’s Will, which resulted in an explosion of popular indignation directed against the Jews after the assassination of Aleksandr II. But just how weak the Jews’ influence was in the organization’s leadership is shown by the fact that the People’s Will broadside ENDORSED those disorders, attributing them to the people’s indignation against Jewish exploiters. By the end of the 1880s the situation had changed somewhat. According to a collection of statistics put together by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Jews constituted a little more than one-third—51 of 145—political emigres known to the ministry. It was only after the establishment of the Socialist Revolutionary Party that the Jews formed a solid majority of the leadership of that movement. Here, for example, is a brief history of the Militant Organization of Socialist Revolutionaries: it was founded and led from 1901 to 1903 by Gershuni, led from 1903 to 1906 by Azev,²¹ and led from 1906 to 1907 by Zilberberg. After that Nikitenko became the leader, but after two months he was arrested, and in 1908 it was disbanded (when Azev’s role came out). Azev’s reports, which were subsequently published, provide extensive material in this regard. In one of them he lists the members of the foreign committee: Gots, Chernov, Shishko, the married couple Levit, Gots’s wife, the Minors, Gurevich and Chernov’s wife; and in another he lists a “narrow circle of party leaders”: Mendel, Vittenberg, Levin, Levit and Azev. We see an analogous evolution in the Social Democrats, as well. The idea that not the peasants but the workers could become the main revolutionary force was expressed with regard to Russia not by Jews but by Yakubovich and, especially, Plekhanov, who started transplanting Marxism on Russian soil. In the Social Democratic Party there were at first many

more Jews among the Mensheviks than among the Bolsheviks (in his note on the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, Stalin wrote that the vast majority of the Menshevik faction consisted of Jews, while the vast majority of the Bolshevik faction consisted of Russians, and he cited a well-known "joke" to the effect that it would not be a bad idea to arrange a little anti-Jewish pogrom among the Russian Social Democrats; not until right before the October coup [perevorot] itself and, especially, in its aftermath, did Jewish forces begin an influx into the Bolsheviks—from the Mensheviks, from the Bund (many of the Bund's leaders went over to the Bolshevik party), and from people unaffiliated with any party. For several days after the coup the head of state was Kamenev, and after that Sverdlov was head of state until his death. Trotsky was head of the Army, Zinoviev the leader of Petrograd, and Kamenev the leader of Moscow. The Comintern was lead by Zinoviev, and the Profintern by A. Lozovskiy (Solomon Drizo), while the Komsomol was led by Oskar Ryvkin and, at first—for several months—by Efim Tsetlin, and so forth.

One can imagine the situation in the 1930s, for example, by looking at lists cited in Dikiy's book. Whereas the number of Jewish names in the very top leadership was declining, in subordinate offices the number subsequently increased and grew deeper. In the important People's Commissariats (the OGPU [Unified State Political Directorate] and the people's commissariats of foreign affairs and heavy industry) and among the top executives (the people's commissars and their deputies, members of their collegiums), Jews held the dominant position and constituted what we know was more than half. In certain fields, the leadership consisted almost exclusively of Jews.

But all these are only quantitative assessments. What was the *nature of the influence* that such a radical role on the part of the Jewry exerted on that era? One is struck by the especially large concentration of Jewish names at the most painful moments among the directors and administrators of actions that particularly drastically reshaped life and contributed to the breakdown of historical traditions and destruction of historical roots.

For example, from most memoirs of the Civil War times a strange picture emerges: when members of the Cheka are mentioned, Jewish surnames come up with striking frequency, whether the reference is to Kiev, Kharkov, Petrograd, Vyatka or Turkestan. And that is at a time when Jews constituted only one to two percent of the population of Soviet Russia! Thus, Shulgin gives a list of employees of the Kiev Cheka: it contains almost exclusively Jewish surnames. And he tells about the following example of its activity: in Kiev before the Revolution there was a "Union of Russian Nationalists"—its members were shot on the basis of lists.

This feature emerges especially vividly in connection with the execution of Nicholas II and his family. After all, this was not a matter of a claimant to the throne eliminating his predecessor—like the murder of Peter III or Paul I.

Nicholas was shot precisely *as a tsar*, and through this ritual act an era of Russian history was brought to an end, so it can only be compared with the execution of Charles I in England or of Louis XVI in France. It would seem that the representatives of an insignificant ethnic minority ought to have kept as far as possible away from such an extreme act, which left its trace on all history. But what sort of names do we encounter? Yakov Yurovskiy personally directed the execution and shot at the tsar himself, the chairman of the local soviet was Beloborodov (Vaysbart), and general direction at Ekaterinburg was exercised by Shaya Goloshchekin. Added to the picture is the fact that on the wall of the room in which the execution was carried out, a couplet was found written (in German) from a poem of Heine about the King Balthazar, who offended Jehovah and was killed for doing so.²³ Or take another era: the makeup of the top executives of the OGPU during the period of the dispossession of the kulaks and the construction of the White Sea Canal, at a critical turning point in our history—when the fate of the peasantry was being decided (it is cited in a book by a British scholar, who by no means wants to emphasize the nationality aspect): the chairman was Yagoda (Iguda), his deputies were Agranov and Trilisser, and later Frinovskiy; the chief of the operations department was Valovich, and later Pauker; and the director of the GULAG was Matvey Berman and, after that, Frenkel; the director of the political department was Lyashkov; the economic department was directed by Mirnov; the special department by Gay, and the foreign department by Slutskiy, whose deputies were Boris Berman and Shpilgelgass; the transportation department was directed by Shanin. And when Yagoda was replaced by Yezhov, his deputies were Berman and Frinkovskiy. Or, finally, the destruction of the Orthodox Church: in the 1920s the process was directed by Trotsky (whose closest assistant was Shpitsberg), and in the 1930s by Yemelyan Yaroslavskiy (Miney Izrailevich Gubelman). The period in which the campaign assumed a truly grandiose scale is treated in a samizdat letter from the late Ukrainian academician Beletskiy. He cites, for example, a list of the principal authors of atheist literature: Yemelyan Yaroslavskiy (Gubelman), Rumyantsev (Shnayder), Kandidov (Fridman), Zakharov (Edelshteyn), Ranovich, Shakhnovich, Skvortsov-Stepanov and, at a later time, Lentsman and Menkman.

But the most fateful feature of this entire age that can be ascribed to the ever-increasing Jewish influence consisted in the fact that often liberal, Westernizing or internationalist terminology was used to cover up antinationality tendencies. (Of course, many Russians, Ukrainians and Georgians found themselves drawn into this.) Herein lies a fundamental difference from the French Revolution, in which Jews did not play any sort of role. There "patriot" was a term that signified revolutionary, while in our country it signified counterrevolutionary, and it could be encountered in a death sentence: executed by firing squad as a conspirator, monarchist and patriot. This trait did not appear right away in Russia, either. There were certain national elements in Bakunin's thinking, and he dreamed of an anarchic

federation of free Slavic peoples. The bait that lured most young people into the revolution was love and compassion for the people, which at that time meant for the peasantry. But the reverse tendency also began early. Thus, I. Tikhomirov says about V. A. Zaytsev (we have already cited him in the fourth section, for example, to the effect that "slavery is in Russians' blood"): "A Jew and revolutionary member of the intelligentsia, he hated Russia with some sort of frenzied malice and would literally curse her, so it was repulsive to read him. He wrote, for example: 'Rot, damn you.' Concerning Plekhanov, Tikhomirov writes that he 'bore in his breast an ineradicable Russian patriotism.' And then, after returning from the February Revolution to Russia, he discovered that his great influence had evaporated. Plekhanov simply could not have brought himself to exclaim, as Trotskiy did: 'Patriotism be damned!' This 'antipatriotic' attitude dominated in the 1920s and 1930s, a time in which Zinovyev called to 'cut the head off our Russian chauvinism' and 'to take a hot iron and sear every place there is the slightest hint of great-power chauvinism'; Yakovlev (Epshteyn) complained that 'a base great-power Russian chauvinism is suffusing the apparatus.'

Just what was understood by the term "great-power chauvinism," and what did combating it mean? Bukharin explained: "...as a great-power nation we should ... place ourselves in an unequal position in the sense of even greater concessions to national tendencies." He demanded that Russians be put "in a lower position compared to the others...." And Stalin declared time after time, starting with the 10th Congress and ending with the 16th, that "great-power chauvinism" was the chief danger in the realm of nationalities policy. At that time the term "RUSOPYAT" [a pejorative colloquial term for a jingoistic Russian] was perfectly official and could be found in many speeches by leaders of that time. An "antipatriotic" attitude suffused literature, as well. Bezymenskiy dreamed: Bezymenskiy dreamed:

Oh, will the little Rasshian soon be brushed
Out of the way with a harsh hand?

There are endless variations on this theme:

Rus! Rotten? Dead? Croaked?
Oh well, may you rest in peace.

Or:

I propose melting down Minin, Pozharskiy.
Why give them a pedestal?
We've glorified
The two shopkeepers enough—
October caught them
Behind their counters.
They were lucky
We didn't wring their necks.
I know it would have fit just right,
Just think,

They saved Rasshia!
But maybe it would have been better not to save
it?

Any treatment of Russian history included, as a mandatory element, the pouring of slops on everyone who had played any sort of role in Russia's fortunes—even at the price of contradicting the scholar's own convictions: for whether Peter the Great was a syphilitic or a homosexual had no influence on the "commercial capital" "whose interests he expressed." Through literature and the schools, this attitude has also penetrated into the souls of present generations—and so here, for example, L. Plyushch calls Kutuzov a "reactionary figure"!

It is appropriate here to consider the objection that is often made: The Jews who took part in this school belonged to the Jewry only by blood, but in spirit they were internationalists; the fact that they were Jews had no influence on their activities. Yet these authors declare Stalin, for example, a "continuer of the policies of the Russian tsars," although in his speeches he was constantly denouncing "great-power chauvinism." If they do not take Stalin at his word, why do they believe Trotskiy and consider him a pure internationalist? This is precisely the viewpoint that Pomerants, for example, has in mind when he writes that if one considers Trotskiy a Jew, Vrangl must be considered a German. What were they, in reality? "I think this question is unresolved," Pomerants says. At the same time, at least with respect to Trotskiy, the situation does not seem so hopeless. For example, in one of his biographies we read:

"From every indication, the rationalistic approach to the Jewish question that the Marxism he professed demanded of him in no way expressed his genuine feelings. It even seems that he was in his own way 'obsessed' with that question; he wrote about it almost more than did any other revolutionary."

The comparison with Vrangl is, in fact, instructive: Trotskiy's deputy was Efraim Sklyanskiy, and Vrangl's was Gen Shatilov, who was by no means a German. And there are no known indications of any special sympathy toward Vrangl or attempt to rehabilitate him on the part of German public-affairs writers, while matters with Trotskiy are different: for example, that same Pomerants compares Trotskiy's labor armies with the present-day practice of sending students to harvest potatoes! And this is when Trotskiy himself used an entirely different comparison—with *serfdom*, which he declared perfectly progressive for its time. Or V. Grossman in his novel "Vse techet" [Forever Flowing], debunking both Stalin and Lenin, writes about the "brilliant," "tempestuous, magnificent," "practically genius Trotskiy."²⁴

Not only is this example of Pomerants's unsuccessful, many examples can be cited of how both liberal and revolutionary figures of Jewish origin were under the influence of powerful nationalistic feelings. (Of course, it does not follow that this was true of all of them.) For example, Vinaver, one of the most influential leaders of

the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party, turned into an extremely active Zionist after the revolution. Or take the moment at which the Socialist Revolutionary Party was established. One of the leading figures of that time (and later a leader of the French Communist Party, Charles Rappoport, writes in his memoirs:

"Khaim Zhitlovskiy, who together with me founded, in Berne, the Union of Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, from which the future Socialist Revolutionary Party subsequently grew.²⁵ ... This flaming and sincere patriot tried to persuade me in a friendly way: "Be whatever you like—a socialist, communist, anarchist, and so forth—but first and foremost be a Jew and work among Jews; the Jewish intelligentsia must belong to the Jewish people."

Rappoport's own views were the following: "The Jewish people is the bearer of all the great ideas of unity and human community in history. ... The disappearance of the Jewish people would signify the death of humankind, the final transformation of man into a wild beast."

It is very hard to imagine that the activities of such politicians (whether as Constitutional Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, or French Communists) did not reflect their national feelings. The traces of this actually can be seen, for example, in the history of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Thus, the two most famous terrorist acts, which required the greatest concentration of effort by the Militant Organization, were directed against Pleve and Grand Prince Sergey Aleksandrovich, whom rumor accused of anti-Semitism. (Pleve was considered responsible for the Kishinev pogrom; there was even a legend to the effect that he wanted to settle the Jews in ghettos; Grand Prince Sergey Aleksandrovich, as Moscow Governor-General, restored certain restrictions on Jews' residence in Moscow Gubernia that had previously been rescinded.) Zubanov recalled that in a conversation with him, Azev, "trembling with anger and hatred, spoke about Pleve, who he considered responsible for the Kishinev pogrom."²⁶

The same thing is indicated by Ratayev. One of the Socialist Democratic Party's leaders, Sletov, tells in his memoirs how the party's leaders in Geneva reacted to the news of Pleve's assassination:

"For several minutes everyone spoke at once. Some men and women went into hysterics. Most of those who were present embraced one another. There were cries of joy all around. I can see N., who was standing a little to one side, as though it were now: he smashed a glass of water on the floor, gritted his teeth, and shouted: "That's for Kishinev!"

Here is another example: The soviet historian M. N. Pokrovskiy relates:

"... I knew that back in 1907 the Constitutional Democratic Party newspaper NOV in Moscow had been subsidized by a kind of syndicate of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which was concerned more than anything else with the

nationality aspect of the matter and, finding that the newspaper did not adequately defend the interests of the Jews, came to see our Bolshevik public-affairs writer M. G. Lunts and proposed that he become editor of the newspaper. He was extremely surprised, saying: What do you mean? Why, that's a Constitutional Democratic newspaper, and I'm a Bolshevik. They told him: That doesn't matter. We think that your attitude toward the nationality question is better defined."

The thought that a political revolution could be an instrument for attaining national goals is not alien to the Jewish mind. Thus, Vitte tells that when he was conducting talks in 1905 in America concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, he was visited by a "delegation of Jewish bigwigs" that included [Jacob Schiff], the "head of the Jewish financial world in America." They were concerned about the situation of the Jews in Russia. Vitte's words to the effect that "granting them equality all at once would cause more harm than good" "evoked a sharp objection from [Schiff]." Shulgin cites, with a reference to the original source, the version of one of the Jewish participants in that meeting as to what [Schiff's] "objection" was. In his words, [Schiff] said: "...in that case the revolution will create a republic, with the help of which their rights will be obtained."

As a continuation of this story one can cite another, which occurred in 1911-1912. In those years a stormy protest campaign was being waged in America against the fact that, according to Russian laws of that time, the entry of American Jews into Russia was limited. Demands were made that the 1832 Russian-American trade treaty be abrogated. (The treaty actually was abrogated, just as in our time a trade treaty was not signed because the *exit* of Jews from the USSR to the United States was restricted.) Speaking at a rally, the [Food Secretary Herman Loeb] (the aforementioned [Schiff] was chief director of the bank of [Kuhn, Loeb,] and Co.) said that abrogation of the treaty was good, but it would be even better to ship contraband weapons to Russia and send hundreds of instructors:

"Let them teach our boys; let them teach them to kill the oppressors like dogs. Cowardly Russia was forced to give in to the little Japanese. It will also give in to God's Chosen People. ... Money will help us achieve this."

One could cite many more such examples; they are inadequate, of course, to understand just how national feelings influenced Jewish activists, but they show that in many cases such influence indisputably existed.

9. The Past and the Present

Why did it happen that it was precisely people from the Jewish milieu who proved to be the nucleus of the "Lesser People" to which it fell to play such a fateful role in the crisis era of our history? We shall not try to uncover the underlying meaning of that phenomenon. Most likely, the foundations are religious, related to belief in the "Chosen People" and its predestined power

over the world. What other people has been reared from generation to generation on such precepts?

"...The Lord your God will lead you into that land which he swore to your fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob that he would give you, with large and good cities that you did not build.

"And with houses filled with all manner of goods with which you did not fill them, and with wells dug from stone that you did not dig, and with vineyards and olive trees that you did not plant" (Deuteronomy, VI, 6-11).

"Then the sons of foreigners shall build your walls, and their kings will serve you; for in my wrath I struck you down, but in my goodwill I will be merciful to you.

"And your gates will always be open, and will not be shut either day or night, so that the property of the peoples can be brought to you, and their kings brought to you..

"For the people and the kingdom that will not serve you will perish; and those peoples will be utterly destroyed" (Isaiah, 60, 10-12).

"And foreigners will come and will watch your flocks; and the sons of foreigners will be your farmers the keepers of your vineyards" (Isaiah, 61, 5).

"And kings will be your nursing fathers, and queens your nursing mothers; they will bow down to you with their face to the earth and will lick the dust of your feet" (Isaiah, 49, 23).

Among whom can one encounter such feelings?

"Of the other peoples who have descended from Adam, You said that they are nothing, but like spittle, and you likened the whole multiplicity of them to drops dripping from a vessel" (Third Book of Yezdra, 6, 56).

"If this age has been created for us, why do not receive our legacy with the age? And how long will it take?" (Third Book of Yezdra, 6, 59).²⁷

It is precisely this world view of the "Chosen People" that served as the prototype of the ideology of the "Lesser People" in all its historical incarnations (which is especially clearly evident in the case of the Puritans, who even used the same terminology; among the most recent authors, Pomerants uses it).

However, I will point out here only the most obvious reason—nearly 2,000 years of isolation and a suspicious, hostile attitude toward the surrounding world. Of course, the question of the causes and meaning of that isolation arises. For example, such a careful and objective researcher as Max Weber believes that the Jews' isolation was not forced but voluntarily chosen, long before the destruction of the Temple. The Soviet historian S. Lurye agrees with him on this point in his work "Antisemitizm v drevnem mire" [Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World]. He believes that in the age preceding the destruction of the Temple most Jews already lived in the

diaspora, and Judea played the role of a religious and national center (obviously, somewhat similar to present-day Israel).

But in order to avoid getting any deeper into this chain of enigmas, we shall take its final link—dispersion and isolation—as a given. Twenty centuries have been lived among alien peoples in complete isolation from all influences of the external world, which is perceived as "tref" and a source of infection and sin. There are well-known statements in the Talmud and in commentaries on it that explain from various viewpoints that a gentile (akum) must not be regarded as a human being, and that for this reason there should be no fear of defiling their graves; that in the event that a gentile servant dies, one should not offer consolation to his master but express the hope that God will replace his loss, as in the case of the death of livestock; that for the same reason, marriage with a gentile has no force; that his seed is the same as the seed of livestock, and that gentiles are animals with human faces, etc., etc. For thousands of years, each year on the holiday of Purim Jews have celebrated their destruction of 75,000 of their enemies, including women and children, as written in the book of Esther. And it is celebrated to this day—in Israel a merry carnival is held on this occasion! For comparison, let us imagine that St. Bartholomew's night were celebrated annually! Let me cite, finally, a source that can in no way be suspected of hostility toward the Jews: In his book about Reuchlin, Max Brod, the well-known Zionist, friend of Franz Kafka and executor of his estate, reports a Jewish prayer he knows against gentiles that calls on God to destroy their hopes, scatter them, cast them down, and *destroy them in a moment* and "in our days." One can imagine what an indelible trace must be left on the soul by such upbringing, begun in childhood, and by a life lived according to such canons—and by this sort of thing from generation to generation for 20 centuries!

One can attempt to recreate from tiny features scattered among many sources the sort of attitude toward the surrounding population that can grow up on this soil. For example, in his diary the young Lassalle, who repeatedly expresses indignation over the oppressed state of the Jews, says that he dreams of taking over their leadership with weapon in hand. In connection with the rumors about ritual killings, he writes:

"The fact that such accusations are brought forward in every corner of the world, I think, portends that the time will soon come when we really do liberate ourselves through the shedding of Christian blood. The game has begun, and it is up to the players."

If one further takes into account the malice and rancor that are evident on every page of this diary, it is easy to imagine that such experiences must have left a trace to last a lifetime.

Or Martov (Tsederbaum), recalling the fear he experienced at the age of three while expecting a pogrom (the

mob was broken up by the Cossacks before it reached the Tsederbaums' house), reflects: "Would I be what I have become if Russian reality had not hastened to impress its coarse fingers on my malleable young soul, and under the veil of the pity that had been aroused in my child's heart, to carefully sow the seeds of a saving hatred?"

One can find more overt evidence in literature. For example, "saving hatred" is widely diffused throughout the verse of Kh. Byalik, a Jewish poet living in Russia:

Let the unavenged blood seep into hell,
And let it dig in the darkness and corrode like
poison,
Eating away the pillars of the universe.
"Let our grief become
like a bone to a vicious dog,
Stuck, insatiable, in the throat of the world;
And let it water the skies, and the whole surface of
the earth,
And the steppe, and the forest with burning
venom,
And let it live with us, and bloom,
and wither,—
And blossom even more powerful";
"That is why, o man, I have shut
Your moaning up in your throat;
Do not defile, as they do, the sacred pain of your
Sacred suffering with the water of sobbing,
But husband it untouched.
Nurse it, hold it more dearly than a treasure
And build a castle to it in your breast,
Build a fortress out of the hatred of hell—
And feed it not but with the venom
Of your insults and wounds, and wait,
And the nurtured seed will grow,
And will yield a fruit burning and full of venom—
And on the terrible day,
when the time is accomplished,
Pluck it and throw it into the people!"
"From the abyss of Avadonn, raise the song
of Devastation,
Which, like your spirit, is black from the fire,
And scatter among the peoples,
and poison everything in their cursed home
With the suffocation of smoke;
And let everyone sow the grain fields with the
seed of collapse
Everywhere he treads and goes.
If only the purest of the lilies touches their garden,
It will blacken and wither;
And if your gaze falls on the marble
of their statues—
They will crack, broken in two;
And take with you a laughter
bitter and cursed,
In order to destroy everything living."

Contempt and disgust for Russians, Ukrainians and Poles as creatures of a lower type, as subhumans, can be felt in practically every story of I. Babel's "Konarmiya" [Red Cavalry]. Only in the image of the Jew in that book

does one encounter a full-fledged human being who evokes the author's respect and sympathy. He depicts with unconcealed revulsion a Russian father's slashing up his son, and then a second son's slashing up the father ("A Letter"); and a Ukrainian's admitting that he does not like to kill by shooting but prefers to kill by stomping to death ("The Painting of Matvey Rodionych Pavlichenko"). But the story "The Rabbi's Son" is particularly characteristic. The author is riding in a train along with the retreating army. "And monstrous Russia, unreal-seeming as a flock of clothed lice, was tramping in bast shoes along both sides of the train cars. Typhus-ridden muzhiks were rolling before them the familiar coffin of a soldier's death. They would jump up onto the platforms of our train and then fall away, knocked off by gun butts."

But here the author sees a familiar face: "And I recognized Ilya, the son of the Zhitomir rabbi." (The author had stopped by the rabbi's home on the evening before the sabbath—although he is a political worker in the Red Army—and had noticed "a young man with the face of Spinoza," in the story "Gidali.") He, of course, is immediately taken into the editorial staff's train car. He is sick with typhus and breathing his last, and he dies right there in the train. "He died, the last prince, amid his verse, phylacteries and foot wrappings. We buried him at a forgotten station. And I, barely containing the tempest of my imagination in my ancient body, I received my brother's last sigh."

A cold alienation from the surrounding people is often conveyed by the poetry of E. Bagritskiy, and extreme hatred actually bursts out in his poem "February." The protagonist becomes an assistant to a commissar after the revolution:

My Judaic pride sang
Like a string stretched to the limit...
I would have given a lot, for my forebear,
In his long smock and fox-fur cap,
From beneath which, his forelocks fell
In a gray spiral, and the dandruff flew
In clouds over his squared-off beard...
For that forebear to have recognized his descendant
In the strapping fellow standing like a tower
Above the flying headlights and bayonets
Of the truck that was shaking the midnight.

Once during an attack on a suspicious house the author recognizes a girl he had seen back before the revolution. She had been a high-school student and had often walked past him, and he had sighed, not daring to approach her. Once he had attempted to say something, but she had driven him away. Now she has become a prostitute.

I—Well? You recognize me?
Silence.
What do you get for a session?
And quietly,
Without parting her lips, she said:

"Pity me! There's no need for money."
I shoved her the money,
I tumbled down,
Without taking off my boots, or my holster,
Without unbuttoning my shirt.
I'm taking you for the fact that my age
Has been too timid, for the fact that I've been shy,
For the shame of my homeless forebears,
For the chirping of a bird that chances to fly by!
I'm taking you as revenge on the world,
From which I couldn't get away!
Take me into your empty bowels,
Where the grass cannot take hold,
Maybe my nocturnal seed
Will fertilize your wilderness.

It seems to be that it is time to revise the traditional view of the novels of Ilf and Petrov. They by no means represent the amusing mockery of the vulgarity of the NEP era. In a mild but clear form, they develop a concept that, in my view, constitutes their main content. Their action takes place, as it were, amidst the wreckage of old Russian life; members of the gentry, priests and members of the intelligentsia figure in their books, and they are all portrayed as some sort of absurd and dirty animals that evoke disgust and revulsion. They are not even ascribed any traits for which one might condemn a person. Instead of that, a stamp is placed on them whose aim is to either diminish or destroy the sense of having anything in common with them as human beings, and to alienate the reader from them in a purely physical sense: one is depicted naked with a drooping fat belly covered with red hair; it is said of another that he is beaten for not turning off the light in the bathroom. Such creatures arouse no compassion, and destroying them is something like a merry hunt where you breathe deeply and fully, your face flushes, and nothing spoils your pleasure.

These feelings, borne by yet another generation, have come down to our days and often burst out in the songs of bards, poems, novels and memoirs. A stormy explosion of the same emotions can be seen in the works of recent emigrants. Here, for example, is a poem by D. Markish, who recently emigrated, which has published in Israel in the magazine SION:

I speak of us, sons of Sinai,
Of us, whose look has been heated with a different warmth.
Let the Russian people follow a different path,
What do we care for their Slavic business.
We have eaten their bread, but paid with blood.
The accounts have been kept, but not summed up.
We will avenge ourselves—with flowers at the bedside
Of their northern land.
When the varnish sample fades,
When the din of the red cries dies down,
We will stand by the birch coffin
In an honor guard. ...

In an article published in another Israeli magazine we read:

"For the 'god-bearing' people a vast, conformist country is not enough; it also needs the pearl, i.e., the Holy Land. ... It wants this holiness that is inaccessible to it, and although it, sunk in contempt for itself and for everyone else, does not even know what to do with this holiness, because in its pagan Christian understanding holiness is not living and cannot sanctify the world, it still awaits its hour as a petty tyrant- hangman. And in its dark instinct this has given rise to and continues to give rise to monstrous outbursts of hatred for Israel—the bearer of living holiness."²⁸

As we approach our conclusion, let us quote an excerpt from a magazine published in Russian in Toronto:

"Do not remain silent, Lord, stand up for your chosen ones, not for our sake, but for the sake of your vow to our fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Loose upon them the Chinese, so that they may glorify Mao and work for him as we have for them. Lord, let the Chinese destroy all Russian schools and rob them, and let the Russians be forcibly Sinofied, and let them forget their language and their writing. And let the Chinese organize for them a Russian National Okrug in the Himalayas."

One often hears the following argument: Many of Jews' actions and feelings can be understood if one recalls how much they have experienced. For example, some of Byalik's poems were written under the impression of the pogroms, D. Markish's father was shot under Stalin in the "Zionists' trial," while others recall the Pale of Settlement, quotas, or certain other, later offenses. Here it must be stressed once again that in this work we do not intend to condemn, accuse or exonerate anyone. Even raising such a question hardly makes sense: does the humiliation of the Germans under the Peace of Versailles justify National Socialism? We would merely like to get an idea of what took place in our country, which social and national factors influenced its history, and how.

Starting with the postreform years of the 1860s in Russia, the word "revolution" was on everyone's lips. This was a clear sign of an impending crisis. And as another sign of it, the "Lesser People" started to be formed with all of its characteristic features. A new type of person was created, like the young person (Tikhomirov tells about him) who stated with pride, "I am a renegade," or like Ishutin's group known as Hell, whose program stated: "To replace personal joys with hatred and malice, and to learn to live with that." But one can understand what an agonizing operation this was, how hard it was to tear a person away from his roots and turn him inside out, as it were, and how cautiously one had to go about this, indoctrinating him in the new teaching step by step and overwhelming him with the force of authorities. And how much simpler it all was with the mass of Jewish young people, who not only were not bound to this country by common roots and a common people, but who from their very childhood had learned

hostility to precisely those roots; wherein a hostile alienation from the spiritual foundations of the surrounding world was not acquired from books and papers, but was absorbed from early childhood, often quite unconsciously, from tones in adults' conversations, from critical remarks overheard by chance and remembered for all one's life! And although most likely by no means all Jews felt the feelings reflected in the excerpts cited above, it was precisely the school that was suffused with them that intruded itself into life with unprecedented energy and that was able to exert an especially powerful and unhealthy influence on it.

It must be admitted that the crisis in our history took place at an absolutely unique moment. If at the moment that it broke out Jews had been living the sort of isolated way of life that they had, for example, in France during the Great Revolution, they would not have exerted a significant influence on its course. On the other hand, if the life of the small-town communities had started to break up much earlier, some ties might have had time to take hold between Jews and the rest of the population, and the alienation caused by 2,000 years of isolation might not have been so strong. Who knows how many generations are needed to erase the traces of a 2,000-year-old tradition? But we were scarcely given a single year; the influx of Jews into the terrorist movement coincided almost precisely with the "emancipation," with the beginning of the breakup of the Jewish communities, and with their emergence from isolation. Pinkhus Akselrod, Gesya Gelfman and many other terrorist leaders came from strata of the Jewry where it was impossible to hear any Russian spoken at all. They set off with bundles over their shoulders to study "goyish science" and soon found themselves among the leaders of the movement. The coincidence of two crises had a decisive influence on the nature of that era. Here is how it was seen by a Jewish observer (from that the aforementioned book, "Russia and the Jews"):

"And of course, it was no accident that Jews, who are so inclined to rationalistic thinking, who for the most part were not connected by any traditions with their surrounding world, and who often saw in those traditions trash that was not only useless but even harmful for the development of humanity, found themselves in such proximity to those revolutionary ideas."

And as a predictable result:

"We were struck by what we expected least of all to encounter in the Jewish milieu: cruelty, sadism and acts of violence that were seemingly alien to a people that was remote from a physically militant life; people who only yesterday had not known how to use a gun found themselves today among the directors of the cutthroats."

This remarkable book ends with the words:

"One of two things: either foreigners without political rights, or Russian citizenship based on love for the homeland. There is no third possibility."

But a school has turned up that has chosen precisely a third path, which from the author's viewpoint is "impossible." Not only dislike for the homeland, but complete alienation and active hostility toward its spiritual foundations; not only the repudiation of political rights, but the concentration of all one's will and efforts to influence the country's life. Such a combination has proven strikingly effective; it has created a "Lesser People" that in its effectiveness has surpassed all other versions of that phenomenon that have appeared in History.

Footnotes

1. We shall provide the briefest information about the authors of the works that will be discussed here. G. Pomerants is a Soviet specialist in Eastern studies. He was arrested in Stalin's times. He has set forth his historical and social views in collections of works that have been distributed in samizdat and subsequently published in the West, as well as in lectures and reports at seminars. Several of his articles have appeared in the West in magazines published in Russian.

2. A. Amalrik studied in Moscow State University's Division of History and subsequently changed occupations a number of times. Soon after publication of the work mentioned above, he was arrested and sentenced to two years, and after he had served his term, he was sentenced to another term by the camp court. After a statement explaining his views he was pardoned and emigrated.

3. B. Shragin is a candidate of philosophical sciences. He was a member of the CPSU and even a secretary of his organization. He has published a number of articles in samizdat and abroad under various pseudonyms. For signing several letters of protest, he was expelled from the party and emigrated. In emigration he has contributed to a collection titled "Samosoznaniye" [Awareness] and written for emigre magazines.

4. A. Yanov is a candidate of philosophical sciences and journalist. Prior to emigrating he was a member of the CPSU and favorite author of the magazine MOLODOY KOMMUNIST. Since emigrating he has been a professor at a university in New York and a Sovietologist. He has published a large number of works in English- and Russian-language magazines and newspapers.

5. R. Pipes (Pipes or Pipesh) is from Poland, and American historian. He is considered a leading specialist on Russian history and a Sovietologist. An extremely close adviser of former President Reagan.

6. In contrast to Berdyayev and those who have repeated the idea of the authors cited above, present-day professional historians evidently do not support this concept. The extensive literature devoted to this question agrees in acknowledging that even in the 16th century the concept of "Moscow as the Third Rome" had no influence on the Moscow tsarist regime's political thought, and that its last traces manifested themselves in the 17th century.

7. We preserve the spelling of the original, although the reference is evidently to K. Jung's concept of the archetype.

8. This observation was reported to me long ago by A. I. Lapin.

9. A. Krasnov (A. A. Levitin) is a church figure who in the 1920s took an active part in the "renewalists" movement aimed at splitting the Orthodox Church: he was secretary to the movement's leader A. Vvedenskiy. After the "renewalists" movement had come to naught, he returned to the Orthodox Church. In connection with his church activities, he was arrested. In the 1960s he protested against the mass closing of churches under Khrushchev. He was arrested again and sentenced to three years. After serving his term, he emigrated. In several works he develops the idea of the joining together of Christianity and socialism.

10. L. Plyushch is a Marxist but has been critical of certain aspects of Soviet life. He wrote several works in that spirit and was a member of the "Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights." He was arrested, deemed insane and put in a psychiatric hospital. His arrest aroused a broad movement in the West. (...) Plyushch was freed, emigrated, and continues to develop his Marxist views in the West.

11. It is interesting that in this regard the author himself actually lags behind the development of Western thought. Pomerant's "Eurocentric" viewpoint on the West has for the most part been overcome, is regarded as the reflection of 19th-century imperialism, and would most likely be rejected if any attempt were made to apply it to some African country.

12. General MacArthur was the commander in chief of the U.S. occupying forces in Japan.

13. Although, it would seem to be an unlikely sort of gendarme, if it is constantly being beaten. Evidently what is reflected here is a desire to wound Russia simultaneously with two arguments, albeit mutually contradictory ones.

14. Yet even more recherche problems are debated: the right to free choice of the month of emigration (three months in advance, or later), the right to free choice of invitation (whether to emigrate on the basis of an American or an Israeli invitation).

15. A. D. Sinyavskiy published several short stories and novellas in the 1960s in the West under the pseudonym Abram Tert's. He was tried and sentenced to five years. He served four years, was pardoned and emigrated. In Paris he was a founder of the magazine KONTINENT. He has published several books, of which "Progulki s Pushkinym" [Strolls With Pushkin] enjoyed a scandalous success (a typical review referred to it as "The Strolls of a Boor With Pushkin"). He currently publishes the magazine SINTAKSIS in Paris.

16. V. Belotserkovskiy is a recent emigrant, contributor to the collection "Demokraticheskiye alternativy" [Democratic Alternatives], and author of public-affairs works. He lives in the FRG and has had cases initiated against certain other public-affairs essayists on charges of anti-Semitism (there is a law on the matter in the FRG), but has not won them.

17. M. G. Meyerson-Alsenov is a historian by education. He has published several works in samizdat and in the West (often under pseudonyms). He emigrated and graduated from the seminary in the United States. He has been ordained in the American Orthodox Church.

18. I beg your pardon for an omission in the quotation, but I simply cannot bring myself to write the foul words used by the author.

19. It is precisely to these emotions, and not to elementary ignorance, that one must probably attribute the crude logical and factual errors to which we called attention in the second section. It is unlikely, for example, that Yanov believed that Belinskiy was a "classic representative of Slavophilism." This is more likely a manifestation of a disdainful revulsion according to which both the Slavophiles and the Westernizers are equally loathsome.

20. These are not empty words—his book is suffused with a revulsion toward Russia and Russians that spews forth from practically every page.

21. Of course, authors living here among Russians cannot always permit themselves such strong expressions as in the works of emigre literature that have been cited in the preceding sections. The usual form is such that one could argue: that is a drunkard, a hooligan, an obtuse bureaucrat in general, and not just a Russian. And the names are native Russian names that are nowadays even rarely encountered. Yet Galich (Ginzburg) should be far more familiar with the type of the go-getting playwright and screen writer (by no means necessarily such an indigenous Russian) who knows how to worm his way into fashion and has received a prize for scenarios for a film about Chekists and acquired fame for songs with dissident air. But for some reason this image does not attract him.

22. It seems that his name should be pronounced as Azev, and not Azef.

23. A recent book by two British journalists represents a rather candid attempt to obscure precisely this aspect of the Ekaterinburg tragedy. But in another connection we learn from it that inscriptions in Yiddish were found on the walls of the building where the execution of the tsarist family took place!

24. V. S. Grossman was a Soviet writer and public-affairs essayist. Together with Erenburg and Zalsavskiy, he was a leading propagandist in Stalinist times. At the same time, in secret, he wrote several books, which were published after his death. In one of them, "Vse techet,"

he harshly denounces Stalin and Lenin and comments very sympathetically on Trotskiy (it is from there that the quotation cited above is taken). In the same book he asserts that all Russian history is the history of slavery and that the Russian soul is a thousand-year-old slave that has perverted freedom-loving ideas imported from the West (although in his official wartime public-affairs writing he spoke with an entirely different language: he saw in the Russian soul "an indestructible, furious force," the "iron force of Avvakum, which can be neither bent nor broken," etc.). Thus, V. Grossman may be regarded as a forerunner of the school that is the object of examination in the present work.

25. The author somewhat exaggerates: the Socialist Revolutionary Party grew out of the merger of several organizations, including the aforementioned "Union."

26. In Azev's fate there is, in general, a great deal that is enigmatic. Why was he not killed following his exposure, when the party executed people for much lesser deeds, including mere attempts at betrayal (for example,

Gapon)? It was believed that he went into hiding, but Burtsev found him and interviewed him! Azev died a natural death in 1918. It is hard to think of any other explanation than the fact that the party leadership knew about his collaboration with the authorities and sanctioned in on certain terms.

27. The Third Book of Yezdra is not part of the Jewish canon: it belongs to the Jewish apocalyptic school. It is believed that the beginning and end are interpolations by a Christian transcriber, and that the central part (from which the quotations have been taken) reproduces the original Judaic material (see, for example, J. Hastings' "Biblical Dictionary").

28. The author evidently senses absolutely no irony in the fact that he is accusing someone else of "outbursts of hatred," although he could hardly be surpassed in this regard.

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KGB Democratic Union Investigation Results

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[Article by I. Losev: "'The Exclusively Peaceful' Democratic Union: Between the Lines of a Criminal Case"]

[Text] On 28 December 1988, LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA reported on the start of an investigation initiated by the Leningrad KGB Directorate under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, with a promise to tell our readers of its result. The investigation was halted on the basis of a review of the contents of Article 70, made by the Supreme Soviet in 1989: From now on, pluralism permits the existence of an alternate point of view regarding Soviet power. And nevertheless, the materials from the investigation reveal a heretofore unknown side of the activities of the "Democratic Union."

Criminal Case No. 64, in accordance with Part 1 of Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, was initiated by the investigative department of the USSR KGB Directorate for Leningrad Oblast on 13 December 1988 and received wide public attention following searches that were carried the next day in the apartments of Leningraders R. Yevdokimov, Ye. Podoltseva, Yu. Rybakov, A. Skobov, and V. Terekhov. The appearance of a case involving anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda in the fourth year of perestroika struck many as a challenge. The procuracy and Leningrad authorities were flooded with various kinds of accusations, up to and including that of "a return to Stalinism."

There were also attempts to "raise up the public" in defense of these "victims of KGB arbitrariness". Fifteen Leningrad writers sent the Leningrad procuracy and the mass information media a letter condemning a resurrection of the policy of charging persons under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Its text was published by the bulletin VEK I MIR and by the foreign press.

"The entire experience of application of this article," the Leningrad writers asserted, "shows that the persons who were actually discrediting the Soviet state and society were those investigators, procurators, and judges who initiated and conducted the political trials... Everything that can be written about our system has already been written, and R. Yevdokimov and his cohorts cannot think up anything new. The only anti-Soviet action that is possible in our times—this is a trial in accordance with Article 70."

It is shame that, before protesting, the authors of the letter did not turn to the KGB or the procuracy for an explanation. In the era of glasnost, it would be logical to do precisely this and only then, having obtained official information, to make an assessment of what had occurred. I think that, in this case, the position of our esteemed writers would have been different. I permit myself to be so bold as to assert this because I have familiarized myself in detail with the materials of the investigation. For people who like detective stories, the

story of how it went would surely be extremely interesting but, somewhat more important, in my view, are its results, the lessons of this case that has the number 64. And it is specifically about this that I will speak.

NECESSARY AMPLIFICATION. "Case No. 64" was preceded by a criminal case initiated by the Leningrad procuracy on 13 October 1988 against a member of the Democratic Union (DS), V. Yaremenko, who had published a vile verse entitled "Russia" in the "organ of the Democratic Union Party," a photocopied small journal called "The Democratic Opposition." It had been so loathsome that even the DS coordination council had hurried to distance itself from its own "organ" and its editorial collegium by condemning the verse, by excluding Yaremenko from its ranks, and by depriving "The Democratic Opposition" of its "official status." But the word, and the written word as well, is not a without weight... The hooliganism perpetrated by Yaremenko fell under the criminal code.

Employees of the militia made a search of the apartments of the members of the editorial board of "The Democratic Opposition"—A. Gadsik, V. Dobasyvich, and V. Yaremenko—and discovered and confiscated a large collection of materials prepared in the name of the DS, including a large number of copies of "The Democratic Opposition." The program documents of the Democratic Union, published in its "official organ," called for the destruction of the socialist state and the "overthrow of communist ideology." "The fundamental task of the Democratic Union," they stated, "is forcible change of the system existing within the USSR and it subordinates all its actions to the fulfillment of this task."

For the achievement of these goals the union intends actively to provoke dissatisfaction with Soviet power on the part of residents of the Leningrad region and, in so far as possible, of the country. In 1988, before review of the article, this qualified as a state crime, which is the concern of the KGB, to which the materials from the criminal case of V. Yaremenko were transferred. It was later on that the first folder with the title "Criminal Case No. 64" appeared on the desk of USSR KGB Leningrad Oblast Directorate senior investigator A. Fedorov.

This case was initiated, as the jurists say, "based on the fact"—of preparation and distribution within Leningrad, in the name of the so-called "Democratic Union oppositional political party" of documents that contained calls for struggle against the order existing within our country. A special feature of such cases lies in the fact that the conduct of an investigation is not aimed at specific persons or groups (at that same DS, as certain "defenders of democracy" wish to portray it). Rather, a study is made of events and actions that show signs of a crime. And so long as such study is not completed, no accusation may be made against any of the persons appearing in the case.

And thus, the searches conducted by employees of the KGB on 14 December in the homes of "R. Yevdokimov

and his cohorts," made it possible to uncover a large quantity of DS leaflets, program documents, bulletins and journals in addition to what was found by the militia in the possession of members of the "Democratic Opposition" editorial board, and also printed materials from the National Labor Alliance [NTS], an anti-Soviet organization abroad: the journals POSEV and GRANI, the program of the NTS entitled "Path to a Future Russia," issues of the newspaper RUSSKAYA MYSL, brochures, and pamphlets which set forth the program positions of the NTS for the liquidation of socialism within the USSR.

An elementary comparison of texts showed that many of the "theoretical positions and conclusions" of the DS had simply been copied from publications of the NTS, especially with regard to the "destruction of socialism." Confiscated from R. Yevdokimov, in addition to literature, was a telefax machine, which made it possible to receive and send facsimile copies of handwritten and printed materials via telephone channels. Incidentally, the only hero of this story who is not a member of the DS is—

Rostislav Yevdokimov

On 16 March 1989, during a pre-flight luggage inspection at Pulkovo airport, a handwritten report by R. Yevdokimov about his activities as a member of the NTS was found and confiscated from the West German citizen Gerald Poshman.

NECESSARY AMPLIFICATION. The program and the charter of the National Labor Alliance state that the final goal of the organization is the overthrow of the system existing in the USSR and the creation of an "independent Russian national state." The NTS proposes to achieve this with the aid of propagandizing its goals within the USSR and abroad, and also by way of covert subversive activity and armed struggle. The leaders of the organization are trying to present NTS as an independent, self-reliant structure, but in fact the members of the alliance are paid agents performing the assignments of American Intelligence, under whose leadership they are carrying on subversive activity against the USSR. Our press has repeatedly reported about KGB suppression of their activities.

... AND SO, thanks to the watchfulness of the customs workers a curious document fell into the hands of the investigative department. In particular, Rostislav Borisovich complained in his missive especially about a serious shortage of powder for making xerox copies of publications they received from the NTS, which was making their broad dissemination among the masses much more difficult and, among other things, he reported about an acquaintance of his—Igor Fedorov—who in the recent past had been a Captain Third Rank aboard a nuclear submarine and was now a "party drop-out" [otkaznik] and DS member who had obtained an opportunity to go (now, he has already gone—I.L.) to the West.

Yevdokimov reported that I. Fedorov wanted to leave "some kind of apparatus and 60,000 rubles in notes or in sables, which is more convenient, under the condition that they will help him find work abroad." Pointing to the opportunity of receiving 60,000 "for the needs of the organization," R. Yevdokimov wrote: "He (Fedorov—I.L.) speaks English and is prepared to work in the United States or South Africa. An Engineer and programmer, has contacts among naval personnel, can be either an instructor for military staffs, or a programmer, or a driver. In the long range—a businessman, ready to be a consultant to the emigration in business matters. Half-Jewish, Half-Russian. Considers himself a patriot of Russia..."

Later, at the KGB investigative department, Yevdokimov who, by his 39th year, besides secondary school, had behind him several years of "doing time" for anti-Soviet activity, decided to "play it dumb." To the question of whether he knew a West German citizen by the name of Gerald Poshman, he answered that he did not know this name, but that, possibly, he had met a man with the name Gerald in March 1988. He could not say this for sure, since he had a weak memory for names.

"You probably are interested in the person by whom I sent a note to my friends abroad in March?" Rostislav Borisovich suggested, although nobody had asked about any kind of note up to this point. "So, I don't know this person. He dropped in on me, passed on a greeting from one of my acquaintances, and I gave him a note with a request that he give it to one of my friends. Precisely to whom, I did not specify. This is not important. I have many friends abroad. I don't remember the contents of the note well, but it was of a personal nature and should not be of interest to the investigative department.

"Somebody sends the NTS and DS publications to me at home. How, I don't know. I have many friends in the DS, but I do not have any relationship to this organization."

The truth is that R. Yevdokimov is a member of the NTS and of the International Society for the Rights of Man (MOPCh), which separated from the NTS in 1972. The headquarters of this "office" is located in Frankfurt-am-Main (FRG) and is supported by foreign anti-Soviet centers.

Yevdokimov's lie is convincingly refuted—by Yevdokimov himself. During a repeat search, they found in his home an extensive report prepared for dispatch to a member of the NTS executive bureau in London, Yu. Miller.

"Dear Yura!"—Rostislav Borisovich wrote. "As you recall, I have been asking you and our other friends for a rather long time to send someone who could carry a small text from me. You let me know that such a person would appear soon. Therefore, when Gerald arrived and brought Merezhevskiy, I turned him this request. He agreed and came the following day with two young people. I called Gerald into my own room and, without witnesses, handed him two pieces of cigarette paper,

having noted that this was a very serious and responsible matter. By means of gestures I indicated to him that he should crumple them up and put them in his mouth in chewing gum. In the most extreme case, he could, as if by reflex, swallow the gum from surprise. Practically, this was a scheme that could not lose."

Yevdokimov refers further to Poshman's bumbling, which led to the flap, reproduces the text of that "ill-fated letter," and declares: "Alas, everything has become known to the checkists!"

"This is the cost of lightmindedness in the transmittal of two sheets of cigarette paper!"—Rostislav Borisovich chastises himself, counting on sympathy in response. "Now, all my contacts have either been broken off or have been greatly complicated: I am forced to hide myself, moving from place to place (all this costs money). Right now I need a wig of good quality, a beard, moustache, make-up, glue for the beard, and the like. The only hope is that by the end May, by the congress (of peoples deputies—I.L.), the situation will change for the better... I want to try to organize an all-union constituent congress concerned with human rights in Leningrad somewhere in June, having invited to it all kinds of Korotiches, Sakharovs, Yeltsins, and also guests from the West. I am sending you an open letter to the Congress of Deputies. Try to raise as much of a stir as possible surrounding it, especially on the radio and in the press I have nothing to lose now, and the surest tactic is—to go for broke... I don't recall whether I have already warned you that we are sliding toward terror. I think we should be realists and be ready for an adequate reaction. Alas, we don't even have gas balloons, not to mention gas pistols."

The letter, of course, was much longer. Rostislav Borisovich discourses on the situation within the country and asks for material assistance. In a discussion with an investigator, R. Yevdokimov described his appeal to the letter's recipient as follows:

"The Yu. Miller referred to is an acquaintance of mine via correspondence who lives in England. I don't know where Miller will find the monetary funds I need and this doesn't interest me. This is his problem. I have been counting on him helping me as a good friend. What we have been talking, you see, is material assistance."

But, it would appear, Yevdokimov's "acquaintances via correspondence" from the NTS were not pleased by his "jabs." And, added to this, Rostislav Borisovich landed in a sobering-up station and conducted himself in such a way before the microphone of a reporter from "600 Seconds", who had looked in there, that his "friends" turned away from him entirely, making Yu. Rybakov the fully empowered representative of MOPCh in Leningrad and transferring to him authorized material assets and material help. And Yuliy Andreyevich Rybakov, like

The Other Actors

in this history, was already an active member of the "Democratic Union."

On 14 April 1989, PRAVDA published an article by N. Volynskiy entitled "The Knight's Move, or Where is the Democratic Union Calling Us." Written on the basis of materials then at the disposal of the investigation department, it provoked a storm of hysteria on the part of the DS members which has not quieted to the present day, judging from their samizdat.

In an "open letter from the members of the Northwestern Regional Division of the DS," entitled "An Answer to PRAVDA's Lie" and directed to the editors of the central and Leningrad editions, it was stated, in particular, that:

"Volynskiy's crude lie relative to calls by the DS for physical violence against communists, for terrorist acts at chemical combines, railroads, and nuclear electric power stations, like any gibberish is not deserving of refutation."

And then, for the next three pages, there is a "refutation" of the article by my colleague on the central organ. I have more than once had occasion to hear in conversations with DS members, and to read in their samizdat, assurances of the "exclusively peaceful, nonviolent methods of struggle" that are being used and have been used by the DS. But is this so in practice? If you take the practical side of the activities of the Democratic Union, then, fortunately for its members, they still have neither "terrorist acts" nor sabotage behind them. As regards plans, then here, as they say, I will dare to take exception. (I also will not argue with the DS program. Not because it is inarguable or original. Everything there is precisely to the contrary. There are no "specific ideas of any kind within the Democratic Union with regard to a restructuring of the life of society in the USSR. Everything is on the level of general discussion and desires." These words belong to DS member A. Korytkin, and I am in complete agreement with them.)

And now, let us look at what the members of the Democratic Union are saying

About the Nonviolence of its Methods

So as not to subject the leaders of the DS to the ordeal of having also to accuse me of slander, I will quote testimony by members themselves of this "opposition party," who knew what they were saying and who, being sound in mind and thought, signed protocols in a firm hand.

First, so to say, an "official document," discovered in the possession of a member of the coordination council of the Democratic Union, V. Terekhov, which is entitled "On the Structure of the Party. Proposals for the Party Conference." In its concluding part, it speaks about the possibility of a transition by the "party" to an illegal situation, and here there are these words: "In an illegal

situation, each member of the party may, if he wants to, wage an armed struggle, protecting his life and freedom. This struggle can be waged either individually or as a member of a group."

I hear the expressions of protest that these supposedly are proposals that "did not pass!" All right. Here is other evidence.

"I recall well how, at one of the meetings that took place in the apartment of Coordination Council member Ye. Podoltseva, some person came out with a call for armed struggle. An uproar ensued. Somebody present said that if there are people in the party who consider armed means of struggle possible, then another opinion should not be forced upon them," V. Konokova told an investigator.

And here is the testimony of a more authoritative member of the DS, now already a former one, A. Lysenko. He joined the DS, in his own words, for ideological considerations, but very quickly came to understand the essence of this organization and broke with it. But he had been in the public eye and held on high esteem within the coordination council.

"In the process of associating with the leaders of the DS and of being closely acquainted with the Union's work practices, I came to the conclusion that the Democratic Union is an organization that is detrimental to perestroika and that its goals and tasks do not coincide with the interests of society. In essence, the DS is a petty bourgeois party headed by people for whom the main thing is personal ambition and selfish interests, a desire to earn political capital by any means," A. Lysenko declared to investigators. "Therefore, I was somewhat put off... DS members Korytkin and Denisov repeatedly talked about the necessity of acquiring arms. There was frequent discussion of the possibility of establishing so-called self-defense detachments." This is the testimony of A. Lysenko regarding the "nonviolence" of the "union's" activities. But he also said much of interest in connection with its "methods."

"Trying to understand more precisely the content of a 'nonviolent overthrow of the existing political system,' I turned for an explanation to O. Lipovskaya, who directs work with the young members of the DS. She gave me the following interpretation: 'Nonviolent overthrow means making appeals. One can call for an overthrow of the existing order, but not take the specific action oneself. One can call to beat up the Jews, but not do this oneself.' That is, insofar as I understood, the Democratic Union figures on kindling a conflagration, but at the same time intends to stand apart from the fire. A characteristic provocation feature of the DS. I more than once observed during meetings and events at the Kazan Cathedral how members of the Union insulted workers of the militia, provoking them to take responsive action, and then, when the latter began to do something, how they hid, substituting the spectators who

had gathered and casual passers-by, calling on them to give a rebuff to the militia, shouting about the 'tyranny they are creating.'"

We will return again to the testimony of A. Lysenko but, for the moment, I will note that he has defined with absolute accuracy the methods by which the DS operates and by which it is trying "nonviolently" to achieve its aims—by provocation.

Testimony, contained in the case file, by "member of the coordination council and authorized agent of the DS for the Far East," B. Kapusta, also convincingly refutes the assertion by the "party" members in the letter which I have quoted.

"As a member of the Democratic Union, I guarantee the accuracy of my words. Indeed, the DS, its leaders, plans and the attitudes that have become widespread among members of the party are known to me not by hearsay, not second-hand, but from within. I myself participated in discussions of many plans and received corresponding assignments. During the time I spent in Leningrad, I became convinced that the DS Northwestern Division is split into factions and groupings, in which a struggle is going on for power, for financial help from the West, and for portfolios within the party and a future government.

"I more than once have heard that the DS will undertake to organize a simultaneous armed uprising within Russia, if such should begin in the national republics. Party members B. Kelim and A. Lysenko repeatedly spoke in my presence about the acquisition of arms, initially if only for self-defense. In the words of Lysenko, if a revolution should start following the carrying out of acts of civil disobedience in Russia, everything will be of use: from rifles to bicycle chains. At the same time, they understood that the intended uprising could end in defeat. In this case, Kelim and Lysenko had worked out a way of getting abroad. For some reason, it seemed to them that it would be easier for them to do this in the Far East. Having initiated me into their plans, they asked me to go in the summer to Nakhodka (B. Kapusta is a resident of Nakhodka—I.L.) and purchase a cutter, on which, in case an uprising is crushed, they will leave for neutral waters and then for Japan.

"It may seem to some that all the things I have described represent the ravings of madmen (they, for example, discussed in complete seriousness a plan for an attack on Lenin's mausoleum in order to kidnap or destroy the body of Vladimir Ilich) but, when you become more closely acquainted with them, it is evident that these are simply obsessed, uncontrolled people from whom anything can be expected."

"Case No. 64" contains dozens of similar testimonies: about the establishment of military squads, about the acquisition of machine guns, for which a certain Kachalov demanded money. He declared that it is possible to "put under the arms of the Democratic Union people who are ready for anything, who have nothing to lose." Kachalov himself, in the case that the "situation

became complicated" intended to make his way to the UAR and become a mercenary there.

Well, in order to place a final period on the "peaceful" tactics of the DS, I will call cite an excerpt from the testimony of Ye. Rotar: At a meeting in the studio of Yu. Rybakov (Rybakov is an artist—I.L.), a representative of the Democratic Union Central Coordination Council spoke and said that the "party has a channel for the acquisition of arms abroad."

Now, I think, is the very time to talk about the foreign ties of the "oppositionists."

From the testimony of A. Lysenko

"DURING THE TIME I was in the DS, I understood that the party has some kind of ties to the NTS. There was the following incident: On 12 March, at a meeting with members of the DS at the Kazan Cathedral, a videotape was made. They also taped my address. The cassette with this tape was stored with O. Lipovskaya.

"Then B. Kelim informed me that this cassette had been sent abroad via NTS channels. Kelim also told me that, in addition, it was planned to send an article of his for publication in the journal POSEV."

DS member S. Markov, sentenced for robbery in the summer of 1988, who was questioned in connection with "Case No. 64," indicated that before his arrest he was acquainted with Democratic Union members Skobov and Sytinskiy. Skobov, in a conversation with him and other people said a number of times that he was a member of the foreign anti-Soviet organization NTS... "Back in the autumn of 1987, I became acquainted at Sytinskiy's home with the United States citizen George Hassaryk, who frequently visited him. Hassaryk used to pass Sytinskiy and Skobov packages of NTS leaflets, issues of POSEV, and negatives of certain books and of the same POSEV. Through Sytinskiy and Skobov, I became acquainted with A. Dubkov. During a drinking party at Sytinskiy's, the latter said a number of times that he was a member of NTS and that he had funds from this organization at his disposal in Leningrad. He frequently reimbursed expenses for the payment of fines imposed by the court for participation in unauthorized events."

B. Kapusta told an investigator about contacts known to him between Yu. Rybakov and employees of the French Consulate in Leningrad, and between V. Terekhov and the American Consulate. Rank-and-file members of the organization indicated that they time and again heard about the assistance in money and things given to the "party" from abroad, but this topic was concealed from broad discussion and was only mentioned, without specifying who, precisely was helping and in what amount.

The leaders of the Democratic Union love to expound about honor, about the virtue of the "democrats" and the dishonesty of the "partocracy." There is no argument: Not everyone in the CPSU is crystal pure in terms of honesty, and the party itself talks openly about its own

"black sheep." The high style with which the DS people describe their own merits, however, draws attention to itself. In one of the DS pamphlets giving the DS interpretation of the suppression of the unauthorized demonstration on Dvortsovaya Square on 23 August 1989, the following words appear: "What are they (the authorities—I.L.) afraid of? Free people? People who do not play rat-like games of intrigue, who are not trying to snatch their little piece of authority, who are not providing themselves with military squads... The Democratic Union Party is introducing a fundamental new basis into the political struggle—an ethical one..."

Well, to complete the picture, we will talk

About Ethics in the DS

Among the sources of the Leningrad group of the democratic Union stood Yekaterina Podoltseva—a former leader of the former "Doveriye" [Trust] group, a "well-known Leningrad dissident," as she is sometimes portrayed by samizdat. Members of the present coordination council include V. Terekhov, O. Lipovskaya, R. Makushenko, and L. Gusev—altogether 11 persons. Let us take a look at what the rank-and-file "party members" say about their "leaders", and you draw your own conclusions about the "ethical spirit" emanating from them.

Here is the story of former DC member A. Smetankina.

"I joined the party on 3 June 1988 and it was only curiosity that led me there. Members of the DS paid an entry fee of 5 rubles and made a monthly payment of one percent of their wages. Those who did not work gave a ruble each.

"Meetings of our cell, which has headed by Bulychev, took place on Saturdays in the apartment of O. Lipovskaya or in the teenagers' club at Kolemenskaya No. 5. Based on participation in the meetings and other DS events, I developed the impression that this organization was created by people who had not succeeded in 'working their way' into management positions and a good situation and who were striving for power by any path.

"I didn't understand everything. For example, what money Ye. Podoltseva used to relax in the South from June to September. She doesn't work anywhere and evidently travelled using the money which we collected. In August, A. Gadasik also flew there. I shared my doubts on this score with other DS members, but they gave me to understand that this was not my affair. In the end, after one of the meetings, Grebneva told me that they had directed her to pass on that my further presence in the DS was undesirable."

"I publicly condemned the fact that R. Makushenko and O. Lipovskaya were speculating in DS printed publications," said A. Lysenko. "Buying SVOBODNOYE SLOVO for a ruble in Moscow, they were reselling it in Leningrad for two or three rubles a copy. I demanded a

check of the party treasury, but this met a hostile reception. The rank-and-file members supported me, and we discovered that there were a total of 36 rubles in the party treasury. Up until this, nobody had checked the treasury, no reports had been made to the members of the organization with regard to the financial side of DS activities, and it was not considered possible to keep track of how much money was coming into the treasury and where it was being disbursed. It was however possible to draw one conclusion: Many members of the Democratic Union declared that money from the party treasury was going for the personal needs of the leaders of the Leningrad organization, who don't work anywhere. It was stated directly that O. Lipovskaya was living off party money and crumbs from the West.

"From associating with rank-and-file members of the party, I understood that many of them had doubts with regard to the personal qualities of their leaders, who frequently had a criminal past. Dissatisfaction also resulted from the fact that the leaders of the DS reserved for themselves all contacts with the West and with diplomats, not allowing any of the rank-and-file members access to them.

"Party members who had gotten close to the coordination council (and under its auspices) were carrying on activities that clearly compromised the party. Makushenko, Gadasik, Yaremenko, and several other persons formed a Freedom for Sexual Minorities faction within the Democratic Union, which advocated putting an end to communists and legalizing homosexuality and lesbianism within our country..."

S. Markov revealed to the investigators how, together with Skobov, he visited Ye. Podoltseva's apartment at the beginning of March 1988 to deliver copies of the journal POSEV, which had been obtained from Moscow by Ye. Debryanskaya.

"We found Ye. Debryanskaya and M. Shoykhet at Podoltseva's home. Podoltseva and Debryanskaya were already in a rather strong state of drunkenness... Skobov went down somewhere and brought about 400 grams of spirits, which we then drank. And the evening ended with Debryanskaya (a member of the DS Central Coordination Council—I.L.) drinking some kind of eau de cologne that Podoltseva had."

"Case No. 64" also contains a characterization of Ye. Podoltseva given by a 17-year old DS member from Alma-Ata, A. Blend: "In terms of character make-up, she is vulgar, speaks sharply, peremptorily, extremely unsociably." "In public Podoltseva talks about nonviolence in achieving the goals of DS, but within her own circle says that all means are good in the struggle against the communists." (From the testimony of S. Novikov.)

And here are some other extracts from the investigative protocols: At meetings at Podoltseva's one can frequently hear that it is necessary to hang the communists

from the lamp posts; many say outright that it is necessary to change over to direct terror... DS member Shoykhet, who has finished chemistry school, has recently been stirring up the question of using explosives for political purposes... The theme that "it is necessary to hang the communists from the lamp posts" is a favorite one in conversations between members of the DS. Publicly, it is true, they do not declare this, as they consider this premature... For the purpose of determining the leadership of the DS, I. Popadichenko proposed that consideration be given to those who had spent the most days under administrative arrest. He declared: "Anyone from the DS who has not been arrested cannot be considered a real member of the party..."

I think this is enough quotes.

THE MORE I have become acquainted with the materials of the investigation department, the more convinced I have become that these "fighters for violated human dignity" have themselves long since forgotten about dignity and honor, while bargaining in beliefs, in the motherland, and in people who have been bought with pretty words about freedom and democracy. Of course, it has not only been former criminals and riff-raff that have ended up in the Democratic Union. There have also been honest people who, for a certain period of time, have lost their political and moral orientation. But, and this is entirely natural, these have not remained long within the ranks of the "party."

The reader may ask me: What is all this with you about the DS? It began with Yevdokimov!

Rostislav Borisovich, having been deprived of "status," did everything he could to demonstrate to his NTS masters that he was loyal and irreplaceable in the post of head of the Leningrad division of the MOPCh. He again has his "status." Yu. Rybakov surrendered to him both his authority and the video camera with which "DS civil disobedience actions" are filmed. Incidentally, Rybakov has also broken with the DS. True, they say that he has not given up social activity but, in my view, as an artist, he is a hundred times more interesting than as a dissident. However, this is my opinion. Still another part of its recent "active soldiers" have abandoned the ranks of the "party": Some of them have been frightened by the investigation, some have understood that all this is no more than "rat-like political games," and some have "run off" to the West. The most "convinced" have remained. They are preparing for the elections and are nominating their own "nonviolent fighters" as candidates to the republic and local soviets.

Concluding Information and Thoughts

"Case No. 64" has been closed. The KGB Directorate for Leningrad Oblast has issued an official warning to the "heroes" of this sketch. Perestroika, no matter how the "democrats" abused it, and only this, has permitted "R. Yevdokimov and his cohorts" to remain free. Several years back, such a sketch would end, as a rule, with the phrase: "Now they have enough time to think about how to live in

the future, after they regain their freedom." However, there is time for this as well when one is free. And all the practitioners of "radical" methods who have been mentioned and not mentioned in this sketch have something to think about, for they have come to the boundary itself, beyond which they will inevitably be punished with all the severity of Soviet law. And it was precisely of this that they have been warned. And who knows, perhaps the investigation that was begun has saved the DS people from taking a fatal step?

With this, I will close and, once again, call on all those to whom the destiny of the motherland and of perestroika is dear to put aside their "nonviolent methods" and to join in creative work—to build a democratic socialist state governed by law—the Soviet Union.

Moscow Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Operations Explored

90WD0181B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 5, Jan 90 p 24

[Article by Yelena Isakova: "The Drug Chain"]

[Text] I joined the participants in one of the operations conducted regularly by personnel of the Moscow Gorskopolkom Main Administration for Internal Affairs. Regrettably, I gave up a chance to participate directly in arresting the criminals and simply observed the operation.

It was just like an old Russian fairy tale: "I sit on high and see far and wide." I sat in the attic of an old Moscow building with the men in charge of the operation. I could see the busy street below and I had a clear view of the market square across the street and the market itself.

"Undercover" operatives sat in their cars somewhere nearby, where we could not see them. Neighborhood volunteers and detectives were taking part in the operation with the administration personnel. The men "strolling" through the marketplace communicated with the cars by wireless.

It did not take an expert to single out, in the very first half hour, the people in the square who were breaking the law, including drug dealers and buyers. They would meet and then walk over to the stalls. Sometimes the money would be handed over right there. This was the case when the buyer and seller knew each other. Then the buyer would walk around while the seller went to the hiding place where he kept his drugs. It would be too dangerous to carry all of the drugs—it would be like a plea for a long prison term.

One of my neighbors in the attic relayed an order to the operatives: "Number three, keep an eye on the dark man in the sheepskin hat. It looks like he is going to get some drugs," he said. "No, it is too early to arrest him.

Number five, number five, get ready to arrest the 'customers.' One has a red scarf and the other is wearing a blue jacket with white trim. They are getting into a red Zhiguli...."

At that time "sheepskin hat" reappeared on the square and walked with his customer to a lone taxi in the parking lot with its green light off.

The taxi drove away, and it was followed by a light-colored Moskvich on orders from "above."

As we were told over the wireless, the passenger got out of the taxi a few blocks away from the marketplace and was arrested. The taxi, along with "sheepskin hat," returned to the market, where a new client was already waiting for the dealer. The entire procedure was repeated without any variations. One more individual with another drug purchase was taken into custody by the militia and was driven to the nearest station.

All of the people who got out of the taxi we were keeping under surveillance that day were carrying drugs. This meant that the exchange was made in the vehicle.

"Sheepskin hat" continued dashing back and forth like a shuttle.

What a job this "shuttle" had. I wondered what kind of fee he was paid for this exhausting work, especially since he was risking his freedom.

"His pockets are probably bursting with money, but he gets 50 or 100 rubles a day," the detectives explained.

Well, a member of a cooperative can make just as much money honestly. A person could even make a good living selling harmless coriander and parsley from the same places where the dope is raised. What sends these bedraggled and worn-out people down the road of crime?

It turns out that many of them believe in legends. They hear, for example, that someone lives like a tsar because he made a fortune instantaneously in the drug trade. Then, as soon as they become involved in this trade, they are immediately bound hand and foot. If they have tried drugs or if they have been in prison, they are all the more convinced that they have no other choice. It is true that some people manage to accumulate a certain amount of capital between their stays in labor colonies and penal zones, but this is a slow process, and it takes a lifetime to become a rich man by, for example, Azerbaijan's standards. Needless to say, only a few people ever reach this cherished goal.

The marketplace I observed was occupied mainly by southerners. Almost every day the militia catches drug dealers and buyers here and takes them out of the business for a few years, but new ones are always arriving, and they persist in conducting their illegal transactions right here, in this marketplace.

I could not see "sheepskin hat" anywhere in the square. I heard over the wireless that he was arrested right in the

taxi along with his latest customer at the time he was handing over the drugs. He turned out to be 35-year-old S. Faragin Ismail-ogly from Massaly. He had three children and a criminal record. For the sake of his own children's welfare, he had come here to poison ours with drugs. Like most people of this type, he was not very talkative and was in no hurry to admit his guilt. But I was interested in something else: Was it true that they had people who had grown rich in the drug trade? His eyes lit up: "Some are very well-off. They have power and they live on easy street."

I also had a chance to talk to a drug businessman on one of the highest rungs of the criminal ladder.

He was 28 years old. He had come to Moscow from Kirovabad in a Zhiguli registered in a relative's name. He had been convicted of speculation and was on record as a worker in a mobile corrective labor detachment. I have to omit his name because the case is still being investigated. When he was arrested, his pockets were simply stuffed with money. Just under 5,000 rubles in all. He, however, did not even go anywhere near the ill-starred marketplace. A man named Dzhalil "worked" for him there. Dzhalil had been a boxer, but he did not look like anything but a short and badly dressed man.

The events leading up to this arrest were the following. At the end of 1988 a new and strong chemical drug appeared in Moscow. It was an old and discredited medical compound which had been used right after the war as a painkiller. Later it was banned and removed from production. Now it was back, but this time it was being used by drug addicts. It was rumored to be of foreign production. In just a little over a year, almost 80 people were arrested and around 50 trials were held in connection with this drug in the capital alone.

Until recently the militia had been unable to find the source of this drug. They only knew that it was being brought in from Azerbaijan.

Last summer a young man carrying a large quantity of this drug was arrested, and it was learned that he regularly arranged for its delivery to the capital and its distribution there.

Unfortunately, legal technicalities—video tape cannot be entered into evidence, and the testimony of militia personnel is considered invalid—worked to the benefit of the lawbreaker. Besides this, some of the operatives had been too slow. All of this led to a situation in which the young man could not be arrested and could only be ordered not to leave the city. He was eventually put on trial, but he came up with a convenient story to explain his actions. Furthermore, he was not easy to convict because he was a wholesale dealer and had no direct contact with the drug trade because he conducted all of his operations through middlemen. The people he hired to do his dirty work were men like "sheepskin hat" or Dzhalil.

At the end of November the detectives heard that the young man who had escaped conviction was back in the capital with a new shipment of drugs. He was choosing the clients who would later distribute the poison. Within 2 months the "wholesaler" changed his place of residence several times. Furthermore, he had several cars at his disposal. He could get away again at any time. By a stroke of luck, a group of people dealing in the same old-new drug were arrested at that time, and one of the main traffickers, Mukhtar, testified that he had bought large quantities of the drug from the "wholesaler"—the same young man who was being watched so closely by the militia.

The rest was, as they say, a matter of routine. They learned where the drug was stored and established the fact that an exchange was made. In general, everything went well, without any snags.

An investigator spoke to the arrested men separately, asking them how the profits had been divided. He learned that Dzhalil, who had taken the biggest risk, was paid 5 rubles for each sale. Mukhtar, as the middleman, was paid 30 rubles, and the "wholesaler" was paid from 80 to 100 rubles. The transaction cost the buyer 200 rubles, however, so this chain probably has a highest link, from which all the rest are suspended and to which they regularly pay a tribute.

This boss sits in warmth and comfort. He enjoys life and simply issues orders. The little birds who are enchanted by the glitter of his wealth obediently fly to the Moscow market, where they, luckily for us, have a good chance of falling into the hands of the judicial system.

Afghan-Uzbek Drug, Contraband Ring Operations Detailed

*90WD0181A Tashkent KOMSOMOLET
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 2*

[Article by Viktor Slavkin: "Dirty Money"]

[Text] The following is an excerpt from the list of exhibits of the criminal proceeding:

"Two scraps of newspaper from the 30 December 1988 edition of PRAVDA. A scrap of newspaper measuring 15 x 21 cm. A cellophane 'Montana' pack. Opium weighing 19,200 grams. A glass jar labeled 'natural grape juice.' USSR Savings Bank certificates totaling 400,000 rubles. Two pieces of friction tape. Two cellophane packages containing 1,620 grams of hashish. An attach case. Four antique sabers, a bayonet-knife, and nine lengths of fabric. A spare tire."

Everything was combined on the list: the money, the scraps of newspaper, and the antique weapons. The republic KGB investigators had the difficult job of exposing the smugglers who had entered into a criminal conspiracy and had brought drugs from Afghanistan into the country after taking gold items to Afghanistan and selling them there. Since the days of the notorious

Vyshynskiy, the "crowning evidence" in the judicial process had always been the personal confession of the accused. In this case the outcome of the case was influenced to a definite degree by the weight of irrefutable evidence. The same scraps of newspaper, pieces of friction tape, and fingerprints, scrupulously entered as evidence, testified where the criminal had kept the narcotic substances among his personal belongings and how he had hidden them carefully in the car.

The whole thing began with a customs inspection. Two cars—a Volga and a RAF—drove up to the border near Termez. A specially trained border dog "went to work" on GAZ-24. It began barking and pawing the trunk. There was one ticklish detail: The cars belonged to our country's consulate general in Mazar-e Sharif. As investigators learned later, the criminals were counting on this diplomatic cover. They assumed that the baggage of diplomats would not be searched and that, therefore, they could take whatever they wanted across the border. This incident, however, clearly aroused the suspicions of customs officials. When the senior inspector in the Termez customs house noticed that the driver of the car, Khatskevich, looked worried, he asked him whether all of the statements on the customs declaration were true. "Of course," the man replied. The inspectors still had doubts, however. Their x-ray equipment helped them find a container of opium hidden in the car. It had been camouflaged by being packed in a cardboard box with various lengths of fabric.

This incident was only one episode in the chain of criminal acts committed by a group of people who had exchanged their conscience for ill-gotten gains. The glitter of gold and the rustle of currency made them forget the elementary moral values. They began to measure their lifestyle with a single universal yardstick—banknotes. The more money in the cash-box, the better. Their income rose in almost a geometric progression.

Oddly enough, when the strictest measures are instituted in the struggle against speculation and smuggling, black-market prices soar even higher, to compensate for the risk. Today's underground dealers can sell a kilogram of opium, for example, for no less than 100,000 rubles. Therefore, it is possible to get rich, and it makes no difference to them that they are endangering the life and health of thousands and thousands of people.

These channels of criminal contact did not exclude even the possibility that the gold the smugglers took to Afghanistan in secret was used by the mujaheddin to buy weapons and supplies for their gangs. They were eager to supply us with drugs. It is possible that the special services in close contact with the gangs had a direct interest in replenishing the underground drug market with new products. So many young people could be driven to desperation after they had been turned into spineless victims of a ruinous habit.

Who were the people who were so willing to become suppliers and dealers of the diabolical drugs?

Gennadiy Grigoryevich Khatskevich, born in 1942, a non-party member with a secondary education and a family, had no prior convictions and had worked as a driver for the USSR Consulate General in Mazar-e Sharif before his arrest.

Now he curses himself and wonders why he let himself become involved in the criminal operations. We have heard enough, Gennadiy Grigoryevich, to know that no one forced you to do this. The man was bewitched by the glitter of wealth and led astray by his greed. His sense of impunity then led to further "exploits." After everything went well the first and second times, he felt that anything was permissible. In a photograph taken before his arrest, he haughtily showed off his thick mustache. Later he had to shave, and he looked slack-jawed. His strong and calloused hands, which had grown used to heavy labor, suddenly seemed out of place. Wringing them, Khatskevich moaned: "I was born in the year of the horse, you know, and according to my horoscope, I was supposed to keep plugging away. I could have lived to a ripe old age without this kind of disgrace...."

He was right: Nothing was keeping him from doing an honest job and earning a good living. In official depositions and in casual conversations, Khatskevich's coworkers referred to him as a master of his trade, and with good reason. He could take any vehicle apart and put it back together again. In his previous place of employment in the Mongolian People's Republic, Khatskevich received good references and was even honored with high republic awards. Besides this, I must say that he earned quite a decent amount of money there without indulging in any criminal activity. When he came back home, he did not have any great desire to go abroad again, but his wife began "pressuring" him, telling him he could make a good living in Afghanistan.

Here I should mention some character traits which were left out of the character references, either because they were overlooked or because they were deliberately omitted. His wife's passion for foreign finery was completely in tune with her husband's greed and his awakening desire to amass wealth in any way whatsoever. Apparently, the money he earned honestly did not seem to be enough.

Khatskevich was certainly not as naive as he sometimes tried to pretend he was in court, and he must have known that some of the drugs he brought across the border would make their way into corrective labor colonies and would be used for the psychological manipulation of young people who would then be drawn into all types of shady dealings.

Khatskevich used his talent and skill to plan and carry out various clever ways of transporting the drugs across the border. He devised carefully soldered tin cans to serve expressly as opium containers. He found hiding places in the car, to conceal the gold from customs inspectors.

He spoke in condescending tones to the consular rank and file, behaving like the minion of a great man. At the same time, he did everything within his power to indulge his bosses. The support of his superiors was an excellent cover for him.

Khatskevich helped Consul V. Babkin transport 150 meters of brocade across the state border. If Babkin had known that illegal drugs were packed in the same box as the material, he probably would have had second thoughts about the kind of arrangements he had made, but we will never know.

In August 1988, A. Karimov bought 84 diamond rings with gold settings in several different stores in Termez and Tashkent with money he had received from F. Avlikulov. Khatskevich and Avlikulov hid them in GAZ- 2410, the car registered in Babkin's name. Babkin, who did not suspect a thing (after all, Khatskevich was his managing agent), drove the jewelry across the state border. Later the grateful Khatskevich did the diplomat a favor: He bought 200 meters of synthetic fabric from Afghan merchants at Babkin's request and with his money. It was in this atmosphere of connivance that the members of the criminal gang did their own shady business while doing favors for their "good old uncle."

New names have appeared in our story. I should tell you about these men too. Farkhod Avlikulov, born in 1959, a non-party member with a higher education, worked as an instructor at the Termez State Pedagogical Institute prior to his arrest. He had no prior convictions. I do not think that he was destined from birth to live a life of crime. He had a chance at a good academic career, but his ambitions took him into another field. The money seemed to be swimming into his pocket by itself. There was no more need to pore over academic tomes. He was bewitched by the adventure of his double life. He was intoxicated by his feelings of invulnerability. He even believed that he could live off the drug trade forever. Farkhod openly bragged to his friends that he had enough money to pay the salaries of institute instructors.

When writers investigate the causes of crime, they sometimes look for them in the criminal's upbringing. I can say quite definitely that neither Farkhod's father nor his mother, who are extremely honorable and respectable people, contributed to these criminal inclinations. On the contrary, they instilled high moral principles and, in common with other Uzbek parents, taught him to respect his elders and to be unpretentious and honest.

But something went wrong. After all, even today, many extremely responsible workers neglect their offspring because of the pressures of everyday life and because they are so busy with various social and professional obligations and meetings. As long as their children are fed and clothed, they are happy, and they seem to have no time to talk to these children

about moral values and take an interest in the company they keep. Is this why children from quite successful families get mixed up in crime so often? Then amazement and guilt set in, and the parents wonder how they could have missed the symptoms and how they could have failed to protect their children from criminal influences.

Criminals, on the other hand, do have enough time to "educate" children, and they are quite generous with this time. They have a direct interest in luring the son or daughter of a high-placed individual into their nets. On the one hand, this is a wonderful opportunity for blackmail, and on the other, the situation can be used to cover up their own dirty dealings. This criminal case should force some parents to wonder how and with whom their children spend their free time. Restaurants and dates require a sizable income, and honestly earned money is never enough for the big spender. This is how Farkhod became involved in speculation and smuggling, and he was far from a minor partner in these operations.

The next member of the criminal gang is Abdusattor Karimov, born in 1956, a non-party member with a secondary education who was the chairman of the Orom Cooperative of the Termez Public Dining Administration. He had a keen business sense, and it is too bad that he did not have the moral qualities to match. The smell of money made him ready to do anything. At the end of 1988 Abdusattor bought 276 gold rings with a total value of 66,750 rubles in jewelry stores for the criminal gang and turned them over to Avlikulov, so that the dirty money could be used to buy drugs in Afghanistan. Khatskevich then performed his function conscientiously by taking the jewelry to the neighboring country and exchanging it for the 19 kilograms and 200 grams of opium the customs officials confiscated on 20 January last year.

Karimov's activities were not confined to this episode. Several times in the past, he and Avlikulov had bought and sold drugs smuggled into the USSR by Khatskevich and others and had made huge amounts of money.

The members of the criminal gang also included another man, Komsomol member Vladimir Karimshakov, a mechanic in a military unit with a secondary specialized education. Why did he join the gang? For the same reason: a lack of discrimination in choosing ways of making money. This is why he also became involved in the smuggling operations and the drug dealing.

At some point he seems to have stopped taking part in the gang's activity, but probably not because of the fear of punishment and certainly not because he wanted to begin living an honest life. It was simply that the gang members decided there was one member too many. It would be preferable to divide the proceeds among a smaller group of individuals. It is even

possible that Khatskevich might have been chosen as the dispensable one. The methods of getting rid of people who know too much and have too large a share of the profits have been highly perfected in the criminal world.

Instead of examining the code of ethics in the criminal world, however, I would rather discuss the views and thinking of the people who were so close to these criminals but somehow never noticed a thing. The investigators learned, for example, that Karimov hid his money in his relatives' homes. Many of them knew about Abdusattor's shady dealings. The other criminals asked their friends to keep sums of 100,000 rubles or more for them. Packages with unknown contents were hidden in their presence. Why did this not arouse anyone's suspicions?

Khatskevich's wife, Galina Fedorovna, removed the price tags from the rings in front of her friends, explaining to them that the jewelry was to be sold to traders in Afghanistan, and her friends saw nothing wrong with this. All of these people helped the gang come into being with their indifference, their refusal to interfere, and sometimes even their secret complicity. Of course, the gang was nothing like the Italian "octopus," but if the criminals had been allowed to continue their improprieties, operations on a broader scale would have been quick to materialize.

There is another side of the matter that must be considered. People who took advantage of their (professional?) diplomatic status were also mixed up in this plot. How could they commit such a breach of trust? They knew that the baggage of diplomatic personnel could only be searched in exceptional cases. They also knew that the manufactured goods they took across the border duty-free, including fabric, had to be for their personal use. They knew this, but they flagrantly broke the law. And the criminals were quick to take advantage of the "weakness" of their bosses.

We might wonder whether the same loopholes exist today and whether this is how the muddy torrent of inferior video equipment, pornographic publications, and openly anti-Soviet materials flows into our country. Is it not time to consider the need for reliable obstacles?

This time the smuggling was skillfully nipped in the bud, even though it seemed that nothing could break this criminal chain. Everything had been planned down to the last detail. The ideal diplomatic cover had been found. A system of sales through reliable people and close relatives had been worked out, and hiding places had been prepared in the car. It appears that it never even entered the drug dealers' minds that all good things must come to an end.

The investigation entailed a great deal of difficult and painstaking work. Furthermore, the trail of the criminals led to Afghanistan, where there was considerable unrest at that time. How much material evidence can an investigator collect when bullets are whizzing past him

and shells are exploding nearby? Nevertheless, the necessary proof of guilt was found in this extremely tense atmosphere.

The investigators were motivated only by a desire to keep the dangerous drug trade from thriving, to find an antidote, and to catch the main organizers and executors of these operations. They did this job honorably. The investigation took almost a year. Every fact and every piece of evidence was scrupulously verified. Any incident that was the slightest bit unclear was interpreted in favor of the accused. The presumption of innocence was observed.

Then it was time: "All rise, court is in session! By the authority of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic...." Khatskevich was sentenced to 6 years in prison, with the confiscation of property and with compulsory hard labor in a corrective labor colony.

Avlikulov and Karimov were sentenced to 7 years, with the confiscation of property. They will also serve their sentence in a corrective labor colony.

Karimshakov received a suspended sentence of 4 years in prison, with 3 years of probation.

Judging by the gravity of the crimes, the penalty might seem too lenient, but the court seems to have been absolutely justified in taking the sincere confessions of the accused into consideration, as well as their sincere desire to pay their debt to society and help the investigators retrieve the money they made from their criminal dealings. The court decision also included another important point: "The recovery of 302,400 rubles of illegal gains from Khatskevich, 144,500 rubles from Avlikulov, and 9,800 rubles from Karimov."

The dirty money did not make these men happy. The goods they acquired and the money they made illegally will now be returned to the State Treasury.

We asked Deputy Chief Medvedev of the Investigative Division of the Uzbek SSR KGB to comment on the investigation and trial.

The case is closed. The sentence has been read. The money will be returned to the state. But how can we return the health of the young people who bought the illegal drugs? They might still be using drugs. Maybe not in such large quantities, but, unfortunately, opium and hashish are still making their way to the black market. This means that other advocates of easy money have not reformed. They must know that they will have to pay for this someday, but this will require concerted effort by the public and by law enforcement bodies.

Television programs and newspapers frequently show how the big-time dealers of the drug Mafia run the whole show in Colombia, Italy, and other countries. Do we really have to see this happen in our own country, to wait quietly and passively until the situation goes over the edge and ceases to be uncommon?

Contacts with foreign states are being expanded, mutually beneficial trade is being organized, and diplomatic relations are being established on new levels. All of this must be applauded, but we probably should not forget that certain forces abroad will take advantage of the thaw in the international climate for their own sinister purposes. Unfortunately, there are people in our country with a weakness for easy money and for illegal means of

personal enrichment. They have no trouble coming to an agreement—the foreign dealers and our home-grown businessmen—but at whose expense? Is it not at the expense of our interests, at the expense of the health of our youth and of all our people?

What more is there to say? The correctly worded question already contains the answer.

Government Archivist Views Draft Law on Archives

90US0530A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 5, Jan 90 p 11

[Interview with Chief Archivist F. Vaganov by L. Maksimova: "Without the 'Secret' Stamp"]

[Text] In the last century, one of Russia's archives was situated in Moscow on Bolshaya Pirogovskaya Ulitsa in a two-story detached building, built especially to hold the archives. Over the centuries many Moscow institutions have changed addresses, but the archive managed to hang on to its residence permit, crowding up to the massive modern depositories in the next block. Time confidently passes under its archway, like a picture in a frame, in order to preserve it for posterity. The building currently houses both the Central State Archive of Historical Documents of the USSR and the Main Archives Administration of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Our conversation with Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor F. Vaganov, chief of the Main Archives Administration at the USSR Council of Ministers, concerns the draft USSR Law "On the USSR Archives."

[Maksimova] Fedor Mikhaylovich, what caused the draft law "On the USSR Archives" to be drawn up?

[Vaganov] The short answer is—life itself. The USSR State Archives are an integral part of our national cultural heritage. They are the historical memory of the people. The country has a unique collection of archival documents on the history of the Fatherland from ancient times to the present day. There are 355 million items in storage. In terms of the volume of archival materials we occupy one of the top places in the world.

[Maksimova] Excuse me, I'm interrupting you, but how many documents are there in the archives of the world's leading countries—for comparison?

[Vaganov] It's hard to make a comparison, because in many foreign states, the volume of archival documents is measured in kilometers.

[Maksimova] How can that be?

[Vaganov] Very simple. They tell you approximately like this: "In our archives there are so-and-so many kilometers of documents." And the total length of shelving on which the archives are situated is entered in the estimate.

However, let us return to the topic of our conversation. Up to the present time the organization of the USSR State Archives and its corresponding institutions has been regulated in a legal respect by government acts: the Sovnarkom Decree, "On the Reorganization and Centralization of Archive Matters in the RSFSR," was signed 1 June 1918 by V.I. Lenin, as well as the statutes on the USSR GAF [State Archives], approved by the Government of the USSR.

But right now, as intensive work has begun on forming a law-governed state, such a cultural treasure as the USSR Archives require a legal act of a higher order—corresponding to the law of the highest organ of state power. Given responsibility for drafting the act were USSR Glavarkhiv [Main Archives Administration], the USSR Ministries of Justice and Culture, the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The draft law was prepared by these organizations, and it was discussed in the working collectives of state archives, of which there are 3,269, and at many departmental archives as well. The draft law was also examined by union republic councils of ministers, at ministries and agencies, at scientific institutions, and at other organizations. Discussion of the draft law also took place at the scientific council of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau on Social Development. Last October the draft law had been approved on the whole by the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. Presently the draft is being completed.

[Maksimova] On what is the draft of the law based?

[Vaganov] First of all, in drafting the law we were guided primarily by Leninist principles of building archives in a socialist state, the vital interests of which have been proven in practical social experience. Secondly, the draft is based upon the historical experience of organizing archive affairs in our country and the effectiveness of such normative acts previously in effect, such as the statutes on the USSR State Archives. Thirdly, numerous suggestions and remarks by archival institutions, agencies, scientific and academic institutions and the public at large, were taken into consideration. And finally, preparation of the draft law was carried out in consideration of modern organization of archival matters in other countries.

[Maksimova] Fedor Mikhaylovich, I have familiarized myself with the draft law, and have come to the conclusion that its essence lies primarily in democratization of archival matters. The archives must become more accessible, both for specialists and for anyone interested in the history of his country.

[Vaganov] That is true. Article 24 of the draft law contains an important statement on establishing public councils at USSR Glavarkhiv and at archival institutions at union republic councils of ministers, for the purpose of democratization of the administration of archival matters. Incidentally, we have already established such a council at the Main Archives Administration. It consists of 93 people—scholars, and figures in culture and the arts. Chief of the council is USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member N. Bolkhovitinov. And work is under way to organize an All-Union Society of Archivists.

The state archives and their working collectives have now been rights which permit them to independently resolve all questions of archive work, production and social life.

[Maksimova] Article 20 of the draft law states that documents in the archives shall be available for use from the time of arrival for permanent storage at the state archives. Does this mean that they can be demanded then and there?

[Vaganov] Every year the state archives receive up to 3.5 million new documents that fall under the purview of USSR GAF, for storage. They may be received immediately after arrival at the archives.

[Maksimova] But what about foreign researchers?

[Vaganov] Every year up to 300 foreign researchers visit the state archives. A number of the provisions of the draft law do regulate the practice of use of archival documents by foreign citizens in accordance with the rules of international agreements.

[Maksimova] What are foreign researches interested in?

[Vaganov] Their range of interests varies widely—the many periods of history of our country. And certain ones are searching for the sources of their own family tree.

[Maksimova] And yet, access to some of the archival documents is still restricted...

[Vaganov] Yes, that is so. In any country (and ours is no exception) there are materials, the content of which touch upon especially important state interests, military or official secrets. Limitations on their use are established by the draft law for a period of up to 30 years from the time of their creation. I stress that in Soviet archival practice this is the first time that such a period has been established, for it did not exist previously—which led to unjustified restrictions on the use of archival documents. Over the past three years, Soviet state archives have removed these unjustified restrictions, and 7.4 million documents in storage have been transferred to the open access category.

[Maksimova] Is that a lot or a little?

[Vaganov] Judge for yourself. Today about 2.5 percent of the total volume of documents stored in the state archives are in the secret category. Furthermore, work on declassifying documents is continuing.

[Maksimova] Fedor Mikhaylovich, as is well-known, a group of instructors at the Moscow Historical-Archive Institute and associates at the State and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences have prepared an alternative (in the spirit of the times!) draft law about the USSR Archives. Are you familiar with it?

[Vaganov] Of course; although unlike our author's collective, which as I said has disseminated our own draft

law among many organizations—to include our colleagues at the institutions you mentioned—USSR Glavarkhiv has not received a copy of the draft law which they drew up. For us, any alternative is of interest; therefore, we did find an opportunity to acquaint ourselves with this document, and we have adopted certain of the ideas expounded in it in our own draft law. Last November, discussion of the alternative draft law was held at the Historical Archive Institute. Taking part in it were USSR Glavarkhiv Deputy Chief A. Yel'patyevskiy and other archivists. And they expounded their points of view on that document. Now we would like to invite the author's collective of the alternative draft law to sit down at a "round table" and carry out joint work with us.

[Maksimova] And one final question: What significance will the USSR Law on Archives have?

[Vaganov] It will be extremely important. Adoption of the law by the highest organ of state power will lay the authoritative legal foundation for the organization of the USSR Archives, as well as other archival matters in the country. The law will ensure the legal protection of the USSR Archives, which are a unique culture] property of the nations of our country. All this will further the necessary increase in the role of archives in the life of the Soviet state, and more effective participation of the institutions of the USSR State Archives services in carrying out the policy of perestroika.

Officials Comment on Planned Public Access to Foreign Media, Copiers

90US0530B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian; No 5, Jan 90 p 12

[Article by L. Chernenko: "The Bans Have Been Lifted"]

[Text] And now the number of foreign newspapers and magazines freely coming into the country has increased; measures are being taken to provide the Soviet people the opportunity to watch foreign television via satellite, and access to video products and xeroxes.

Have you seen the London TIMES, the Italian MES-SAGERO, and the West German SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG at the news stand, right next to PRAVDA? Not just yet, right? "But soon you will see them and you will be able to buy them," authoritatively declares USSR Goskompechat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade] Deputy Chairman I.P. Korovkin. "Even now, for example, these well-known foreign publications are being sold at 40 Soyuzpechat news stands in Moscow. A copy of the English TIMES costs 80 kopecks, the Italian CORRIERE DELLA SERA is 60 kopecks, and the American magazine TIME—3 rubles. In all, 264 different newspapers and magazines from 47 capitalist and developing countries are being sold in our country, by subscription or at news stands.

"Various periodicals from the USA, England, France, the FRG and other countries are arriving to be sold

freely in all cities in the USSR. The overall one-time circulation of these publications increased more than twofold in 1990, as compared with last year. Measures are being taken to further expand the volume and range of titles, and to develop a system of free sale of foreign periodical publications in the USSR. We are primarily striving to ensure that our readers have access to the most authoritative foreign socio-political, literary-artistic, scientific-popular and other periodicals. Enterprises, institutions and organizations, as well as cooperatives are now authorized to subscribe to foreign publications. Payment is made in foreign currency [valyuta] at their own expense. Citizens having a foreign currency account may also do so."

And here is information received from the USSR Ministry of Communications: limitations have been lifted on sending via international post articles from domestic radio, video and musical electronic devices; as well as foodstuffs, microcomputers for personal use and accessories for them; also the ban has been lifted on religious literature, and collections of works by Russian, Soviet and foreign authors. All this promotes expansion of cultural exchange and freer spread of information.

Of course not everyone can subscribe to foreign publications or purchase one at a stand. But if, nevertheless, one suddenly wishes to page through the *FINANCIAL TIMES*, for example? There is a solution—the library reading rooms. But before, as is well-known, here too foreign periodicals were kept under "special protection." And it was not easy to obtain access to them. Has this situation changed now?

"Yes," replied USSR Deputy Minister of Culture N.P. Silkova. "We have given instructions to provide free access to foreign periodical publications in all reading rooms of libraries and cultural information centers. Copying and reproducing equipment will be more widely used in libraries. We are striving to more fully satisfy the demands of readers who wish to have xerox copies of the materials they need. Moreover, we are interested in developing this kind of service for a fee; after all, that will bring us profits. But, alas; there are not enough xeroxes—not even at the USSR State Library imeni V.I. Lenin, not to mention the libraries of the non-chernozem zone..."

"Here I must note that at present, institutions, enterprises, organizations, cooperatives and citizens as well, are authorized to use copying-reproducing equipment for copying any materials, the content of which does not conflict with constitutional norms and the laws in effect in the country. In other words, a person may have a xerox in his home, and this would not be considered an 'underground printing plant.' After all, for people in many professions this is just as necessary as, let's say, a typewriter."

Specialists estimate that there are 3,000,000 video tape recorders in the USSR. This, of course, is very few and here we significantly lag behind not only European

standards—we do not even come up to the level of many developing countries. While our own industry does not yet have the capacity to satisfy public demand for video equipment, how can we expand the opportunities for people to have access to video products?

"There is one way out—to expand the system of video salons," says USSR Goskino Deputy Chairman O.V. Uralov. "In 1988 1,000 video salons and 500 video cassette libraries were opened in the country. Manufacture of video products is growing. Last year its volume amounted to 94.5 hours—more than a major film studio such as 'Mosfilm' produces in a year. In 1990 the volume will be 100, and in 1995—300 hours. Every year we purchase 100 foreign films for video. Even now our video cassette libraries contain 1,300 titles, and of these—120 are programs made especially for video. We have greater hopes for opening a system of commercial cable and broadcast video networks. Connecting to it for a certain fee, television viewers will be able to view specially-prepared programs and films. This could to a certain extent become an alternative to the 'video piracy' that is now growing wildly, in which its entrepreneurs, by some estimates, receive over five billion rubles a year. At present a video-broadcasting consortium is being set up in Leningrad. There are plans to organize a similar commercial network in Moscow as well."

Satellite television promises truly revolutionary changes in our world of information as well. The Soviet people will receive the capability to receive foreign programs. Just when will this occur?

"In 1991 receiving equipment for satellite television will appear in the trade system," says N.A. Loginov, chief specialist at the Department of Transport and Communications, USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs. "Preparatory work has been under way for a long time. First of all, the experience of many foreign countries in this matter was studied, and both technical and legal questions have come up here. Specialists from union republic ministries of communication, Gosteleradio and lawyers have prepared drafts of certain normative documents. Working on experimental models of receiving equipment for direct reception from satellites are Astra, a Moscow scientific-production association; the Banga production association in Kaunas; the Vitebsk Radio Plant, and other collectives. According to preliminary estimates, one set of equipment will cost from five to seven thousand rubles.

"But I believe it is necessary to warn those citizens who are all ready to invest large sums of money for such receiving equipment: before making that decision, one has to know their real capabilities. The fact of the matter is, that communication satellites have highly-directional antennas for certain territories. Considering the vast size of our country, the level of television signals in, let's say, the Baltic, Moscow and the Far East, would vary. For example, right now in the capital one can reliably receive only one foreign program. For this one needs an antenna with a two-meter diameter. But if one wants to receive

several foreign programs, an antenna with a diameter of more than four meters is required. Otherwise the picture on the screen of your television would be unstable. Of course it makes no sense to have such a massive antenna for individual reception. And that is why proposals are being drawn up on procedures for installing collective antennas, and rules for using them.

"Also under study are the possibilities for organizing transmission of Soviet satellite television to foreign countries.

"And there is still another innovation: the Ministry of Communications has submitted a proposal to USSR Gosstandart to revise the state standard for radio receivers. The new standard envisages expanding the short-wave band. Industry will soon commence manufacture of such radio receivers."

Thus, soon "dishes" of satellite antennas on the roofs of our homes, and bright multicolored covers of foreign magazines in Soyuzpechat news stands will be a common sight. The criminal aura around xeroxes will dissolve, and video will be more accessible. And the band-limitations on radio receivers will expand. Thus we are moving the boundaries of our information world. Essentially, glasnost will receive new dimensions.

Chief Editor Grigoryants on Function, Future of Journal GLASNOST

*90US0445A Sverdlovsk URAL in Russian
No 12, Dec 89 pp 156- 164*

[Interview with Sergey Ivanovich Grigoryants, chief editor of GLASNOST independent journal, by Nina Konstantinovna Maksimova: "Not To 'Expose,' But To Understand One Another"; first two paragraphs are URAL introduction]

[Text] Many samizdat publications of earlier years are now the best sellers of the official press. It seems that the unprecedented expansion of the permissible sphere would have eliminated samizdat—as something unnecessary—but something unforeseen happened instead: The number of "independent" periodicals actually rose, and quite perceptibly. The samizdat bulletins and journals which were already quite apparent in 1988 and 1989 have now become such an important part of the spiritual life of our society that they can no longer be ignored. Our inherited stereotypes cause us to view "unauthorized" journalism as the work of invariably hostile and invariably destructive forces. This opinion has certainly been expressed in the official press more than once. The new thinking, which we are just mastering now, will not permit the mechanical repetition of someone else's opinions, and if someone's passion for argument or his spiritual torment will not stay within the prescribed confines, we must not be in too much of a hurry to condemn him before we have heard what he has to say.

This is why Sergey Ivanovich Grigoryants, who seems to us to be the most qualified representative of samizdat in

our country, is addressing the readers of URAL today. The conversation with him was conducted by journalist Nina Konstantinovna Maksimova.

[Maksimova] They say that this journal is sold on the newsstands in Paris and New York. In our country it is not sold openly. The official Soviet press refers to it in strictly accusing tones. In any case, all of the articles I have read (in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, TRUD, and other periodicals) have hinted at GLASNOST's corrupt "overseas" connections. Furthermore, the "accused" has never been given a chance to speak.... This is why I decided to fill this gap when I was in Moscow on business and arranged for a meeting with GLASNOST publisher and chief editor S.I. Grigoryants.

Sergey Ivanovich, have you read the articles in the official press with all of the derogatory remarks about you and your journal? Have the authors of these articles tried to contact you or other members of the GLASNOST staff?

[Grigoryants] The one that made the biggest impression on me was the article by Iona Andronov in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA last year, where I was called an American spy and the organizer of the uprisings in the Ukraine, in Latvia, and among the Crimean Tatars. This article was later cited as an authoritative source by lecturers and by authors of articles in other newspapers. Few people know that Iona Andronov's article caused an international scandal. The American journalists Iona Andronov quoted demanded that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA print a retraction because their remarks had been distorted. The retraction was never printed, but this incident and a few others had repercussions, and Iona Andronov was deported from the United States.

Articles in almost all of the central newspapers portrayed me either as a CIA agent or as a secret millionaire, or even as a top-level international mafioso, and alleged that GLASNOST was someone's "mouthpiece" and that the GLASNOST staff was "unscrupulous." We stopped paying attention to them long ago. As a rule, the authors of these articles did not try to contact us. I have never even met many of them. There is no indication in their articles that they have ever read even a single issue of GLASNOST.

I remember only two cases in which journalists who were writing clearly uncomplimentary articles about GLASNOST wanted to meet me. As soon as our first issue had come out, a correspondent from VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA came to see me and urged me not to publish the journal. As he put it, why would there be any need for an independent GLASNOST when there is enough glasnost in party press organs today?

[Maksimova] Well, why and how did GLASNOST come into being? Was there a need for it? What subjects and readers does it address? I read a few issues and noticed a prevalence of articles championing human rights....

[Grigoryants] The first issue of GLASNOST came out in June 1987. It was relatively easy for me to establish the journal because I had experience in samizdat activity. In 1982 and 1983 I published a bulletin reporting violations of human rights and containing information about courts, prisons, and camps. I was convicted of this in 1983. When I was released from prison in February 1987, I looked up other people who had been involved in publishing these materials but had remained at liberty because their names were not listed in the investigation files. The periodical acquired characteristics corresponding, in my opinion, to the society's new needs during the first year of our work.

We decided to publish the journal openly, without any underground printing presses or conspiracy. The very name of the journal demanded this. We tried to register GLASNOST as a cooperative, but our request was denied. To this day, it is as if we do not exist officially, even though our 30th issue is already coming out and we cannot complain that people have not paid enough attention to us.

It was clear from the very beginning that the defense of human rights, which was a salient feature of yesterday's samizdat, was no longer enough (evidently, you read some of the first issues, in which this topic was still predominant). We also started writing about the economy, ecology, youth, religion, and many other topics and tried to address every aspect of our life, without which intelligent solutions to pressing global problems would be impossible. In the declaration we printed in our first issue, we promised to provide a forum for all groups which had not been able, for any reason whatsoever, to express their views in the official press. We said we would present more complete information about processes occurring in the country to the population and to the leadership. After all, the leadership is often also in need of objective information because the official Soviet press is a state establishment, and this is not always conducive to informational accuracy. We also said we wanted to give the entire world information about a country which arouses the interest of all and the fear of some.

Later we defined another goal—we wanted to unite socially active forces with those who might be called the spirit and intellect of the nation.... Unfortunately, the Russian intelligentsia is passive and has never displayed the kind of unity we have seen in the Caucasus or in the Baltic republics, but we did not lose our hope of uniting the progressive forces with democratic ambitions in our society by publishing articles, both by officially acknowledged and by disgraced authors, and information about all unofficial associations.

When we began hearing from people who had given up searching for justice in state establishments, we opened a public reception room. Unfortunately, GLASNOST could not publish even a hundredth of the extraordinary experiences of our visitors. If a man came to see me and said that he had been out of work for a year, I would try

to give him aid and comfort, but I knew that we would not be able to print his story because we had already been contacted by 100 people who had been out of work for 10 years.... We had to look into the most disastrous situations. After all, our periodical was the last chance these people had to attract someone's attention.

It is not only that we are trying to help these people; they are also helping us acquire a fuller understanding of what is going on within the society.

[Maksimova] And did this public reception room help you make certain discoveries?

[Grigoryants] Yes. When people started coming to us from all parts of the country, we learned that the misuse of psychiatry had become the most prevalent form of repression in recent years, and the most frightening form. No one realized this. It was a simpler way of taking revenge than putting the person on trial and sentencing him to prison. According to the world press, known dissidents were being locked up in "loony bins." This was also happening, however, to thousands of unknown individuals. A trial, after all, can be so much trouble and can involve so many different people and different courts. No grounds are needed for the "loony bin." If you do something to arouse the resentment of a rayispolkom secretary or a militiaman, all he has to do is call a physician from the mental hospital and you will be "put away" and you might be turned into a cripple. For the rest of your life you will have no rights because your insanity has already been diagnosed....

After our articles were printed, the chief psychiatrist of the USSR had to admit that 5 million people were on record in the country's mental hospitals. Three million were to be taken off the rolls this year. This means that they were on record for no good reason.

[Maksimova] That is a good example of the power of the printed word.... How would you evaluate the impact of your articles? Are you frequently able to help the people who come to you with their troubles and to influence events?

[Grigoryants] Some of the stories we hear are simply incredible! In one of our first issues we printed an article about the dismissal of Vakhtang Gurgeneidze, the director of the Literature and Arts Archives in Tbilisi who had decided to present a report on the circumstances of Ilya Chavchavadze's murder. Chavchavadze was a great Georgian poet and prominent public spokesman who was recently canonized by the Georgian Orthodox Church. All of the books say he was killed in 1907 by agents of the tsar's secret police. In a report based on materials in the archives, however, Vakhtang Gurgeneidze said that Ilya Chavchavadze was killed by members of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. Furthermore, Makharadze (who was later the first secretary of the Georgian Central Committee and was later buried in the Pantheon next to Chavchavadze) and Sergo Ordzhonikidze were closely implicated in the assassination. It goes without saying that the man was

dismissed from his job, he was expelled from the party, and his report was banned. After we printed our article, Patiashvili, who was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party until recently, called him in for a meeting, informed him that he could return to his job, and started to hand his party membership card to him. The man said: "First allow me to present my report and then offer me the card." Patiashvili tried to talk him out of this (all of this happened just before the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution), saying: "Just let us celebrate the anniversary of the revolution first, and then you can present your report." In view of the fact that the director was driven out of the archives and out of the party with the aid of the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, it is clear that the article motivated people at the highest levels of our hierarchy to intervene.

After articles of this kind have been published, the authorities usually try to make it up to the person who has suffered from the flaws in the system. Sometimes this is not enough to bring the person's life back to normal. It is particularly difficult to help a person who has made the rounds of all of the official departments, has aroused the personal hatred of personnel of the USSR Procuracy, the Commission for Party Control, etc., and who then begins to display his own hatred for the system which is trying to crush him like a bug.... We have to take up the fight for this person and devote several articles to his story. Sometimes we are able to effect changes for the better even in these cases.

[Maksimova] The effectiveness of GLASNOST evidently stems from the international repercussions of some of its articles.... Have you ever been able to get results by going through official channels? Or is there an impenetrable wall between them and the illegitimate GLASNOST?

[Grigoryants] We have been submitting requests to official agencies more frequently. And we get replies. Incidentally, they are not as formal as the ones the official newspapers and journals usually get; they are often quite specific and emotional. We also receive "responses" to GLASNOST articles. Sometimes they even thank us for our suggestions. Chairman Saykin of the Moscow Gornispolkom thanked Director Myasnikov of our public reception room for the suggestion to open hostels and inexpensive hotels and promised to look into the matter. We got this idea from the people who came to GLASNOST to tell us about their problems and had no place to spend the night but the railroad station.

[Maksimova] How many people read GLASNOST regularly? Who are they? Are they the personnel of the KGB, CPSU Central Committee, and USSR Procuracy? Emigrants? Members of unofficial organizations? The Moscow intellectual elite? The humiliated and outraged? Or are they the "masses," the population, the people?

[Grigoryants] People in the highest official establishments apparently do not simply read GLASNOST but also study it (like an enemy they have to know and understand). Our readers are intellectuals and people with little education, people of different status and convictions from all strata of the population in our country, emigrants and citizens of other countries. Our broad range of readers gives rise to many difficulties, but it is also the basis of GLASNOST's social role and influence. This is why the range is constantly being broadened as our subject matter, contacts, and functions are broadened. Today we not only put out a journal; we also work with Western radio stations and television companies and publish a daily newspaper in French and Spanish in Paris. The same kind of newspaper will be published in New York and has begun to be published in Moscow as the organ of the new trade union of independent journalists in the USSR. All members of the union will receive this chronicle of the events which receive little or no coverage in the official press. The chronicle will be supplemented by comments on the latest issues of samizdat journals and newspapers and the most interesting articles in the provincial press. These newspapers do not have a large readership yet, but there is every indication that it will grow.

The readers of the journal itself in the Soviet Union number a few thousand, and outside the Soviet Union they number around 30,000. There is no comparison with the millions of readers of official newspapers, but we recently realized that GLASNOST's influence and popularity are far in excess of its circulation figures. Even people who have never read the journal talk about GLASNOST and come to our public reception room.

[Maksimova] In what languages does GLASNOST speak to its readers?

[Grigoryants] According to the latest reports, in 12 European languages. There are three regular overseas editions (Russian and French editions in Paris and an English edition in New York). I learned about a German edition in Switzerland when a friend sent me a copy. We are not always told about the new editions of GLASNOST and we do not oversee them because we are not publishing the journal for commercial purposes. We do not sell it. We give it to distributors and publishers for free. We allow them to sell GLASNOST, but the Moscow editorial office does not earn an income from this.

[Maksimova] What do you live on? After all, you are not paid a salary by the state? Your whole economic base could not consist only of voluntary contributions!

[Grigoryants] Yes, I have to tell you about our economic base, because there has been so much speculation about this in the official press.... We have had many offers of help (and not only financial). GLASNOST has acquired volunteer distributors and reporters (personal correspondents) in all of the big cities in the country. Many of them came to us for help and later decided to help us. Graphic artists have already designed 10 or 15 covers for us. Art

exhibits and concerts are organized to raise money for us. Yesterday we received an offer of support from a cooperative in Ust-Ilimsk. A psychiatrist in Odessa gave me 500 rubles. He refused to make false diagnoses and was driven out of the mental hospital where he worked. Nevertheless, he was able—in the rarest of cases!—to win reinstatement and to get compensation for his involuntary absence, and he sent the money to us. We accepted help from him because he no longer needs our help.

Why am I emphasizing this? Because we do not accept donations from everyone. We will not take anything from the visitors to the public reception room who have come to GLASNOST for help. We are cautious about accepting foreign donations. We see the contributions more as evidence of the need for our existence than as a serious financial source. After all, they are sporadic. We cannot open an account for them in a bank or even enter them in a bankbook.

For the first 7 or 8 months the editorial staff (it then consisted of 10 people—only a third of its present size) lived on my royalties. I became a correspondent of the oldest newspaper in Norway purely by chance. One of its reporters interviewed me and then asked me to send the paper reports on the USSR twice a week. The Norwegians even tried to accredit me, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delayed the matter for so long that the contract with the newspaper lapsed.

Now GLASNOST makes most of its money by working with foreign television companies. Our camera team goes to all of the "hot spots" in the country. Our first film to be seen all around the world showed the February rallies in Yerevan. Some people believed the reports in newspapers about rallies in the USSR and some did not believe them, but this was the first time that people abroad saw a million people gathering in a square in a Soviet city, a million excited and united people singing national songs. The world learned that there was a public movement in the Soviet Union. Our videocassette showing Baku before and during the state of martial law was the only one of its kind. The authorities in Baku helped our cameramen: They guarded them and reserved a room for them in an Inturist hotel overlooking the square where the rallies were held. Members of our staff are frequently allowed to buy priority airplane tickets. Of course, sometimes the authorities have detained them and have threatened to destroy their equipment.

We have a great deal of video coverage of Estonia, of the Baltic Assembly where the "popular fronts" gathered, and of the National Independence Party congress. We filmed an Easter service of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which is still outlawed, in the woods, and we filmed the trial of human rights activist Sergey Kuznetsov in Sverdlovsk. We are planning film coverage of some ecological issues. We record whatever might be of interest to the whole world. We film the "sore spots" which have hardly been mentioned yet in the official

press.... Our cooperation with Western television companies and radio stations is not only a way of making money, but also a logical extension of our journal and newspaper work. We see our foreign colleagues, television viewers, readers, and radio audience not as enemies, but as people who realize that what is happening in Russia today is important to the future of mankind.

Because we are constantly broadening the scales of GLASNOST, the money we earn from our cooperation with television companies might not be enough. We will be offering subscriptions to the journal (but not through Soyuzpechat, of course). Each issue will cost around 10 rubles.

[Maksimova] More than 10 times as much as any "thick" journal....

[Grigoryants] All unofficial publications are expensive because of their low circulation figures and difficulties with equipment. Issues of GLASNOST are sold for 25 rubles on the black market. When we offer subscriptions, we will obstruct this trade. When our circulation figures rise, we can lower the price. At this time it is impossible to compare us with the journals printed on state printing equipment.

[Maksimova] If it is not a secret, what are the members of the GLASNOST staff paid?

[Grigoryants] From 100 to 200 rubles.

[Maksimova] Does the exact amount depend on their qualifications?

[Grigoryants] On qualifications and on personal circumstances.... Many do not want financial assistance from the editors. They feel that their work for GLASNOST satisfies a spiritual need. They make their living elsewhere. We talk some of them into taking money from us. Otherwise, they might have to spend so much of their time earning a living that the quality of the journal will be affected.

[Maksimova] What kind of economic entity is GLASNOST? Is it a cooperative, a communal enterprise, or a private enterprise?

[Grigoryants] I am not sure.... It is a group of like-minded people.

[Maksimova] Unanimity on the staff of an independent journal?

[Grigoryants] Not the kind of unanimity you mean! We all have serious differences of opinion: The people who work on GLASNOST are non-religious and religious, and the latter are Catholic, Adventist, and Orthodox. There are nationalists, there are people committed to political struggle, and there are cosmopolitans. All of us, however, are united by a belief in the importance of a free press and genuine pluralism, which, I hope, is noticeable in our journal. We give people with different points of view a chance to explain their position. This

includes people with views which do not seem progressive to me and my colleagues. We printed a letter from A. Kazantsev, the Novosibirsk leader of Pamyat, along with his denunciation of us, comparing GLASNOST to the journals which once fostered the rebellions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We are editing an anti-Semitic article by Kolchugin (the pseudonym of a group of writers from official publications). We will print it next to an article discussing the range of attitudes toward these common stereotypes. This is a dialogue, an attempt not to "expose," but to understand one another, valuable in light of the present exacerbation of social animosity now that numerous antagonistic groups have come into being in the country.

[Maksimova] It sounds as though GLASNOST is consistently helping the country recover its health. It records pathogenic processes earlier and more courageously than the official news media. It is establishing the informal international contacts without which Russia cannot hope to become part of the world economy and world culture again. The fact that it is still being portrayed as an enemy of the country is not evidence of a misunderstanding, but an indicator of the severity of the illness of the state structure. Foreign radio "voices" have reported that the harassment of GLASNOST has not been confined to articles in newspapers....

[Grigoryants] Militia cars have been stationed in front of our doorway. Militiamen still occasionally burst into the apartments where we live, work, and receive guests (we have no separate editorial offices).

The raid on the dacha in Kratovo, where the editorial staff was located at the beginning of last year, was absolutely gangsterlike. We had already paid the money for the dacha, but we had not filled out all of the papers yet, and there is no question that the authorities knew this.

The militiamen came close to killing the official owner of the dacha, a 93-year-old woman who had been bedridden for a year. They dragged her to the dacha. I tried to tell her who I was, but she had only seen my wife when she signed the papers.... They pushed me aside, hit me on the head, accused me of assaulting the militiamen, and dragged me to the militia station, where I was under arrest for 7 days. My wife, who had brought the rental agreement with her, was not allowed to enter the dacha, and neither was anyone else. The deputy procurator of Ramenskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast was present when all of this happened.

Personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB treated the dacha as if it were their own for around 2 months, although they did not even have a search warrant. Later we were allowed to retrieve what was left of the broken furniture and one-fourth of our library. Nothing else was left. We calculated the value of the stolen items at 70,000 rubles. We lost the personal computer the RSFSR union had given me and two typewriters, a huge archive, including single copies of

manuscripts and around 500 copies of GLASNOST, and many of our personal possessions.

In the 2 years of GLASNOST's existence, criminal proceedings have been instituted against me twice, and I have been arrested three times. The last time I was arrested was during the demonstrations on the anniversary of the February revolution. The colonel commanding the dispersal spotted me in a group of Western journalists: "Why hasn't Grigoryants been arrested yet?" He sent around 20 of his men after me.... I was sentenced to 10 days for attending an unauthorized rally and for allegedly shouting slogans. I remembered that the foreign journalists had filmed them dragging me to the car, and I asked that the file on the case include this videotape and the testimony of witnesses. My request was denied. I asked for an attorney. The attorney said he would not defend me. I asked for a chance to choose an attorney who would agree to defend me. My request was denied.

What an interesting situation! As a member of the International Federation of Journalists, I am defended in all such situations by numerous international organizations. But in my own country.... Even attorneys sympathetic to GLASNOST and to me offer us only advice after office hours and refuse to go to court with us. There is no point in petitioning the courts ourselves to redress the damages caused by the slander in the articles and the brutality of officers of the law. We receive formal or cynical replies or none at all. A trial date had already been set in the case of the article by Iona Andronov, but the entire matter was suddenly turned over to another judge for no good reason whatsoever. The new judge sent us a shocking response: He said that we had not submitted the petition in triplicate as we should have and that he was therefore returning the document. The returned papers included the previous judge's receipt for the three copies of the complaint. They had not even bothered to remove it from the file. The response to the complaint about the dacha burglary I had sent to the RSFSR Procuracy came from the procuracy of Moscow Oblast. It said that I was completely to blame for everything because I had broken the law by setting up a printing and publishing business in the dacha. We still do not have any printing equipment even now, but this lie was repeated in a TASS news release. And Chairman Nazarov of the Soviet Committee for Human Rights declared at a press conference in Paris that I had allegedly been arrested in the dacha for beating up old women. When I saw him at the Soviet-Danish conference, he excused himself: "After all, I told them that this was only a preliminary report...."

[Maksimova] Have these harsh sanctions been imposed on all GLASNOST associates, or are you the main target?

[Grigoryants] I am treated more harshly. This is completely understandable.

[Maksimova] Who is Sergey Ivanovich Grigoryants? Why has the administrative system declared war on him? Why is he the head of the well-known independent journal?

[Grigoryants] My biography has a happy beginning. I was born in Kiev in 1941. My parents were intellectuals. In my youth I was interested in engineering and I attended a technical VUZ. In 1963 I enrolled in the School of Journalism at Moscow State University. I transferred to the correspondence division in my second or third year because I was already in charge of the criticism department of YUNOST magazine. I studied Russian literature of the early 20th century and emigre literature. I corresponded with many writers living in the West and had relatives abroad. I had meetings with people who had annoyed the authorities. The times were changing, and they had already arrested Sinyavskiy, with whom I had a good relationship....

In 1967 I was expelled from Moscow State University. The initial grounds for this were academic deficiencies (I had none), and later the reason was professional incompetence (although my articles had been printed in ZNAMYA, YUNOST, and NOVYY MIR and in the "Literary Encyclopedia"). I appealed to the university administrators and to a jurist; then Vice-President Shvets of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (my grandfather was a renowned scholar, and Shvets was one of his students) gave me a note to take to the deputy minister of higher education.... In the ministry I was told that I would be reinstated if I worked for a year and got a good reference. Why should I have to get a reference?! All of this gave me something like an ulcer.... The School of Journalism was of no damned use to me because my articles were being printed without this. I gave up.

[Maksimova] You made the same rounds as the people who ask GLASNOST for help.

[Grigoryants] This was only the first round. I had no more trouble for about 5 years after my expulsion from Moscow State University. I did not write or do anything "reprehensible." Around 1972, however, I began to be urged to collaborate with the KGB. Something had made this agency take notice of me—probably my extensive family, professional, and friendly ties. But I did not agree to do so.

In 1975 I was arrested for allegedly distributing anti-Soviet literature. In the course of my work, I had access to literature which had not been published yet. Around 10 people in Moscow, including me, received books from abroad (until 1970 fiction could enter the Soviet Union freely) and exchanged them. Literary scholarship would have been impossible without this.

They found an old and frightened writer who had been in prison and had miraculously survived, called him in for questioning, and said: "If you do not want to go back to that place.... Did you get books from Grigoryants? Write a statement about this." The fact that I had also received books from him was of no interest to anyone. No one else

was ever arrested for this. They used the same ruse to accuse me of the speculative exchange of taped movies.

They put me in Yaroslavl prison, not far from Moscow. For the next 2 years or so, KGB personnel drove out to the prison in black Volgas: "Have you changed your mind about us?" They made some feeble attempts to intimidate me and then promised me a high salary and a dacha in a good location, but they could not talk me into it.

After I was released (in 1980), I was not allowed to live in Moscow. I had to live 100 kilometers away and visit my family two or three times a month. I worked as a controller in a gas boiler room and grew vegetables. I also published a samizdat news bulletin, for which I was sentenced to 7 years in prison and 3 in exile in 1983. I was released before my sentence was up, and I owe this primarily to Academician A.D. Sakharov, who included me among the people whose release he demanded from the head of state.... First they put me in a punishment cell, where I was visited by Ovcharov, the head of the USSR Procuracy department overseeing KGB investigations. He asked me to write a statement, and it was a statement I would be willing to write at any time: If Soviet law enforcement agencies strictly observe all Soviet laws, the Constitution of the USSR, and all pacts on human rights ratified by the Soviet Union, I will have no reason to come into conflict with them. I was released soon afterward.

[Maksimova] Foreign radio commentators reported that you had been awarded the "gold pen of freedom." There was nothing about this in our official press. What kind of award is this?

[Grigoryants] It is awarded by the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers. It happens once a year and only as a result of a unanimous decision. If there is no unanimous decision, the prize is not awarded. It has been awarded to the editors of the popular LE MONDE and CHICAGO TRIBUNE newspapers and to journalists who have worked in the world's "hot spots" and who have done much for freedom of the press. This time Vitaliy Korotich and I were nominated. The vote for me was unanimous.

[Maksimova] Have you never considered that it might be better to move to another country? How do you feel here? Like an internal emigrant?

[Grigoryants] Above all, I feel like a journalist. This surprises me because, after all, for many years I felt the same way about journalism as I do about politics. I thought it was too bad that it was hurting the country. But I flatter myself with the hope that the independent press is not repeating the mistakes of the official press yet.

I have had many offers to move.... But after all, the French established France for themselves and their children, and not for me. And I do not think that we are so much worse or so much stupider than the French, the

English, and the Americans, who have built the kind of home in which they can live without fear. Yes, we are guilty of not establishing this kind of home for ourselves. I am not a young man and I am also guilty in many respects, just as my parents and grandparents were. Even if we did not promote the evil, we were not always able to oppose it. Now we have to correct our mistakes instead of looking for a better place to live.

Our journal is not in a state of internal emigration; it is at the center of events and of the most active movement in the country. The fact that we arouse the anger of some and the selfless support of others signifies that we are also in the spiritual and emotional center, where the passions and beliefs of hundreds and thousands, if not millions, of people converge. No, I would not want to emigrate.

[Maksimova] What will happen to GLASNOST in the future?

[Grigoryants] GLASNOST cannot have a future separate from the future of the country. Regrettably, I do not have happy expectations. I am not certain that the current leadership is capable of making intelligent decisions. Endless talk eventually causes regression, and I do not mean a return to past conditions, but to worse conditions. At the beginning of perestroika much was said about larger capital investments in machine building and in the production of consumer goods ("for the people"). In fact, proportional investments in both spheres were reduced dramatically. By the same token, in spite of the talk about the reduction of the material and energy requirements of production, larger sums were invested in fuel extraction. Even in this sphere, however, production volume did not increase, but prices did. Even the "surplus slippers" have disappeared from stores and warehouses. Remaining commodity stocks do not exceed 80 billion rubles, and the budget deficit is far greater than the figures predicted by the most audacious speakers. Policy on nationality is displaying the same kind of acute signs of crisis.

Can we believe that not one person in the Soviet Union today would not try to persuade the army to "complete perestroika successfully" and "put things in order"? We need order, but what kind of order? It is already impossible to restore the people's earlier convictions: the belief that our leaders have mastered the only true doctrine, and that this gives them the right to govern. Our illusions have been destroyed, and M.S. Gorbachev did much to promote this. The government has been left with only one way to back up its decisions—with tanks. It is no coincidence that so much is being said today about the possibility of a military coup and a return to brutal dictatorship and repression. While all of the speeches were being made about democratization and about the transition to a law-governed state, several undemocratic ukases were passed (on internal troops, on the regulation of rallies and assemblies, etc.) to sanction violations of the Declaration of Human Rights. There have been reports from different cities of the arbitrary and brutal

treatment of informal social associations by local authorities, backed up by these ukases. There have been attempts in the official press to accuse these associations of extremism and of "rabid anti-Sovietism" on spurious grounds, to create an "enemy image" in their likeness, and to blame them for the exacerbation of social tension. There is little chance that this chain of events will not reach its logical conclusion.

I can only hope that the increasing severity of the crisis will teach the population something that is not at all in line with the wishes of the authorities, and that military and nationalist authoritarian regimes are possible only when a country is isolated from the rest of the world, and not under the conditions of the present flow of information.

I think that our country with its great culture cannot be turned into a third-rate power. I believe that democratic forces and alternative social relations will develop in Russia. But I do not know what will happen to us personally, to glasnost, and to our journal.... When we put out the first issue, pessimists predicted that it would be the last, and optimists believed that we would survive until 7 November 1987. When we were still alive in the new year of 1988, we were amazed.... Even today, however, we have not lost the sense that each issue could be the last. It is true that it would probably be impossible to get rid of GLASNOST without any turmoil. After all, GLASNOST has become a social force that must be taken into consideration. Many journalists of the official press and scholars with good reputations already want to work with us.

[Maksimova] Your colleague Andrey Shilkov said that GLASNOST has a chance of becoming one of the first officially authorized independent journals in our country.

[Grigoryants] If the independent press has to be "officially recognized" (and there are now around 500 such periodicals in the Soviet Union), GLASNOST, with its international prestige, will have to be recognized first, but this will mean that we are already living in a different country. Under present conditions, we can only sell part of the journal's independence for official recognition or better conditions, and then simulate independence. We will not agree to this.

[Maksimova] Did I understand you correctly: Did you say you might not agree to official registration if it requires concessions?

[Grigoryants] We are already making concessions. We have been restrained in our coverage of what might be described as reckless social groups. For example, there can be different points of view on the right of people to smoke marijuana, but in the Soviet Union it is too early to support the kind of struggle they are waging in Holland for the liberal treatment of drug addicts. We also do not print articles about the army, or we print them with discretion. In America the pacifists can break into military bases and beat missiles with hammers. In

the Soviet Union any show of interest in military installations will lead to 15 years in prison. We also impose several other restrictions on ourselves in connection with our ideas about good and evil, about the journal's status, and about the state of the society. No one can say that we act without considering the consequences.... But to agree to some other concessions in exchange for a calm life.... This is an inconspicuous way of turning an independent journal into a state establishment. Our independence is the most precious thing we have.

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New Telegraph Systems Transmit Georgian Script

90US0496A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
19 Jan 90 p 2

[GRUZINFORM Report by Boris Bochorishvili, Georgian SSR deputy minister of communications: "Georgian Script in the Telegraph Network"]

[Text] An old wish of the republic's society has been fulfilled—in the territory of Georgia, the processing of Georgian-language telegrams composed in Georgian script has begun.

This old aspiration of the republic society was also the wish of many generations of Georgian signallers. Today, it is appropriate to mention that back in the seventies, one of the oldest communications workers, Archil Karkarashvili, created a telegraph apparatus with Georgian script, operating between the cities of Tbilisi—Telavi and Tbilisi—Gurdzhaani, and several other points.

The improvement of the telegraph network and the automation of its technological processes subsequently complicated enormously the involvement of apparatus with Georgian script with the general state network. The creation of a universal apparatus equipped with Georgian, Russian, and Latin script proved impossible with the technological means in existence at that time. Therefore the experiment was not carried out on a broad scale.

The Center for Telegraph Communications Switchboard became operational in Tbilisi in 1987. Its work is based upon computer technology and offers the opportunity to introduce Georgian script into the republic's telegraph network without expanding the work force.

After the Center for Telegraph Communications Switchboard came on line, the research work for creating telegraph apparatus with universal script was intensified.

The problem was that the domestically produced telegraph apparatus do not allow for the introduction of Georgian script while simultaneously preserving the Russian and Latin scripts, and the numerals in their entirety. This is a necessary requirement presented to the apparatus as stipulated by telegraph rules and international norms.

In order to achieve the desired results in the shortest period and with minimal expenses, we chose, it can now be said with confidence, the only correct path of the several possible versions of creating a telegraph apparatus. That consists of modernizing by our own efforts the F-2000 microprocessor-type telegraph apparatus, manufactured by the GDR's RFT firm.

A group of specialists from the Tbilisi telegraph consisting of Amiran Popkhadze, Mikhail Shengeli, Ruben Azizyan, and David Kavtaradze took it upon themselves to solve this most complex technological problem. Thanks to their selfless labor and creative thinking, a universal telegraph apparatus was developed which can process telegraphic information containing Georgian, Russian, and Latin writing.

The preparation of the new universal apparatus demanded the implementation of an enormous scale of work, which was rendered to us by an number of republic enterprises and departments. First and foremost among them should be cited the labor collective the the "Elva" scientific production association, and personally, I. Tsuladze, this association's deputy general director, as well as the labor collectives of the production associations imeni 50-letiya SSSR and "Gruzelektroapparat."

Today, with a sense of special gratitude we wish to note the services of the Anton Dumbadze, Goskompechat laboratory head, who accomplished great creative work in the creation of Georgian script for introduction into the telegraph apparatus. Through its efforts, the collective of the Tbilisi Telegraph created a universal apparatus with Georgian script. Here, a highly labor-intensive job was done in a short time. As a result, we have today about 240 such apparatus. Vakhtang Kaladze, Temur Khutsishvili, Tengis Ichkitidze, Temur Kipiani, Zakhari Varamashvili, and Stanislav Triandafildi also distinguished themselves in this work.

Other jobs of no lesser importance were being carried out parallel to this. The directions for working on the telegraph apparatus with Georgian script were developed and printed. Approximately 100 telegraph workers and others were trained for work on these machines.

All the difficulties have been surmounted, and today, universal apparatus with Georgian script have been installed and are operating in communications departments numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 24, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 44, 45, 48, 52, 62, 63, 67, 77, 79, 82, 86, 96, 103, 117, and 122.

The new apparatus are also functioning in Kutaisi, Poti, Ozurgeti, Samtredia, Zugdidi, Tkibuli, Tskhaltubo, Zestafoni, Chiatura, Sachkhere, Khashuri, Borzhomi, Gori, Gurdzhaani, Telavi, Akhmeta, and Akhalitse. We have a request for the population and enterprise and institution leaders of these cities: Take advantage of the services of the communications organizations and send telegrams in Georgian writing.

The installation of universal apparatus with Georgian script is continuing in the republic's cities and rayon centers, and in the near future they will be in operation in Batumi, Sukhumi, Rustavi, Senaki, Signakhi, and Tbilisi communications departments numbers 11, 20, 23, 41, 47, 51, 53, 54, 59, 61, 65, 72, 74, 78, 89, 98, 102, 104, 115, 119, and 120.

The USSR Ministry of Communications, by whose intercession the republic received the F-2000 product of the GDR, is giving us enormous assistance in this great common national cause. A total of 200 such apparatus will be received this year. After the appropriate modifications, they will be additionally installed in almost 40 more cities and rayon centers. According to our predictions, the introduction to the general telegraph network of apparatus with Georgian script will be completed in 1991.

The introduction and operation of universal apparatus with Georgian script into the republic's telegraph network will give our workers a certain experience, and the processing of telegrams with Georgian writing and others will gradually improve. At the same time, we request of the public in the republic that distortion of Georgian words not be allowed in composing the text of telegrams, as our workers are not responsible for correcting grammatical errors. Everyone will take pleasure in receiving telegrams in Georgian script.

The start of the introduction of Georgian script into the republic's telegraph network is our concrete step in the realization of the measures envisaged by the state program for the development of the Georgian language, a vivid manifestation of the observance of national interests.

Foreign Radio Programs' Georgian Coverage Reviewed

*90US0496B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
20 Jan 90 p 4*

[Report by Tamaz Lomsadze: "Georgia in Radio Voices: The Main Topic—The Transcaucasus"]

[Text] We begin today a new weekly rubric "Georgia in Radio Voices," a review of Georgian-service radio broadcasts of the world's most diverse radio stations. Such reviews are not a tribute to the fashion; their appearance is not dictated by conjunctural considerations. After all, it is important to know how the events happening before our eyes are being portrayed and interpreted in the world.

So, radio "Voice of America" is on the air. The lead news item this week in the radio station's Georgian service were the reports from Armenia and Azerbaijan. This topic predominates both in the information reports and the analytical material. They do not distinguish themselves particularly from TASS reports or from those of the republic agencies, apparently due to the foreign correspondents' limited access.

But events in Tbilisi are not outside the field of vision. The summaries of the latest news also describe the numerous actions in front of the Government House, other Government institutions, and the Georgian CP Central Committee. And in principle, there is no analysis here; after all, for all information, the "Voice of America" relies upon EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA, the information bulletin published in Moscow.

Early in the week, the interview of "Voice of America's" European correspondent Marina Ellis with philologist Nana Makashvili, a guest in Paris, was on the air. During the interview, they spoke of the life of Georgian expatriates in Paris. We note that she became an eyewitness as to how the regular anniversary of the 1924 Georgian uprising was celebrated here. The discussion of holding church services in Paris, in the Georgian Orthodox Church, was deeply emotional. N. Makashvili particularly noted the attitude of the Georgian community, and the French doctors, toward David Paylodze, who is undergoing treatment in France. As a reminder, David Paylodze lost his vision on the tragic night of 9 April. And this is especially important—the representatives of the young generation of Georgian emigrants do not leave him unattended for a moment...

And one more report from Tbilisi—yet again on the protest actions at the House of Government. As the radio station notes, the fact that the hunger strike has united individuals of the Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalities is of particular importance.

Concerning the programs of the "Freedom" radio station, I limit myself to mere information. In reporting on the rally of Tbilisi Armenians over the interethnic clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh and the events in Baku, they note that the further course of events is difficult to predict. It is clear, however, that the national movement of Georgia is in a certain danger in connection with all of this.

Print Runs for Major Tashkent Newspapers Compared

*90US0525A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Jan 90 p 4*

[Report based on information from V.I. Mamasadykova, head of Uzbekistan's Soyuzpechat Agency: "At the Previous Level"]

[Text] The 1990 subscription campaign was much quieter than last year's. Readers are asking whether the print runs of newspapers published in Tashkent have been reduced.

Yes, some newspapers have lost some of their subscribers; others, however, have acquired new ones. But, on average, the total circulation of Tashkent publications has remained at the previous level.

Here are the January circulation figures for the main newspapers published in Tashkent:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| In Russian: | |
| PRAVDA VOSTOKA | 270,463 |
| VECHERNYY TASHKENT | 168,920 |
| TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA | 48,609 |
| KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA | 37,789 |
| FRUNZEVETS | 27,783 |
| FIZKULTURNIK UZBEKISTANA | 20,836 |
| SELSKAYA PRAVDA | 16,099 |
| In Uzbek: | |
| LENIN UCHKUNI | 1,008,380 |
| SOVET UZBEKISTONI | 880,462 |
| UZBEKISTON ADABIYETI VA SANATI | 579,245 |
| YESH LENINCHI | 509,233 |
| UKITUVCHILAR GAZETASI | 227,437 |
| TOSHKENT OKSHOMI | 139,035 |
| KISHLOK KHAKIKATI | 121,587 |
| UZBEKISTON FIZKULTURACHISI | 65,830 |
| TASHKENT KHAKIKATI | 55,964 |
| In Tajik: | |
| KHAKIKATI UZBEKISTONI | 29,861 |
| In the Crimean Tatar Language: | |
| LENIN BAYROGY | 22,763 |

This information was provided for our readers by the head of the republic's Soyuzpechat Agency, V.I. Mamasadykova.

Uzbek SSR: Cable TV Installation Begun in Fergana

90US0525B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA
in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by V. Panamarev, PRAVDA VOSTOKA special correspondent: "Home Video Channel"]

[Text] Installation of a cable television network has begun in Fergana. The ispolkom of the oblast soviet of people's deputies has taken a decision on this matter. The project was initiated by the local branch of the Soyuzteatr All-Union Creative Production Association. The latter's funds have been used to acquire the head station, produced in West Germany, as well as more than 40 kilometers of main and subscription cables, and to pay for the installation work which is being carried out. Lines are being laid in the Frunzenskiy Rayon—one of the most populated. The first phase of the network is designed for 10,000 subscribers.

"Cable television will make it possible to receive without any interference the four traditional channels—the first and second Moscow channels, as well as the first Uzbekistan and Kirghiz channels," says S. Nikonov, deputy

director of the Soyuzteatr branch. In addition, we are organizing our own studio. It will broadcast feature films made for the cinema and television, as well as feature film videos; popular-scientific and documentary tapes. It will offer selections of animated cartoons, video clips, recordings of plays, as well as academic and language programs. The following organizations will supply us on a contract basis: Sovetskoyefilm; the Oblast Film Lending Service; Nika-TV, the new Soviet telecompany; and Soyuzteatr. We will also collect our own video library. Under the heading of "Fergana Day By Day" we propose to provide programs about the life of the city, up-to-date information, reporting and advertising. We will meet interesting people, including the leaders of party and soviet organs, and enterprise managers. We are counting on the active and creative support of journalists from the oblast's newspapers and radio committee.

Cable television will operate on self-financing principles. The initial fee to join the network is 60 rubles, and the monthly payment will be 3.5 rubles. That is a little more than the cost of telephone service. Plans call for the programs to start in the next three-four months.

In our country cable television is just taking its first steps. But abroad it has withstood the test of time. In the USA, for example, cable television appeared 40 years ago. As a rule, subscribers now have a wide choice of channels. There are quite a few firms which own a cable network and companies which specialize in the production of programs for pay-TV. The possibilities of cable television are utilized in the area of education and library organization.

What are the prospects for cable television in Fergana?

The Frunzenskiy Rayon is better supplied with telephones than other places. It was for this reason that the work started here once it was decided to install the television cables with the telephone lines. It is cheaper and faster that way. A plan is also being worked out to bring the cable television network to the workers' rayon of Kirguli. Then it will be the turn of the central party of the city, including the Akhunbabayevskiy and Kalininskiy rayons.

Every day the branch receives up to a hundred requests from those wishing to receive cable television service. As of today there are more than 6,000 people on the list.

Writer Details Uzbek SSR Publishing Sector Difficulties

90US0525C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA
in Russian 13 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Kh. Shaykhov, writer and secretary of the party organization at the Yesh Gvardiya Publishing House: "Profitability and Spirituality"]

[Text] Recently I happened to be present during a conversation between two well-known Uzbek writers, one of whom is also an experienced publisher.

"With economic accountability [khozaschet], we are forced to publish mass demand books in order to make a profit, and the lion's share of paper is used for them," complained the publisher.

"That won't do!," the writer stated categorically in reply. You have to choose either profitability or ideology. And what do you get? Making money at the expense of our national literature means inflicting harm upon our spiritual culture.

The whole problem is that they are demanding both from us! Many consider books by young authors to be unprofitable, and they are the first to be crossed off the lists of books scheduled for publication. But are we not pulling out the roots of our future? We need to look for other ways to obtain income, and if you want to, you can find them.

In recent years we have heard often that the time of books has passed, that technology reigns now. The cinema, radio, television, all kinds of "visuals," tape recorders, and record players are more convenient and accurate transmitters of words and thoughts, and they are already crowding out books. Soon, it is claimed, their cultural-historical mission will recede into the past. "What a narrow outlook, what a short-sighted view," says "Stefan Tsveyg." "For where and when has technology managed to create even one miracle which could surpass or even be compared to the miracle which was revealed to us a thousand years ago in the book? Chemistry has not invented an explosive which could shake the world more; there is no steel or reinforced concrete which could surpass the longevity of this small heap of paper covered with printed signs. Not one source of energy has yet managed to create the kind of light which has emerged at times from a small volume, and no electrical current will ever possess such power as the electricity found in the printed word. An unaging and invincible power, a power not subject to time, a power most concentrated and in the most saturated and diverse form—that is what a book is!"

Book publishing today has turned into an ordinary, everyday affair, and in the hustle and bustle of it we frequently forget our enormous responsibility to the present and future generations of readers. After all, books are designed for them. Publishers are justly accused of putting out a multitude of literary items amounting to a gray literature. Our publishing house, Yesh Gvardiya is no exception. Frequently we put out books in which the main characters are today's school-children or older students, and relations between them are the same as they were in the 50's. But today's young reader will not buy a bad book. And so it remains on the bookstore shelves, gathering dust over the years.

We used to strive to submit manuscripts for production ahead of time and correspondingly to fulfill the plan ahead of time. Our own plans, it goes without saying, we are obliged to fulfill. But how? With steady, regular and, most importantly, with high-quality work. And the result

of this work is a well-written, beautifully-designed book with real substance. It is the only criterion on which to judge our efforts.

How is perestroika proceeding in publishing? USSR Goskomizdat (State Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Publishing, Printing and the Book Trade) has granted the publishing houses independence. But up to now we have not exercised our rights: this is accompanied by increased responsibility, which does not suit some people. At present we have not yet put effective publishing methods into practice. And the essence of perestroika in publishing amounts mainly to this. In Moscow, for example, works which arouse a great public response are beginning to be published with no delays. But in our case? In order to exclude from the plan even one manuscript unworthy of publication and to put in its place a worthy one, we must overcome a mound of paper-bureaucratic barriers.

The transition of many of Uzbekistan's publishing houses, including Yesh Gvardiya, to cost accountability has placed before their collectives a number of complex problems.

As is well known, our multi-faceted youth publishing house puts out books for school-aged readers, i.e., for children and adolescents in the elementary grades through senior high school, as well as for young adults.

With the creation of the Yulduzcha Publishing House there have been changes in the production of children's literature, but they have been extremely insignificant ones. Not enough literature is being published in the Uzbek language. (As for books in the Karakalpak, Kazakh, Tajik, Kirghiz, Turkmenian, Korean and other languages, the book trade must make an effort to order them from the corresponding Union republics). The republic has 15 million Uzbeks, of whom 7 million are children and adolescents. And in 1988, for example, the Yesh Gvardiya and Yulduzcha publishing houses put out about 4 million copies of books in the Uzbek language. That is not even one book per child per year.

At first glance, books in Uzbek constitute the bulk of the subject plan—about 70 percent by volume and number of titles. However, every year the publishing house puts out two high-demand books in Russian with print runs of up to a million copies. And they use up a significant amount of paper. However, the publishing house is forced to do this in order to obtain the profits specified by the plan.

Another way to obtain profits is to expand the range and increase the print runs of books, but this avenue is closed due to the shortage of printing facilities and paper. The printers do not ensure that planned books are produced on time. Every year the publication of eight-10 titles is carried over from plan to plan. For the most part these are picture books in Uzbek aimed at preschoolers and young school-aged children or they are books by young authors. The shortage of printing facilities makes it difficult to expand the subject matter of publications, to

improve the artistic design of books, to use various modern formats and to put out books which are also toys, etc.

We have become convinced that complete cost accountability is unthinkable without a good printing facility and the creation of independent associations, which would include a publishing house, a printing production unit and an outlet to sell the books. But for now the resolution of these questions remains a matter of the future. And for our publishing house it is a matter of the indefinite future. The construction of a printing combine and residential-service facilities for the Yesh Gvardiya Publishing House has been dragging on for more than 10 years. Year after year there have been failures to fulfill the plans for construction and installation work.

We have raised this question regularly at republic meetings and with the higher organs. However, even now changes are not foreseen, and it can hardly be otherwise if neither the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Komsomol or the republic's Goskomizdat cannot get the delayed construction completed.

Recently the Yesh Gvardiya Publishing House presented to the higher organs a proposal to start up a new monthly scientific-artistic magazine called SIRLI OLAM (Secret World) similar to the magazines VOKRUG SVETA, ZNANIYE—SILA and TEKNIKA MOLODEZHI. The new magazine would print scientific-artistic material, and it would promote advanced scientific ideas and exploration in Uzbekistan, as well as the rest of the country and abroad. Incidentally, scientific-artistic literature comprises 60 percent of all literature published in the world. However, our republic is at the very bottom of the list in this regard. Mysteries of outer space, forgotten inventions, secret finds related to the past, scientific discoveries which strike the imagination and more would all be described in the new magazine. It would acquaint people with the best science fiction and adventure stories by writers from Uzbekistan and the fraternal republics as well as by foreign masters of these genres.

Recently the secretariat of the Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee approved the proposal by the Yesh Gvardiya Publishing House to establish this new magazine. It remains to be hoped that the decision will be followed by action.

To satisfy the spiritual needs of the republic's young people—both those at work and those in school—and to bring to the reader a genuine book—that is what the youth publishing house aims for in its work. We shall resolve our problems; the yield will be total. But the resolution of these problems does not depend on us alone.

RATAU Press Agency Director Urges Reduced Publication of Official Information, Reports

90US0440A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian
No 11, Nov 89 pp 52- 54

[Article by Vladimir Burlay, RATAU director: "According to Official Sources..."]

[Text] It is no secret that newsmen have felt an unwavering dislike for press agencies for a long time. We must admit that there is reason for it. For decades a torrent of official materials which had to be published rained down on the newspapers through our agencies, took up the lion's share of space, made the proper coverage of local events impossible, and deprived editorial personnel of royalties by sending many of their works to "fraternal cemeteries." Interruptions in publishing schedules, exhausting overtime work for the editorial and printing staff, and colossal material losses in the production and delivery of papers became common. Furthermore, this torrent, referred to by journalists as semiofficial information (although this does not coincide completely with the dictionary definition), frequently killed the pages of newspapers with its bureaucratic tone and indigestibility and essentially represented dead weight, which was just as repugnant to the reader as to the newsman. Finally, and this is the most important point, the materials coming from official sources were always, in all cases and for all publications, obligatory, as if to underscore the fact that this official material was the legitimate offspring of the authoritarian system.

In recent years the work of press agencies, just as the rest of the press, has undergone significant changes. Only an extremely disgruntled and arbitrary critic could deny this. The information sphere has expanded, and we can even say that the news might be slightly more timely. The infamous silence about Chernobyl, for which the entire world condemned us, would probably be impossible today; the Ukrainian press agency, for example, did not gain access to the "installation" until 14 days after the accident. The discerning discussion of specific issues became a substantial and established part of the agency releases which had been written only in optimistic tones since the days of the cult of personality.

Even official materials, representing an important part of the news released by the agencies, are no longer the same as they were. They contain more objective discussions of vital issues. There has been a departure, as yet only partial, from the indirect references of the past, some changes in the tone of reports, etc. For the first time, official materials (although certainly far from all of them) are competing more successfully with the newspapers' own commentary in their ability to arouse the reader's interest and are contributing to the popularity and profitability of newspapers instead of detracting from them. The long and difficult process of humanizing official information, a process closely related to the processes of democratization and the development of glasnost in the society, has begun.

All of this applies to the qualitative side, but what about quantity? Regrettably, there has been essentially no change for the better in this area. Newspapers are still being smothered by official materials. What is more, there has been a recent tendency toward the further growth of their volume. In my opinion, there are three quite obvious reasons for this. First of all, the constant maintenance of a high percentage of this kind of information is connected with the activity of the country's current dynamic leadership. Second, the requirements of glasnost and openness have led to an unprecedented increase in the length of reports. The summarization and even the most scrupulous adaptation of reports and speeches are now likely to be regarded by the speakers and sometimes by the public as critical pressure and the suppression of facts. The extremely detailed or even complete presentation of reports and speeches became more common, first in the central press and then in the republic and local press. Third, many departments and organizations are using the appeal for glasnost as a convenient excuse for the incessant growth of the volume of official reports, coverage of all types of conferences and meetings, and the publication of decrees and directives. This is completely in keeping with the spirit of the authoritarian system and its ethics. After all, it is distinguished, on the one hand, by a belief in the magical power of the printed directive and, on the other, by the conviction that official undertakings are not as important as their representation, the hustle and bustle they generate, and a demonstration of animation to superior agencies.

The excessively high percentage of obligatory official news items seriously overshadows the work of newspapers, especially party editions. When PRAVDA UKRAINY Editor A. Zonenko addressed a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine this year, he cited the following figure: 48 percent of the materials printed since the beginning of the year had come from official sources. Republic newspapers have no chance to cover events in the republic adequately. And this is happening at a time when it is impossible to find a single family which subscribes to at least one republic newspaper. They subscribe to PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and other papers. When the reader gets his papers, he sees the same materials in all of them. The editor suggested either the augmentation of the size of the main republic newspapers or the publication of a special official chronicle.

Paradoxically, the excess of official materials has an adverse effect not only on the newspapers, but also on the press agencies themselves. After all, just as all other agencies in the world, they transmit not only official reports to newspapers, but also current news items about all types of events in the economic, cultural, and other spheres of republic life, as well as surveys, interviews, and other items on important and relevant topics. The newspapers would be happy to use them, but they do not even have enough room for the articles of their own correspondents. As a result, a great deal of valuable and

interesting information dies before it ever reaches the reader, and this hurts the morale of our reporters because there is nothing more distressing to a journalist than work which turns out to be pointless.

Therefore, there is an acute conflict between the natural desire of the press to give local events the fullest possible coverage and the significant quantities of information produced (and this is certainly not surplus information; I would describe it as the minimum requirement for the satisfaction of readers' demands) on the one hand, and the extremely limited opportunities for its publication on the other. Four pitiful pages—this is all the editors have. It would be difficult to name another country, even an underdeveloped one, where newspapers have such meager measurements. Furthermore, at least two of the four pages are taken up by official materials. Could the remaining two ever accommodate even the somewhat adequate and consistent coverage of the activities of party and soviet organizations and of economic affairs, spiritual developments, and athletic and other events, at least the most relevant of the letters to the editor, without which a newspaper cannot exist today, debates and open discussions of current issues, the bare minimum of advertising, etc.?

What is the solution? It appears that the problem could be solved simply by increasing the size of newspapers by at least 50-100 percent (newspapers abroad consist of 12-16 or more pages). Given our present circumstances, however, this sounds like science fiction without the scientific basis. Per capita paper consumption in the USSR is only 22 kilograms—16 percent of the U.S. figure. In this respect, we are far behind virtually all of the developed capitalist and socialist countries. Given the present state of paper production, including newsprint, in the country, we cannot even dream of increasing the size of editions, at least not in the next few years. In the exceptional cases when there is so much official material that editors have to put out an edition with an "insert," they do this at the cost of a subsequent edition. In other words, it is as if they have to pay back the paper they borrowed.

Some people have suggested the more efficient organization of publications of official information and its stricter regulation. These measures are not likely to be effective. They are administrative in nature and therefore cannot be reliable or long-lived. Special decrees setting limits on official materials and specifying the procedure and sequence of their publication were issued in the Ukraine several times in the past, but after a few months everything invariably "went back to normal." The personnel of the superior organizations setting the procedures were the first to violate them, and the attempts of agencies to secure strict adherence to the rules were always futile: The "weight categories" in this fight were too different, as the saying goes.

Our circumstances demand the extremely economical and efficient use of newspaper space, and this will

require, above all, the resolute renunciation of the current practice of disseminating official information "to all and sundry," reflecting our incurable obsession with the grand scale, our overcautious attitude, and our fear of missing even one potential reader. The official materials distributed through TASS and republic agencies are addressed to the republic, the kray, and the oblast too often. Hundreds of newspapers are filled with the same text. Several facts are ignored in this process, particularly the fact that republic newspapers are drenched by a double cloudburst of official materials—union and republic—and in the oblasts the newspapers are subjected to a third—their own, oblast downpour. People forget that it has been a long time since only one or a couple of newspapers reached, for instance, the rural community. Today the average family in the Ukraine gets six periodicals, and they usually include a central, a republic, and a local newspaper. Why should they copy each other?

This brings an peculiar incident to mind. For a long time an administrator exasperated us with his persistent demands to print official agricultural surveys in all republic newspapers without exception. When we tried to omit reports on the amount of fertilizer spread on the fields or the amount of fodder prepared for animal husbandry farms from at least the industrial RAB-OCHAYA GAZETA, he countered with the "iron-clad" logic that as long as the workers drank milk, these surveys should be printed in their newspaper.

Unfortunately, the many newspaper pages filled with materials that are sometimes quite far removed from the publication's special field of interest testify that this "logic" is being applied too broadly in our country.

The psychological side of the matter is also being ignored. It is easy to imagine how a reader feels (and which of us has not felt this?) when he gets several newspapers and sees the same report and the same decree in all of them. Inflation does not have any positive results in this sphere either. When propaganda is too intrusive, too abundant, and too uniform, it is more likely to produce the opposite effect and to annoy or irritate people. Experience has clearly revealed that if a publication is genuinely important and if it could be of interest to many readers, they will find it in any edition, even if it is not the most common newspaper and even if it is the only one in which the material has been printed.

People have different interests. They also have different obligations. Many reports on various conferences, seminars, and other gatherings pertaining to particular branches of the economy and fields of culture should probably be published only in specialized editions, especially in view of the fact that readers are tired of hearing about these conferences, which are, regrettably, more abundant in our country than real actions.

If the material is of a reference nature, then one or two editions are certainly sufficient. We question, for instance, the huge panels of space taken up by the reports

of the Central Statistical Administration, which are needed more by economists, scientists, and ideological personnel than by the general reading public. This public has a greater need for articulate and up-to-date commentary. I am certain that even some of the materials pertaining to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies do not warrant publication in republic newspapers—for example, the two-page list of Supreme Soviet deputies and the lists of members of the auditing commission and several special commissions. Furthermore, even the reports on the congress and on the meetings of the First Session of the Supreme Soviet were too long, in my opinion; the central press, television, and radio did their job more than adequately, and it is doubtful whether a high percentage of the reading public was made aware of the work of these forums only by articles in the local press.

Besides this, should republic newspapers, for instance, copy the central newspaper coverage of meetings of national leaders with foreign guests? The same reports with the same photographs are published here regularly. The importance of these meetings would not be diminished in the least if the reports on them, in addition to television and radio coverage, were to be confined to one or two central organs with their colossal readership, and only brief items were to be printed in the republic newspapers.

The measures envisaged in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Some Aspects of the Restructuring of the Central Party Press" could be of some help in the more efficient distribution of official materials among publications in accordance with their specialized fields of coverage. The opportunity has presented itself. Time will tell whether it will be utilized.

I think it would be useful to give press agencies the right to decide how much official information should be distributed, and to whom. Today they do not have this right, and this is unnatural. The regulation of the flow of TASS information was discussed at a recent meeting of the TASS board and the directors of republic agencies. When the discussion turned to official materials, only two opinions were expressed: The first was that less than 1 percent of this part of the news depends on us, and the second was that it does not depend on us at all.

The press agencies have just as little to do with the timeliness of official news items, which must be composed, coordinated, and corrected numerous times before they can be transmitted to the newspapers. No matter how hard we try, the news is always late.

In the "dear" old days of stagnation, the republic agencies received a copy of a high-level speech from Moscow a day or two before it was presented, they could take their time translating it and transmitting it to newspapers, and then all they had left to do was to insert the "applause" into the text at the proper intervals. There is nothing even similar to this today. Even local correspondents cannot get copies of speeches or reports or even

lists of scheduled speakers in advance. Everything has to be done "on the fly." In this respect, our news coverage is closer to the Western variety, but, of course, with the difference that the Western reporter is armed with first-rate office equipment, he does not have to worry about the coordination of texts or seek anyone's approval, and the printing facilities of his publication are certainly nothing like our antediluvian equipment.

News must be timely. This is an elementary requirement of journalism, but given the state of our equipment and other conditions, it is rare that an official report can be included in the current edition of a newspaper without disrupting publishing schedules, and this not only causes losses measured in tens or hundreds of thousands of rubles, but also unavoidably deprives the reader of a current newspaper.

"Is There Any Need for Delay?" A letter from physician Yu. Shakhtarin was printed in PRAVDA on 12 August under this heading. "Whenever a party or government leader makes an important speech, we already know that there will be no newspaper the next day," he wrote. "But is there any need for this kind of delay, even for such a good reason? Is this worthwhile? First of all, we will certainly hear about the speech on television and the radio that same evening. Second, because of the delay, most of the population will not read about the speech in the newspaper until the next day anyway."

The author of this letter is absolutely right. What he suggests will be a forced measure, but an unavoidable one. The demand that newspapers include some kind of official material, despite its late submission, in the current edition is nothing more than self-deception: When this happens, the new edition will be placed only on the desks of leaders in the capitals that morning, while the population, for whom the newspaper is actually intended, will not receive it on time.

There is another problem connected with official materials. In all foreign countries, both capitalist and socialist, the Sunday edition is set apart from others in the justifiable belief that people have the right to relax after a week of work and to have some diversion from their everyday concerns. This is a special edition in form and content. It is only in our country that the Sunday editions and even some holiday editions are indistinguishable from the rest and are just as crammed full of reports on conferences, decrees, statistical tables, and other official materials, especially now that Saturday has inexplicably turned into the day of assorted meetings in our country. It is my belief that this reveals a lack of respect for the reader.

The editorial offices of newspapers and other news organs, including press agencies, are making the transition to economic accountability. The news is to be included in the system of commercial relations. What will happen to official materials? After all, they have a special status. It appears that official materials will derail the economic accountability of periodicals unless at least two conditions are fulfilled. First of all, they must not be excessive, like the 100- percent state order for the enterprise. Second, they must acquire higher consumer value, so that they will sustain the economic accountability of the news media instead of undermining it.

In general, all of this seems to suggest that the old authoritarian type of official information will not pass the test for the right to exist under the new conditions of democratization, glasnost, and economic accountability. This test could be passed by official materials of a different type, a democratic type, meeting the needs of our day.

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Moscow Newspapers Investigate Heavy Metal Contamination of Foodstuffs

Investigation Detailed

90US0478A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Subbotina, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent, and K. Lysenko, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA correspondent: "Cadmium Under a 'Top Secret' Classification"]

[Text] Our acquaintance with heavy metals began accidentally. An agrarian scientist, in criticizing journalists, said:

"What are nitrates! That is a lot of noise about nothing. But they have not noticed serious problems. Just you look, we consume heavy metals with our vegetables! This is something we must combat."

Probably this scientist was not completely correct. Lead, molybdenum, cadmium, mercury and arsenic—these terrifying names at times are encountered on the pages of newspapers in materials about the quality of foodstuffs. Some are inclined to hope that metals reach our table only in rare instances. Others are convinced of the opposite. As the specialists feel, the nitrate danger is a magnitude less urgent than the danger of intoxication with heavy metals.

We set the task for ourselves of ascertaining the real state of affairs with the quality of vegetables reaching our table from the Moscow fields.

An experiment was organized. At the end of the last harvest season under the leadership and with active participation of the Food Laboratory from the Moscow Center of Standardization and Metrology of the USSR Gosstandart [State Standards Committee], a sampling was run on specimens of vegetables grown on the fields of three Moscow sovkhozes: Sergiyevskiy (Kolomenskiy Rayon), imeni Mossovet (Lyuberetskiy) and Serp i Molot (Balashikhinskiy). An analysis of the specimens for the heavy metal content was made by the Nutrition Institute of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, the most authoritative organization on these questions and possessing the most modern equipment.

The results of the analyses, unfortunately, exceeded the most pessimistic fears. Here are some lines from the conclusion of the Nutrition Institute: "According to the results of the testing, it is possible to state the following surpassing of the standard levels of PDK [maximum permissible concentration]: the cadmium content in carrots from the Sovkhoz imeni Mossovet and the Serp i Molot Sovkhoz surpassed the PDK by 3-8-fold, in beets grown on these sovkhozes by 10-14-fold. In the same beet specimens the zinc PDK is surpassed by 2-3-fold."

It turns out that of the three sovkhozes, only one was "clean."

The conclusion of the Moscow Oblast Sanitary-Epidemiological Station on the vegetables raised is the same: they must not be consumed as food in such a form and a veto must be imposed on their sale.

When we showed the results of the analyses to the director of the Sovkhoz imeni Mossovet, N. Tolmachev, Nikolay Pavlovich [Tolmachev] replied:

"Cadmium...what is cadmium?"

Certainly this question could be asked by many, as a predominant majority of us is acquainted with heavy metals within the context of a school curriculum in studying the Mendeleev Table. Here is what the well-known foreign scientist C. Reilley has to say about cadmium in his book "Metallicheskiye zagryhazneniya pishchevykh produktov" [Metallic Contaminations of Food Products] (translated and published by Agropromizdat in 1985): "Cadmium is among the most dangerous of all the metallic contaminations of food and beverages not only because of its high toxicity but also due to its extensive distribution and use in modern industry.... In order to cause an intoxication, an insignificant amount is sufficient as the metal dissolves in organic acids and is easily transferred to food products.... Extended intake into the organism causes severe illnesses of the kidneys as well as the bones. The most typical manifestation of cadmium poisoning is damage to the kidneys.... The damage caused in the kidneys is irreversible. In persons dying from cardiovascular illnesses, the cadmium concentration exceeds the average level...."

The perfidiousness of cadmium, like the other heavy metals, is that they build up in the human organism. For this reason, their consumption even in small doses over time can make itself felt. The legend confirmed by scientific research states that Napoleon was poisoned by his own chef who for several years snuck minute amounts of arsenic in the food of the former emperor.

But how is it possible for cadmium along with zinc to get into the food of the Moscow farms? We asked the Director of the Serp i Molot Sovkhoz V. Meshchaninov and the Chief Agronomist of this farm L. Minchenko about this.

"What do you mean how?" they said in a single voice. "For years precipitation has carried this into the ground...."

The municipal sewage system, as is known, operates around the clock. The effluents, in forming from small rivulets, form powerful underground rivers which are sent through 5-m pipes comparable with a subway tunnel to the municipal aeration stations in Kuryanovskaya and Lyuberetskaya. Here the effluents are converted ultimately into dry matter called precipitate. This was what was mentioned by the persons we were speaking with. According to the data of the Moscow Oblast SES [Sanitation-Epidemiological Station], in Moscow at present up to 20 million tons of precipitates have accumulated

and this is an amount fully capable of competing in bulk with Mont Blanc. It is this mountain that is the start of the problem: what to do with the precipitate?

Not so long ago, such a question would not have arisen. As we were informed by a responsible worker from the Mosvodkanal [Moscow Water and Sewage] Association N. Palgunov, its product was gold, the best fertilizer and the Moscow farms waited in line for it. In actuality, gold is located in a different part of Mendeleyev's Periodic Table. The content of heavy metal salts in the product of the aeration stations exceeds all conceivable limits. Incidentally, these limits are not set by anyone, as until recent years no one has been concerned with the problem of their intelligent use. For this reason, for many years the precipitates were dumped without any limit on the kolkhoz and sovkhoz lands.

Moscow had found a convenient, and as then seemed, optimum method of getting rid of the organic matter. The removal reached colossal amounts. For example, according to the data of the Institute for the Minerology, Geochemistry and Crystallochemistry of Rare Elements (IMGRE), in 1985, precipitate was applied on 79 farms in 20 administrative rayons of Moscow Oblast over some 20,000 hectares and this is the equivalent to the area of all the vegetable fields in the Greater Moscow Area.

Initially, the countryside viewed this as a good as the exhausted soils before their very eyes grew fertile and began to produce generously. The yields crept upwards and the large carrots, beets and potatoes were a joy to the agronomists. The Director of the Sovkhoz imeni Moss-ovet N. Tolmachev stated that he had worked on the farm since 1971 but even before his arrival, precipitate had been actively employed, and there was even a special schedule order.

V. Meshchaninov, director of the Serp i Molot Sovkhoz and which is located immediately beyond the outskirts of Zheleznodorozhnyy said that initially he was happy to be able to top-dress the soil with microelements and for several years willingly did this. However, from 1985, he stopped doing this as he realized that something was amiss. Hazy discussions of the negative influence of the municipal precipitates were already around.

But they began to reflect seriously about the consequences only recently and having reflected realized that they would have to get to work. Here, for example, are the results of research conducted by co-workers from the IMGRE: "It has been established that the precipitates of effluent waters (OSB) are enriched with a number of chemical elements, including toxic ones. As of now, standards for the content of chemical elements in the OSB does not exist and for this reason a comparison is made with the PDK in the precipitates of a number of foreign countries. Excesses of these PDK have been found for cadmium, chromium, mercury and nickel by 10-fold and for zinc by 5-fold.... In comparison with the background analogues, soils fertilized with the OSB contain 10-fold more mercury, 3-10-fold more silver and

chromium and up to 3-fold more zinc, copper, arsenic, strontium, vanadium, nickel and cobalt.

Certainly, the toxic product is not just from the Moscow aeration stations and the oblast is not behind the capital. A scientific co-worker from the institute R. Chelishchev, having made a detailed study of the analogous "commodity" from Voskresensk, concluded that the amount of zinc, strontium and certain other elements described by Mendeleyev surpasses by scores of fold the PDK set for precipitates in Finland.

Incidentally, there is little that is surprising here. The abundance of heavy metals in the effluent precipitates is explained by the fact that in our country, in contrast to the civilized nations, the same sewage pipes are used both for the household (essentially harmless) wastes as well as the toxic wastes from industrial enterprises. According to the general plan, the industrial enterprises should be concerned with the ecological purity of their effluents, but in fact they have not bothered themselves with such concerns. Here are just a few facts from a large list drawn up by the oblast people's control. The Solnechnogorsk Hardware Plant discharges into the city sewage system untreated galvanic solvents with an exceeding of the PDK for chromium-containing effluents from 200- to 1,200-fold. The Serpukhov Worsted Mill, the Pushkino Worsted Mill and the Proletarskaya Pobeda Mill (Pushkinskiy Rayon) abundantly douse their waste waters with heavy metals.

And just where ultimately do these frightful amounts of heavy metals end up? You are right: in our stomach.

According to the data of the IMGRE, lettuce and radishes grown on soils with the addition, for example, of the "Voskresensk precipitates contain extremely high concentrations of fluorine and arsenic, exceeding the norm by 20-40-fold. Even now, there are few who do not know that both elements are among the particularly dangerous.

Strontium is also dangerous, however an assessment of it is still difficult due to the absence of the PDK. One thing is clear: radishes and lettuce are contaminated by it some 3-5-fold more than the usual. These are the lamentable results of the senseless application of effluent precipitates. So does this mean we should not go to the store for vegetables at all? How global is the heavy metal problem? Unfortunately, no one can tell this now. But certainly in the Greater Moscow Area there are uncontaminated fields which produce harmless product. Nevertheless, much is already hard to rectify. A study of 16 rayons in the oblast where precipitate has been used for years disclosed a disheartening picture. In Leninskiy Rayon, a surplus of chromium and zinc was discovered and in Balashikhinskiy a magnitude more of cadmium. There is more than enough lead, chromium and nickel. The surroundings of Ramenskiy Rayon have been thoroughly fertilized with zinc, lead and cadmium. The general picture is depressing: the land has been so

overfed with microelements that if immediate measures are not taken, in 5-6 years it will be completely unusable.

How was it possible for our fields to reach such a predicament? It was very simple, no one was concerned with a very serious problem. What can we say if until recently there have been no PDK whatsoever for the soil. And at present, the soil, in comparison with other media (the water, air) has been very little investigated. At present, some 1,400 substances have been normed in water. In soil, this is less than 40. No one at all is concerned with testing for the content of heavy metal salts in vegetables. For this reason, no one knew what we were eating for long years along with our vinaigrette. As a result, we lag at least 20 years behind the other countries in monitoring microelements. The civilized world has so surpassed us in this undertaking that there they consider it unnecessary to monitor carrots for cadmium but on the other hand they find it advisable to test for this element the surfaces of furniture, for example, office desks, as not all employees react neutrally to the given chemical element and in some an allergy may break out. And how can we help but remember the recent history which occurred in our homeland when it became apparent that the dyes of children's toys contained cadmium.

We have taken up in detail only one way for the penetration of the heavy metal salts into the soil and that is through the effluent precipitates. But there are also other methods of poisoning the earth. Our industry without any difficulty has picked up on some of these. For example, the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant successfully does this by releasing effluents into the Kunya River which contain up to 600(!) PDK for 6-hexavalent chromium and cyanide compounds. Not to be outdone is the Voskresensk Krasnyy Stroitel Combine which over the last 5 years alone has discharged into the Moskva River some 1.3 million m³ of waste water with an exceeding of the PDK by up to 240-fold. The same enterprise has dumped around 30,000 [unit missing] untreated silt sediment on the bank. Water from the Moskva River goes to irrigate the fields. The rest is clear.

The power industry also does its bit. The effluents of thermal plants operating on solid fuel are scattered over a distance of up to a hundred kilometers, that is, very large areas are covered with heavy metals in a single sweep. Add to this the pollution from airports and motor vehicles. The soil is literally larded with many dangerous chemical elements and there merely has to be an acid rain to put the Mendeleyev Table in movement in being absorbed in the plants. The director of Serp i Molot V. Meshchaninov has described how every week a black snow falls on his balcony and he is outside the city! Yes, Vladimir Vasilyevich [Meshchaninov] lives a respectable distance outside of Moscow, but on the other hand he is just a couple steps away from Zheleznodorozhnyy with its famous Minvata [Rock Wool]. Try to figure out who is more to blame for the fact that the carrots grown by V. Meshchaninov contain 8-fold more cadmium than the permissible—it is the distant aeration station or nearby

industry? One thing is clear: the earth has been poisoned by common efforts, some more, some less. However, we all eat the potatoes, cabbage and so forth grown on this land. For this reason, we are not concerned with a very pertinent question: How can this land be used? What must be done so that the product of the Moscow fields is not harmful to our health?

The Storage NPO [Scientific-Production Association] of the Mosgoragroprom [Moscow City Agroindustrial Association] organized a little more than a year ago for monitoring the fruit and vegetable products received by the city feels that the contaminated plots must be limed as the lime bonds the heavy metals and converts them into an immobile form which is not harmful for plants. In addition, it is possible to plant industrial crops or choose plants which are least susceptible to a surplus of microelements. In a word, concrete, scientifically sound recommendations are needed and these, alas, as yet do not exist. Finally, the most radical measure on the contaminated plots is not to grow any product at all, that is, to take the land out of cultivation. Incidentally, this proposal was made in the first days of January at the Mosoblagroprom [Moscow Oblast Agroindustrial Association] where they spoke seriously about the need for recultivation, that is, removing the plowed layer to a depth of 30 cm. These 30 cm, thus, must be multiplied by more than a thousand hectares—this is what our inability to look even into the not-distant future is going to cost us.

But it certainly goes without saying that in no instance must we continue to use the sediments in the former manner. The Mosoblagroprom has given orders not to employ them on the oblast fields. But, regardless of this, other farms calmly continue to deliver the effluent precipitates to their fields. In Ramenskiy Rayon which, as we already know, does not excel in ecological purity, there is the Sovkhoz imeni Telman. And on this sovkhoz, as we were informed by its director, N. Maystat, the product from the Kuryanovskaya Aeration Station is used completely for reconstructing a floodplain. Ditches 3 or 4 m in depth are filled with silt sediments and dirt is placed on top. In the opinion of the director, excellent fertile lands are obtained. In fearing to believe what we had heard, we were interested in whether N. Maystat knew about the prohibition imposed by the Moscow Oblast SES on using precipitates on his farm. Nikolay Vladimirovich [Maystat] told us this was the first that he had heard of this. Did he have a permit? Yes, of course. Oh, show it?! Where had it gone?

Considering the polemics absurd, the director showed the importunate visitors the door. Also seeing no reason for a dispute, we left the director's office wondering about the sense of bans in such situations. What could stop a leader for whom the recommendation of a sanitation physician was not an order? Only economic sanctions which would bring him round significantly better than any attempts to reach his conscience. If an analysis of what is grown on a thus reconstructed floodplain

shows that the vegetables cannot be eaten, then the depot will not accept the products and not pay money. Clear and simple.

Specialists from the Storage NPO are seriously concerned with how to best monitor the fruit and vegetable products. They have proposed a control method in the field at the start of the summer. This will make it possible not only to draw up an accurate forecast for the heavy metal content in the future crop but also save significant money.

But first of all, there must be a map and without this the work makes no sense. The surveying of the land is not an insoluble problem. Specialized expeditions from the Ministry of Geology and the IMGRE have been involved in this, although in truth we have not been able, regardless of all our efforts, to see the map of the specific contamination of Moscow Oblast. This is "classified," but not because the researchers want this, rather the secrecy is to the liking of the departments. Including those who are interested in having us be less concerned with what we eat. We were persuaded of this when we wanted to establish contact with the chairman of Mosoblagropromkimiya [Moscow Oblast Committee for Agroindustrial Chemistry], N. Voytovich. Nikolay Vasilyevich [Voytovich] replied to our proposal to meet but at the very outset he stated that all he would say would be off the record. Since we were investigating not someone's private farm we were forced to turn down such an "off the record" conversation. Nevertheless, it is possible to stop a departmental diktat and there are more than enough examples of this: when at the beginning of the 1960s the Americans became concerned with the nitrate-nitrite question, standards for the content of these substances were adopted by the U.S. Congress. As we can see, overseas they have taken a serious attitude toward the problem, raising it to the rank of an official one.

What follows from our long discussion? That we need a serious statewide program on the level of the USSR Supreme Soviet. There must be uniform state standards for the toxic substances, the strictest monitoring and the highest level of scientific studies. Too serious consequences will emerge on the Moscow, and not only the Moscow, fields in order to further tolerate the disorder and departmental diktat on this question.

Goskompriroda's Vorontsov Supports Findings

90US0478B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Vorontsov, chairman of Goskompriroda: "Goskompriroda Supports the Newspaper Findings"]

[Text] The phones began ringing in the editorial offices on the very day of the publishing of the article "Cadmium Under a 'Top Secret' Classification." The readership of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA reacted strongly to its appearance and it together with our newspaper had

conducted an ecological investigation on the question of "heavy metal salts in food, water and soil."

Sharing his impressions was the Chairman of Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection], Nikolay Vorontsov:

The appearance of the article "Cadmium Under a 'Top Secret' Classification" is in and of itself a noteworthy fact. For the first time, this very important problem has been brought to the broad public. At present, it is clear not only to scientists and practical workers that emergency measures must be undertaken to rectify the situation. In truth, the task of preventing the intake of heavy metal salts into the human organism has long been discussed throughout the world.

Why are heavy metals dangerous? A majority of them is capable of causing dangerous toxic phenomena (for example, mercury poisoning causes Minamoto disease). There is a whole series of toxicoses caused by the salts of zinc, cadmium and chromium.... However, I, as a geneticist, am most concerned by the mutagenic effects of heavy metal salts.

These appear in a double manner. On the one hand, they disrupt the chromosome apparatus in the nonsexual somatic cells (the result can be an imbalance in the regulating of their division and as a result a malignant disease). But if the effect is on the cells of the germinal tract or the sexual cells, then this can lead to the development of permanent hereditary mutations. According to the data of Soviet scientists, each year in our nation 100,000 more hereditarily sick children are born than before. The most terrible thing is that this figure applies to those forms which lead to mental retardation, debility and other very severe afflictions. Can one really remain quiet about this?! However, a special word for those who are trying to economize in our health: the support of such children is very costly and each year we lose almost 300 million rubles on this....

I look with pain at the carefully cultivated gardens along the Moscow Ring Road and the other noisy routes. I understand the longing of people for the land, but I should caution that with the exhaust fumes of ethylated gasoline (and this is precisely what our drivers use) the very strong mutagen tetraethyl lead is deposited along the road. Moreover, the product frequently finds its way not only to the family table and what it grows, but is also sold near the subway station. Vegetables, mushrooms and berries picked along the roads must not be eaten.

The joint ecological research of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA has brought up for public discussion for the first time an extremely important question. However, we must speak not only of the sovkhos and kolkhoz products but also about municipal parks and gardens which have been afflicted with tetraethyl lead. They produce 4-fold less oxygen in comparison with a virgin forest. The leaves contain an enormous amount of lead compounds. The fallen leaves must be transported far away from the housing to a

specially-built garbage burning plant and the ash buried in bunkers. In no instance should these leaves be used for humus!

Enterprises involved with galvanic solvents should have separate domestic and storm sewage systems.

Thought must also be given to converting the Diet stores into stores selling ecologically pure products.

Certainly, the press simply does not have the right to leave this question unfinished.

Azerbaijan CP Issues Draft Plan for Environmental Education

90US0563B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 3

[Azerbaijan Communist Party report: "Comprehensive Work Plan for the Ecological Indoctrination of the Population and the Azerbaijan SSR Public's Broad Participation in the Recovery of the Environment"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan SSR CP Central Committee presents for public discussion the draft of the "Comprehensive Work Plan for the Ecological Indoctrination of the Population and the Azerbaijan SSR Public's Broad Participation in the Recovery of the Environment," the discussion of which is planned at the Azerbaijan SSR CP Central Committee Bureau.

To develop in the republic a social movement for the preservation of the environment. To activate the work of nature-conserving, scientific, and creative organizations.

To support the initiative of scientists and specialists for the creation of an international organization on the ecological problems of the Caspian Sea.

Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan, the Academy of Sciences, the Komsomol Central Committee, the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions, the Soviets of People's Deputies

To prepare and conduct the republic scientific-practicum conference "Ecological indoctrination and education in the Azerbaijan SSR."

1st quarter 1990: Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection], the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan

To organize a permanently functioning republic thematic exhibition on the experience and achievements in the area of nature conservation.

1st quarter 1990: Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League, the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Culture, republic ministries and departments

To conduct republic nature conservation months.

Annually. Goskompriroda, the Ministry of Education, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ministry of Culture, the Academy of Sciences, ministries and departments, Soviets of People's Deputies

To prepare and conduct republic seminar-meetings of staffers of the concerned departments, enterprises, organizations, leagues, and voluntary societies on problems of conservation of: the Caspian Sea, the air surrounding industrial centers, lakes, rivers, and reservoirs, and land resources.

1990: Goskompriroda, Gosagroprom [State Agro-industrial Committee], Academy of Sciences, the Society for Nature Conservancy, ministries and departments

To organize courses to increase knowledge of the ecology for staffers of enterprises, organization, societies concerned with environmental protection issues.

1990. Goskompriroda, the Ministry of Education, the Academy of Sciences, the Society for Nature Conservancy, ministries and departments

To prepare and introduce proposals to the republic Government for the creation of national parks.

1990. Goskompriroda, the Academy of Sciences, the Society for Nature Conservancy

To create a bank of science and technology ideas and proposals of the republic's scientists, specialists, and public on matters of environmental protection and reducing ecological stress.

Permanently. The Academy of Sciences, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Komsomol Central Committee, the Ministry of Education, Goskompriroda, ministries, departments, enterprises, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan

To organize a series of talks, speeches, lectures, and meetings of leading scientists and specialists in the field of nature conservation with the participation of youth.

Permanently. The Academy of Sciences, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Komsomol Central Committee, the Ministry of Education, Goskompriroda, ministries, departments, and enterprises, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan

To conduct annual competitions for the best scientific research developments, technical design solutions for problems of environmental protection and rational utilization of natural resources.

The Academy of Sciences, Goskompriroda, Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing], the Ecological League of Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Education, the Komsomol Central Committee, the republic council of the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers, and Science and Technology Creation of Youth centers

And competitions for works of literature, art, and publicistic works.

The Ministry of Culture, Goskompriroda, Goskomizdat, the unions of writers, artists, cinematographers, and journalists

To conduct a comprehensive inventory of parks of culture and recreation. To expand their network, broadly utilizing them for the purpose of increasing ecological expertise, esthetic indoctrination, and strengthening the population's health.

The first half of 1990. Permanently. Local soviets of people's deputies, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Health, Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan, creative unions

To organize in the university, pedagogical, technical, and agricultural institutes departments for "Environmental Protection and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources."

1990-1991. The Ministry of Education, Gosplan

With consideration for the requirements of the national economy, to develop and introduce proposals for the training of ecological cadres in the republic's appropriate VUZs.

March-June 1990. The Ministry of Education, Gosplan

To introduce courses on the ecology and rational utilization of natural resources into the system of cadre requalification and retraining.

1990-1991. Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet commission on public education

Through the mass information, media To regularly inform the population of fundamental ecological problems and the activity of the control organs.

Monthly. AZERINFORM, Goskompriroda, Gosteleradio, newspaper editorial boards

To organize the population's constant information on the ecological situation in the republic's cities and rayons, first and foremost the situation in Baku, Sumgait, and Kirovabad.

To use for this purpose the science and technology and mass information media, computers, and computer technology.

Goskompriroda, AZERINFORM, Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences

To introduce the practice of having economic leaders (natural resource users) give reports to labor collectives and the public on measures for improving the ecological situation.

Systematically. City, rayon ispolkoms, ministries, departments, enterprises, and organizations

To develop academic plans and programs, textbooks, and teaching methodology materials for education on the ecology and indoctrination in pre-school facilities and academic institutions.

To conduct in academic institutions topical exhibitions, olympiads, tours, and other measures on an ecological theme. To form and activate the work of "green" and "blue" patrols. To intensify the activity of republic, city, and rayon young naturalist stations, and to expand their network.

The Ministry of Education, Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan, the Komsomol Central Committee, the soviets of people's deputies

To organize in a planned order joint expeditions of scientists, specialists, and public representatives to ecologically unfavorable or problematic regions of the republic. To introduce to the Government proposals and recommendations based upon their results.

The Society for Nature Conservancy, Goskompriroda, Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences

To activate the work of existing and create new public ecoposts at off-shore petroleum drilling enterprises, the associations and enterprises of the Sumgait industrial hub, and other sites under high ecological stress. To begin the practice of issuing reports of public ecoposts to the enterprises' collectives.

Goskompriroda, the "Kaspmorneftegaz" production association, the enterprises of Sumgait and others

To introduce the practice of broad discussion by the republic's society of projects of placement, construction, and reconstruction of the largest industrial, agricultural, and other facilities of the national economy.

Goskompriroda, Gosplan, Gosstroy, the Academy of Sciences, Gosteleradio, newspaper editorial boards, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan

To provide broad coverage of ecological problems in the mass information media. To introduce newspaper columns on a nature conservation theme, to organize talks of leading scientists and specialists in the field of conservation. To create a monthly TV-magazine "Azerbaijan's Nature."

Editorial boards of republic newspapers, AZERINFORM, Gosteleradio, Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Academy of Sciences

To expand the output, and improve the quality of posters, booklets, excerpts, publication plans, and other illustrated publications on Azerbaijan's nature.

Goskomizdat, Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Artists' Union

To develop a long-term plan and manage the production of artistic, popular science, landscape and documentary cinematic and television films on nature conservation.

The Ministry of Culture, Gosteleradio, Goskompriroda

To enrich the expositions of historical-geographic museums with materials and displays on the nature of the corresponding regions.

The Ministry of Culture, Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy

To expand the network of amateur associations, interest clubs and circles, and collectives of an ecological tendency (horticulturalists, apiarists, and others), to broadly utilize cultural and educational institutions for these purposes.

The Ministry of Culture, the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions, Goskompriroda, the Society for Nature Conservancy, the Ecological League of Azerbaijan

To provide in the plans of state orders the creation of dramatic and musical productions reflecting the problems of the ecology and propagandizing the beauty of Azerbaijan's nature.

To hold exhibitions of works of professional and independent artists and masters of the decorative applied arts reflecting the topic of defending and preserving the natural environment.

The Ministry of Culture, the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions, creative unions

To generally support and diffuse the folk traditions of planting trees, laying in orchards, making the streets and yards green during the "Novruz bayramy" period, in connection with the birth of a child, in memory of fallen soldiers, and others.

To have holidays of the forest, flowers, nature lovers, and horticulturalists.

To organize voluntary work Saturdays and Sundays in the cities and villages, with the broad involvement of the population for improving amenities, the state of sanitation, and the state of the public greenery.

Soviets of people's deputies, the Ministry of Housing and Communal Resources, the Ministry of Health, the Komsomol Central Committee, the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions, the Society for Nature Conservancy

Georgian Gosplan Official Urges Greater Republic Action in Environmental Sphere

90US0563A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
9 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Georgiy Berozashvili, sector head of the scientific research institute of economics, planning, and management of the national economy under Georgian SSR Gosplan: "Paying for the Resources"]

[Text] Many urgent ecological problems trouble the Georgian public today. The adoption by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation of the decree on the reorganization of the environmental service in the Georgian SSR is an expression of its concern.

The following are necessary for the radical restructuring of environmental protection matters, the improvement of forest resource management, rational utilization, preservation, and multiplication of natural riches of Georgia: provision of effective management of the cause of environmental protection; the conduct of a science and technology policy in the area of environmental protection; strengthening state control; the broad use of economic methods of management, and active influence on ensuring the production and preservation of natural resources.

We recognize that the state of the environment in Georgia is unsatisfactory. Particular concern is demanded by: the atmosphere, being polluted primarily by automobile emissions; bodies of water, being poisoned by untreated discharge waters; the lands, destroyed in connection with their irrational utilization.

For example, in 1988, the emissions from automotive transportation reached 1.0374 million metric tons. This is about 70 percent of all industrial discharge of harmful substances into the air, which is 51,700 metric tons more than in 1987. Significant work was done in preventing the growth of emissions by the republic inspection for atmospheric protection. Automobiles were checked and subjected to comprehensive study; control and regulation points were organized; diesel parking lots were organized, etc. As a result, a reduction in emissions from automotive transportation was achieved in the cities of Rustavi, Batumi, Kaspi, and others. Yet despite the measures adopted, the general number of automotive transportation enterprises which do not observe the standards for toxicity and smokiness of the gases produced is not being reduced.

The discharge of harmful substances from stationary sources of pollution was reduced by 40,900 metric tons annually. At the same time, the comprehensive investigation of enterprises' atmospheric conservation activity also manifested shortcomings. Thus, at the Rustavi Metallurgical Plant, the shut-down of old open-hearth furnaces operating without gas scrubbers is being dragged out. The construction of a gas scrubber has not been completed at the ore-heating furnaces at the Zestafoni Ferrous Alloys Plant. At the Kutaisi automobile plant, dust-collecting assemblies have not been brought up to design capacity, and at the Tbilisi "Elektrozolit" plant, use of assemblies for catalytic purification of the plastic films shop has not been started.

Enterprise managers at the following enterprises were held responsible, on the basis of instrumental measurements, for exceeding the permissible discharge level of harmful substances many times over: the Kutaisi lithium plant; the Kutaisi automobile plant, the Kaspi

cement and shale combine; the Rustavi cement plant; the Tbilisi asphalt and concrete plant, the Avchalskiy plant of silicon wall materials.

The average air pollution level in all the controlled republic cities remains high. This value varies from 3.2 to 4.1 (in Batumi, Tkvarcheli, and Gori), to 12.9-15.1 (in Rustavi, Tbilisi, and Kutaisi), even up to 52.8 (in Zestafoni).

One of the causes of the unsatisfactory state of the air in Georgia is the incomplete exploitation of capital investments allocated for the implementation of air protection measures. For example, of the R4.2 million allocated in 1988, R1.84 million was assimilated, that is, 44 percent. These funds were used to implement a number of measures: a graduated fuel reduction at the Tbilisi GRES, the construction of a new electric filter at the Rustavi cement plant, the transfer of the "Chiaturmarganets" boiler production association from liquid and solid fuel to natural gas, the installation of filters at the Kutaisi automobile plant, and the transfer of the boilers of the Minzhilkomkhos [Ministry of Housing and Communal Resources] and public services to the republic's population to gaseous fuel, etc.

The pollution of Georgia's water resources is of a diverse nature. Particularly polluted are: the Black Sea, rivers Mtkvari, Kvirila, Rioni, Inguri, Khrami, Mashavera, Kubistskali, and others. The republic's lakes are less polluted, although the condition of lakes Dzhandari and Ritsa is cause for alarm.

In Georgia in 1988, the volume of polluted discharge waters was reduced to 318 million cubic meters, or by 20 percent of the total volume of discharge of waste waters. Approximately three-quarters of the facilities discharging waste waters into bodies of water release the waste untreated, or treated in a manner not corresponding to sanitary requirements. By our assessment, the economic damage inflicted by the discharge of polluted waste waters into Georgia's standing waters in 1988 was R16.6 million. Of this, R11.7 was done to the basin of the Caspian Sea, and R4.9 to the Black Sea. In a territorial cross section, the damage was distributed in the following manner: the city of Chiatura, R2.2 million; the city of Batumi, R1.5 million; Tbilisi, R1.8 million; Rustavi, R0.9 million; Gardabanskiy Rayon, R7.5 million (the Tbilisi GRES is located in this rayon).

The problem of raising the efficiency of treatment structures remains topical. For the time being, it is not high—51 percent.

Standardization and strict control of discharge are necessary for the rational utilization of water. The introduction of standardization and strict inventory at over 250 Tbilisi enterprises is yielding substantial economy in water discharge.

There has been observed in the past 3 years a tendency toward incomplete exploitation of capital investments allocated for conserving water resources. For example,

for 1981-1985, the capital investment plan was implemented by 82 percent, including construction and assembly jobs by 55 percent. We see as the cause the diffuse nature of construction of water conservation and water treatment facilities throughout cities and sites, and in the insufficient provision of materials and the lack of the corresponding control. It would be expedient to concentrate the matter of constructing these objects in the hands of a single powerful ministry or department.

The optimum correlation of the branch and territorial approach must become the fundamental principle of water conservation activity; in such a case, the role of the state organs of administration is reduced to the coordination of the water conservation activity and the financing of the branch water conservation programs for a transition to advanced production methods.

There has been noted in recent years soil contamination within a 10-20 kilometer radius around the cities of Tbilisi, Batumi, Rustavi, etc. The soil is being contaminated by such heavy metals as lead, copper, chromium, vanadium, manganese, and nickel. Unfortunately, this contamination process is not yet sufficiently studied. We consider it advisable to expand the research of this problem.

The building of terraces on mountainous inclines has great significance. In Georgia in recent years, terraces have been built on 6,000-7,000 hectares. However, due to the poor quality of their construction, rather than improving the state of the land, erosion processes are accelerated. The cause is ignorance of water retention and water drainage canals, the transition from terrace to terrace, etc. In our opinion, just as in the case of water conservation facilities, the matter of building terraces should be transferred to the hands of a materially concerned organization, which will answer for the construction of terraces in the entire republic.

Both practical and theoretical research has shown the need for developing nature conservation measures on a territorial plan, with consideration for the particulars of the regions. In our opinion, the territory of Georgia may be subdivided into several zones of human activity. For example, in the first zone construction of all sorts of production must be prohibited (especially in territories rich in valuable natural and cultural recreational resources). We may conditionally relegate to this zone the shore area of the Black Sea, the Borzhomi gorge, the resort area of the city of Tbilisi, lake Ritsa, with the adjacent territories, rich in historical monuments. In the second zone, the construction of ecologically safe production is considered possible.

The construction of many sites has been halted in the republic today because of the complexity of the ecological situation: Khudoni GES, the Lakbe and Ilto reservoirs, the cascade of the Namokhvan GES, the gas pipeline in the Aragvi gorge. The GRES to be built near Kutaisi, the Batumi petroleum processing plant, and other facilities are in need of ecological examination.

The Georgian State Committee for Environmental Protection and Forest Resources decided to conduct an ecological examination based upon the methodology developed by Georgian scientists. This methodology considers five basis groups of questions: human health and safety, influence upon the environment, socioeconomic factors, economic aspects, and public opinion. We hope that such a method of conducting a state ecological expert study and the practical realization of its results will be conducive to the ecological-economic resolution of the problem.

The process of transferring a number of branches of the national economy to economic accountability has touched upon environmental protection activity as well. In determining the expenditures on the production of the gross national product, the necessary expenses on the preservation, support, and improvement of the environment should be taken into consideration. However, this principle cannot be applied in all cases without exception. Complications arise with financing the expenses for the maintenance and improvement of the environment carried out on a regional scale. Local organs of state power are in a situation to incur such expenses only if they receive the corresponding assignments in their budget, since, unlike production enterprises, they cannot apply the principles of economic accountability.

The efficiency of resolving many of the most important economic problems of utilization of natural resources will increase if the principle of complete economic accountability is introduced in this area. The free status of natural resources generates a contradiction between state and economically accountable interests, without placing a barrier before the economically accountable units on the path to irrational utilization of natural wealth. Administrative methods for the regulation of relations of the economically accountable units and society on the matter of utilizing and conserving natural resources are proving to have little effect, as they are not fortified by measures of economic stimulation.

The fact that natural resources must have a price does not cause any doubt. The problem is the determination of the methods of quantitative assessment of individual types of resources. The inculcation of well-founded payments for natural resources in accordance with their economic assessment would close the system of economic accountability into a single chain.

The introduction of cost systems will be conducive to a reduction in the proportional norms of expenses of natural resources and production fallbacks. The aforementioned norms must be differentiated by regions, and the level of equipment and technology in the branches of production must be taken into consideration. Among them are delineated three groups: payment for natural resources; fines for raising the pollution level achieved, and normative contributions from the profit into a regional fund for renewal of natural resources and environmental preservation. All environmental protection measures in the region must be financed from this fund.

And fines must be used for the preservation of the environment during unplanned phenomena, natural disasters, for example.

The amount of payment for the utilization of natural resources and the normative contributions from profit must be established on the basis of an inventory of the prognosis of the assessment of the quality of resources, and the permissible level of pollution of the environment on the basis of the production, resource, and demographic development of the given territory.

The introduction of two types of payments is advisable: For the waste (discharge) of pollutants within permissible limits, and for 3-5 times that amount when the waste (discharge) of the pollutants exceeds the permissible level.

Three levels of waste (discharge) limits of harmful substances must be adopted for the short term: for 1991-1995; for 1996-2000, and for 2001-2005, with a phased transition to a normative level.

Economic norms of payment for polluting the environment are formulated according to the following positions: for discharge into bodies of waters, for discharge into the air, and for transporting solid wastes. Normative payments for permissible waste (discharge) and those exceeding the norms are developed by the local soviets of people's deputies, with consideration for the opinion of the Georgian State Committee for Environmental Protection and Forest Resources.

The source of payment for permissible pollution is the enterprise's profit, and for pollution exceeding permissible levels, its economic accountability income. The resources received are redistributed to the regional, republic, and reserve fund for nature conservation.

We would like to note that until this time, the city and rayon ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies and their planning organs have insufficiently exercised the right granted them under the conditions of radical perestroika of matters of environmental protection and rational utilization of natural resources within territories in their jurisdiction.

With the development of control figures, state orders, and long-term economic norms and limits, all concerned organizations, departments, and services of the republic should take into consideration the condition that starting with 1991, the normative payments for waste (discharge) of pollutants into the environment will be gotten from enterprises and organizations in long-term economic norms.

In conclusion, it should be noted that an important task at the current phase is the establishment of a system of statistical accounting for environmental preservation and rational utilization of natural resources, while considering the fortification and expansion of the territorial cross-section in the statistical year books in preparation

for the cities and rayons, and we therefore consider its mandatory introduction to be expedient.

Engineers, Environmentalists Continue Debate Over Central Asian Water Resources

Officials Push Siberian River Diversion

90US0518A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by L. Epshteyn, department chief, Sredazgiprovodkhlodok, and project chief engineer F. Eyngorn: "Aral: Emotions and Reality"]

[Text] The reporting on the problems of the Aral and the Aral region by the mass media has become so controversial that the insufficiently informed reader can be misled, and perhaps he has already been misled to some extent. Emotions often dominate over reality, and the traditional searches for "scapegoats," and sometimes even for "enemies of the people," begin. And this is instead of searching for solutions, ones which would be the most sensible from both the economic and the ecological point of view.

Without a doubt the complaints that water use is imperfect, that water accounting and a careful, commercial approach to use of precious resources is lacking, that the technical level of many irrigation and drainage systems is low, and that the quality of land reclamation and water management construction is low are valid in principle.

Without a doubt, we need organizational and economic measures to put an end to the careless attitude toward land and water at all levels—from simple farmer to minister.

But these measures alone cannot produce any significant results, and all the more so in regard to the Aral Sea, since reduction of "organizational" losses and dumping of unused water will not produce a real savings in water resources.

Nor can change in agricultural specialization (except for rice-growing systems) produce a significant water-saving impact, since the scientifically grounded irrigation norms for the majority of feed, vegetable, melon and other food crops are not any lower—and in some soil improvement zones they are even greater—than for cotton. Therefore a transition from a cotton monoculture to a justified form of crop rotation cannot reduce the volume of the water resources we use. proposed measures to reduce the proportion of cotton-growing and increase the area devoted to private plots, which are suitable from the standpoint of solving the food problem and a number of social objectives, will also elicit an increase in the demand for irrigation water.

An understanding of the need for increasing the dimensions of irrigated land in connection with swift population growth in the Central Asian republics, and of the

impossibility of satisfying the growing demand for agricultural products only through intensification of agricultural production, improvement of agrotechnical procedures, selection and so on, was not something that arose in the present time: It was already obvious to scientists, economists and planners 10, 20 and 30 years ago.

We know that the total volume of atmospheric moisture carried over Central Asia is estimated at 2,700 cubic kilometers per year. Understandably, reduction of evaporation from the sea surface from 60 cubic kilometers per year in the 1960s to 40 cubic kilometers today, which is partially compensated moreover by an increase in evaporation from irrigated land, could not have a significant influence on changes in the region's climate.

Planning developments are always based on the results of scientific research. Scientific organizations such as the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Productive Resources, the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Soil Science Institute, the Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of Irrigation and a number of others were brought in as coexecutors to develop basin-wide plans for integrated use and protection of water resources. The materials of the research and the conclusions of the scientists were summarized in the appropriate reports, which we can acquaint ourselves with, and objectively study.

Scientific and planning developments show that by establishing complete order in water use and investing on the order of 28-30 billion rubles into reconstructive measures in all republics in the Aral Sea basin, we would be able to free only about 10 cubic kilometers of river water. The same amount of spent drainage water can also be conveyed into the sea.

In this case any increase in irrigated area must be completely halted, which in turn harbors the most serious economic consequences.

The well-known decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers terminating the work on transferring part of the discharge of northern and Siberian rivers foresaw development, by March 1987 through the efforts of the USSR Academy of Sciences and other scientific organizations, of a conception for the development of the Central Asian region, until the year 2010 using only local water resources, and then continuation of scientific research on interregional redistribution of this water. This conception, in which we hoped to see the positions formulated by union-wide scientific circles, never did materialize.

Research and planning developments on subjects associated with discharge transfer have been completely blocked. Therefore we, the practical workers of the sectors and the planners, are compelled to seek the answer to the main question ourselves: How do we reasonably reconcile the requirements of economics and ecology?

From our point of view a single recipe does not exist in this regard. One thing is clear: The optimum solution must primarily satisfy man's vital interests and at the same time minimize the harm done to nature.

It seems to us that the efforts of scientific and public thought and the capital investments should be oriented not so much on protecting the Aral Sea itself as on fundamentally improving man's living conditions in the Aral region and in the entire Central Asian region. It is our conviction that providing good quality drinking water to the population of the Aral region and other regions not having their own or nearby water supply sources should be the most important objective.

Specialists of Sredazgiprovodkhlopok [not further identified] suggested an idea for fundamentally solving this problem which, when carried out, would make it possible to provide drinking water to the population of all oblasts of Uzbek and Turkmen SSR in the middle and lower reaches of the Amu-Darya.

The idea is to create a single centralized system for supplying water to the public of these oblasts, with the water intake located on the Pyandzh River, the water of which is characterized by the best indicators of natural quality.

According to preliminary calculations creation of such a system would require capital outlays amounting to 2 billion rubles, which is 1.5-2 times less than capital investments required for other variants presently under consideration. Moreover, in contrast to the former, the suggested variant solves the problem for a significantly longer period into the future.

Before this proposal can be submitted to government and planning organs, serious preplanning must be carried out at the level of feasibility studies, or at least the technical-economic report.

Unfortunately it has now been over half a year that republic organizations have been unable to resolve the issue as to which department should act as the client for this planning work, and what the source of its financing would be.

We attempted to approach the matter by a different path: We suggested that the Committee to Save the Aral might assume the function of sponsor of this work and finance it out of the assets of the Aral Fund. But alas.... All that remains is to assume that the committee is more interested in widely publicized campaigns of words concerning the region's ecological problems, than in practical actions that would bring their solution closer.

The second main objective is to implement immediate measures of a general nature to raise the living and cultural level and improve the social and personal conditions and medical services of the population of the Aral region. No nature protecting and water management measures of any sort, including construction of water supply systems, can be of any help if 75 percent of

the housing pool goes on failing to meet elementary norms, if the level of availability of medical institutions and personnel is extremely low, and if the diet of the people is so wretched.

The third objective is to reduce pollution of water sources. In industry and municipal management, this means building effective treatment plants and recycling and successive water supply systems.

In agriculture, this means reducing the use of toxic chemicals (herbicides, pesticides, defoliants etc.) down to the level of their complete elimination, establishing proper procedures of using mineral fertilizers, and developing and introducing methods of treating and partially demineralizing drain water. And finally, a consistent effort to achieve sensible and economic use of water resources, carried out consistently and coordinated among all republics and oblasts, is among the principal objectives.

Unfortunately, this work is being carried on at an extremely low rate, which is explained in our opinion by the absence of a cost-accounting mechanism that would ensure the interest of farms and other water users in reconstruction and in water conservation efforts. It is apparently difficult to count on full centralized financing of the large-scale efforts to recondition irrigated land—that is, on allocation of 28-30 billion rubles from the budget, given the existing economic situation in the country. At the same time the economic status of most farms in the Central Asian republics would not allow us to absorb all of these expenses either. At least until such time that the system of procurement prices on agricultural products is normalized.

Therefore it would hardly be possible to carry out even those directives concerned with providing a certain fraction of water resources for the ecological needs of the deltas and the sea which were published in the USSR Council of Ministers decree, within the time indicated in this document.

Development of a new "System of Integrated Use and Protection of the Water and Land Resources of the Aral Sea Basin in the Period to the Year 2010" was begun in 1988 in order to solve this highly intricate complex of economic and ecological problems. A permanent government commission will also be created in the Aral region.

The new system differs fundamentally from all previous ones oriented on maximum use of water resources to satisfy the needs of consumers—the growing population and the developing sectors of the national economy—in that the Aral Sea and the Aral region, together with the deltas of the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya, are raised to the level of equal water consumers, on par with the sectors of the economy.

The results of this highly important national economic work need to be discussed not only in the State Committee for Protection of the Environment, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the State Committee

for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Gosplan, interested ministries and departments, and the soviets of ministers of republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, but also by the country's public.

The people must clearly envision the promising paths of socioeconomic development of the Central Asian region and the ecological consequences of this process, and they must have an idea of both the dimensions of outlays on nature protection measures and the restrictions which will obviously be required in the economic aspect in behalf of preserving the ecological welfare of this zone for future generations.

At the same time the public must clearly understand that implementation of the plan to transfer part of the discharge of Siberian rivers, scientific research on which is totally inadequate despite the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Priority Measures to Improve the Use of Water Resources in the Country," can be the only radical solution to the problems of the Central Asian region (but not the Aral Sea!) in the first quarter of the 21st century. This research is being conducted inadequately even though this decree contains this unequivocal statement: "The State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the All-Union Agricultural Academy imeni V. I. Lenin are ordered to continue studying the scientific problems associated with regional redistribution of water resources on the basis of comprehensive economic and ecological research, together with interested ministries and departments of the USSR and the councils of ministers of the union republics."

The Central Asian region must live and develop. Clearly its own water resources are obviously inadequate for this. It makes no sense to wait at the seaside for the weather to change: The problem must be solved today, right now.

Activists Score Officials' Proposals

90US0518B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
16 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by P. Shermukhamedov, chairman of the Committee to Save the Aral and the Aral Region, and Yu. Kovalev and S. Mirzayev, assistant chairmen of the committee: "A Response: They Remained Silent on What Is Most Important"]

[Text] Over the past few years the Aral Sea has been the main topic on the agendas of various meetings and representative forums, and it persists on the pages of newspapers and journals and on the screens of television sets and movie theaters. This is why every study on the problem naturally elicits heightened interest.

Nor is the recently announced "System for Integrated Use and Protection of the Water and Land Resources of

the Aral Sea Basin," drawn up and submitted by Soyuzgiprovdokhoz, an exception. Without a doubt an enormous amount of work was carried out, and it was properly assessed in the republic's Academy of Sciences, in the Uzbekistan national committee under the UNESCO "Man and Biosphere" program, and in the public Committee to Save the Aral and the Aral Region.

Provisions of the system concerning the need for changing the farming structure, especially in the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya deltas, for utilizing drainage water in the national economy, for fulfilling "ecological requirements in their full volume, without compromise," and others received a positive response. Some sections require further work and justification, while others require fundamental reexamination. But the discussion today is not about any particulars which might be eliminated or improved in the course of further work on the system. The problem lies in something else. The authors never did express their true attitude toward preservation and restoration of the Aral.

We reject the notion that the authors and coauthors of the "system"—representatives of Sredazgidrovodkhopok [not further identified], the Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of Irrigation, the republic's State Committee for Water Management Construction and Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Productive Resources, invited to the State Committee for Protection of the Environment to discuss it—are not familiar with the recent USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On Immediate Measures for the Country's Ecological Improvement." Nonetheless we feel it our duty to recall the third paragraph of this highly important document. It states: "Create a permanent government commission with the purposes of seeking out and implementing sensible measures to restore the balance in the Aral region. Have the commission ensure, jointly with the USSR Academy of Sciences and with the participation of foreign scientists and specialists, competitive development of a plan for restoring the Aral Sea (emphasis ours—Authors) and to submit, by 1990, specific proposals on its implementation for examination to the USSR Supreme Soviet."

How could they not account for the decision of the country's supreme organ of power when they drew up another version of the "System for Integrated Use and Protection of Water and Land Resources of the Aral Sea Basin," and say not a single word about a document which honestly states: "The situation in the region of the Aral Sea is practically out of human control. The Aral region has become a zone of economic disaster"?

Also perplexing is the position of the republic's State Committee for Protection of Nature and its executives, who have silently accepted the proposed system. In behalf of the ecological community we request, insist and demand that the Uzbekistan State Committee for Protection of Nature strictly define its position on the problems of the Aral and the Aral Region! Will it take

charge of an effective struggle to restore the Aral Sea, or will it be satisfied with what was submitted by representatives of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources?

And finally, something that does not have a direct relationship to the subject of this article. We are referring to the article "Aral: Emotions and Reality" published in PRAVDA VOSTOKA and penned by associates of Sredzgidrovodkhopok L. Epshteyn and F. Eyngorn.

The "company line," supported by the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources—that the Aral is doomed and "that it seems to us that the efforts of scientific and public thought and the capital investments should be oriented not so much on protecting the Aral Sea itself as on fundamentally improving man's living conditions in the Aral region and in the entire Central Asian region"—is clearly discernible throughout the entire article. That is, the authors remain faithful to the end to P. Polat-zade's "line" associated with the "beautiful death" of the Aral.

In the meantime the country's supreme legislative body voted unanimously in favor of the Aral Sea's restoration. N. Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Protection of Nature, announced directly in his discussion of the Aral in his New Years' interview with IZVESTIYA that "It must be restored at all costs!"

There is one other thing that simply cannot be ignored. The unceasing attempts by workers of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources to shift the burden of moral and material responsibility for what has been done to the shoulders of others. But everyone knows, after all, why the Aral is dying, and why the rivers and the land in the Central Asian region are dying. One would think that the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources should do everything it can, more than anyone else, to save nature, to restore the ecological balance in the Aral basin. But no! It seems to be prepared to do something, but only at someone else's expense.

"We attempted to approach the matter by a different path," write the article's authors L. Epshteyn and F. Eyngorn. "We suggested that the Committee to Save the Aral might assume the function of sponsor of this work and finance it out of the assets of the Aral Fund. But alas...."

Yes, "alas"! The Aral Fund is made up of money collected from communist unpaid work days, from voluntary deductions from collectives and from transfers from the accounts of private citizens, from kopecks intended for school breakfasts saved by young children in love with nature....

And now it is suggested that we need to transfer this money to other "projects" (we are talking about 80,000-100,000 rubles) of planners of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources? No, dear friends, the Committee to Save the Aral would never commit itself to such "operations"! Every kopeck in this fund will go to

the support of only the main objective! There is only one thing that we can hope the planners themselves might do: solve their problem at their own expense. And there would be no sin in getting things done on the basis of public support: The stimulus for such activity might come from admitting who is to blame for the fact that the Aral is dying, that the Aral region is dying.

Second Chernobyl Accident Rumored

90UN0914A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 12 Jan 90 p 3

[Article under the rubric "Rumors and Truth" by L. Brovchenko: "There Were No Emissions. Rumors of an Accident at the Chernobyl AES Spread in Kiev"]

[Text] We called the editors of VISNYK CHORNOBYLYA, the "Labor Watch" of the Prypyat Production Association. Correspondent Yu. Tararin came to the phone.

"Those rumors have reached us too. The phone has been ringing off the hook for several days. That's understandable: an accident at a nuclear plant is no joke. In fact, specialists say, an out-of-ordinary situation arose in Unit Two of the Chernobyl AES. But here, I'll read you the explanation given to our newspaper by V. T. Korotkov, the head of the Radiation Security Shop:

"According to the design of the plant, after the heat components in the reactor are spent they have to be replaced with new ones. The spent components are removed from the reactor using special loading and unloading machines and placed in special cooling ponds. After that, the components are hauled out to the spent nuclear fuel storage facility, where they are kept until they are sent to the radiochemical plants for reprocessing.

"On 2 January, while unloading the components from the cooling pond of Unit Two in order to send them to the storage facility, one of them jammed. The operation to free the component was carried out using machines equipped with remote control and the necessary biological protection. The problem was that a 600-millimeter-long part of the component was in the central hall without protection, thus creating an increased gamma background in the room. It had no effect on radiation conditions in the other rooms.

"Operations to free the component took from 3 to 7 January. They were carried out by Chernobyl AES personnel assisted by technical specialists of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry and the USSR State Nuclear Power Oversight Committee. The maximum allowable radiation dosage for participants in such work is 1.27 BERs. This is consistent with conditions governing such operations in nuclear plants. No radioactive elements were detected in the air of the facility. There were no atmospheric emissions."

Ivashko Voices Hopes for New Year

90UN0682A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
1 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko, member of the CPSU Politburo, first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee: "Today the Priority of the Mind, Culture, and Responsibility Is Needed"; date and place not specified]

[Text] How do I consider the past year for myself? Perhaps, the most difficult one in my life. And this is connected not only with the change of my so-called official position. There was simply a sharp change in the dynamic of our entire life. Look, with what a maelstrom of events it has started to be filled! Events that are important for the entire country and for every individual person.

These are such important steps in political reform as the elections of the people's deputies of the USSR on a completely new basis, the two Congresses of People's Deputies which for us are incomparable with anything, and the work of the country's Supreme Soviet. I will note, the participation in all this is quite a difficult thing.

Of fundamental importance for the life of our republic is the adoption of the Law on Elections to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Law on Languages. In essence, this is a new page in legislation at the republic level, legislation on a truly democratic basis, with the broad participation of the people.

The past year was in many respects a turning-point also in the life of our party and, in particular, in the life of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In spite of the fact that the work on the renewal of the party has just begun, it has begun. Of course, at times not smoothly, with the overcoming of difficulties.

It so happened in my life that I proved to be in the very thick of these events. For this reason, it would be more correct to add to the definition difficult year also the word tense.

But here it is spent, and it has shown that one can in principle live even in such a difficult rhythm. But only on the condition of a sharp increase in the constructiveness of everything that we are doing. Not to spend so much time on empty discussions, which, unfortunately, there were last year.

But as a whole, characterizing the year 1989, it may be said that life was in full swing in a society renewing itself.

NOW—about the hopes I set on the year 1990. You know, previously it was fashionable in our country to call the coming years both decisive and determining, but with all my non-acceptance of labels, we cannot do without precisely those words in characterizing the significance of the year 1990 in the life of the entire country and in the development of our republic.

We all see that the process of restructuring and renewal is proceeding with extreme contradictions, violently, with enormous difficulties and shortcomings. Many people, I would say, have already shown fatigue, at times a lack of endurance. But nevertheless it proved possible during the past year to pull through some, in my view fundamental, decisions. Now we are faced with the practical realization of all the new and progressive that was born in the heated discussions.

Restructuring has encompassed all aspects of our life. But the profound changes in the economy, above all, in my view, will be determining in the year 1990. In order to go over, already as of 1991, to completely new economic relations. In so doing, it goes without saying, it is by no means possible to permit for our society to be cast into a violent, senseless element, the maelstrom of an unregulated, uncontrolled market, which makes the rich still richer, and the poor still poorer. What this can lead to is indicated by the present experience of a number of countries. These are very important things, they go beyond the framework of today's brief conversation.

And because of all of this it is necessary for us during the present year to become clear in all the nuances of the economic independence of the republic, republican khozraschet, and the khozraschet of enterprises. And, of course, to carry out a reform of price formation. Speaking at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies, I assigned primary importance to this question. Indeed, there cannot be any khozraschet of any kind if the wholesale and purchasing prices are simply invented, and are not conditioned economically and do not reflect the realities that have taken shape in society.

It is clear that we are placing great hopes in the solution of the urgent problems on the continuing process of the renewal of the party—the only real force uniting our society today and capable of leading it to a qualitatively new level, worthy of our people. We see the task in approaching the next party congress with the practical experience of work in a new way.

Our hopes are also for a new composition of the parliament of the republic and the local Soviets, where, we are convinced, energetic and active people, genuine citizens of their Fatherland, will come.

What is required for the realization of all these hopes? I will answer with one word—reason. Reason that embodies, besides everything else, the culture of thinking, the culture of work, the culture of conduct, ecological culture, and a great deal else.

I think that it will be much easier to solve the urgent problems if we already today will begin to take these or those decisions from the position of the comprehension of the processes going on at all levels of our society, beginning with the rank-and-file toiler and ending with the government of the republic. And, thus, it is necessary to make full use of the mighty intellectual potential of the people, to increase: the cultural level of society.

We need today, as never before, the priority of the mind, culture, balance, reasonableness over, excuse the sharp words, chatter, precocious judgements, and ignorant prescriptions.

We are able to attain this—everything will go as it should. But all need to work much, very much.

Armenian Churches Returned to Believers

90UN0888A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
19 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by Armenpress Correspondent L. Sargizova: "Monasteries and Churches—to the Believers"]

[Text] The major cultural center of medieval Armenia, the Akhpat Monastery, an historical architectural complex from the 10th-13th centuries, has been returned to the believers. The uniquely beautiful Surb Nshana, designed by the great Armenian architect Trdat, was another of the churches recently restored for divine services. The freedom of conscience and freedom of religion proclaimed under perestroyka has opened a new religious era.

According to information provided to the Armenpress correspondent by Stepan Vartanya, chairman of the Council on Armenian Church Affairs at the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, "In the early 1930's, many churches and monasteries in Armenia were closed. By 1985, only 21 churches and 7 monasteries were operating here in all. The situation was worse in Nagornyy Karabakh—in spite of the predominance of the Armenian population, not a single church was open there. At the present time 17 new religious communities have been registered and are in operation on Armenian territory, and former places of worship have been returned to them. Churches have been opened in many rayons in the republic, including Magri, Kafan, Goris, Martuni, Noyemberyan, Talin, Spitak and others. By decision of the Armenian government, the apostolic churches of the Tatevskiy, Akhpatskiy and Makaravanskiy Monasteries, which played such an important historical role in the lives of the Armenian people, have been revived. Right now the question of transferring to the monastery the church at Sevan, which dates from the 9th Century, and the church at Agarak, from the 11th-13th Centuries, is being resolved. Several churches have been opened in Artsakh as well, including the Gandzasarskiy and Amarasakiy monasteries," said he.

Armenian churches are being opened in other parts of the Soviet Union as well. Since last year an Armenian church has been operating in Leningrad. A religious community has been registered in Gagra [Abkhazskaya ASSR], and permission to build a church has been granted. Armenian believers in Yalta, Feodosiya and Lvov have submitted an application for restoration of former places of worship to them.

The terrible disaster which befell Armenia did not pass by the churches and monasteries. In Leninakan, for

example, the magnificent Amenaprkich church building was totally destroyed, and the existing church in Astvatsatsin suffered also. Centers of religion in Kirovakan and Stepanavan suffered less damage, and are now being restored.

The center of the Armenian Apostolic Church—Echmiadzin, has received several appeals from Armenian Church dioceses abroad, and from private individuals as well, on their readiness to participate in the restoration of the demolished churches and monasteries. In particular, American businessman S. Sogalanyan has allocated one million American dollars for the restoration of the Tatevskiy Monastery, of which 100,000 dollars has already been transferred to the account of Echmiadzin. There is a proposal from the Armenian community in the USA to restore to its previous state, with their own efforts and funds, the Amenaprkich Church in Leninakan, destroyed in the natural disaster. But the bulk of the work on restoration of the demolished and damaged historical-religious monuments is being carried out by means of funds allocated by the republic's government.

Lithuanian Communist Party to Admit Believers

90UN0825A Vilnius *SOBYTIYA I VREMYA*
in Russian No 1, Jan 90 pp 6-7

[Article by Algimantas Muzikavichyus: "Party Membership and World Outlook"]

[Text] Today, it is difficult to astonish anyone with new ideas in politics, ideology, and economics. Therefore, it is feasible and natural that a more tolerant view on the communist's attitudes toward religion, and even on the possibility of a believer becoming a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party should not cause any particular hullabaloo. Why?

Documents regulating the principles of public organizations' activities either legalize a situation, which in reality already exists, or state an aspiration to realize this situation. During the discussion of the freedom of conscience and ideological convictions, which is being proclaimed by communists, the question arises, with which of these cases are we at loggerheads? In other words, first of all we should find out whether or not there have been religious-minded people in the Communist Party up to this time. Only the findings of sociological research can render assistance in this instance, because in the documents of the Party organizations one can only find information on expulsions from the ranks of the CPSU for observance of religious rites.

In 1988, sociologists studied this problem at industrial, construction, and transportation enterprises in the city of Kaunas, Panyemunskiy Rayon. A total of 1740 workers and employees were surveyed and 16.5 percent of them were communists. Upon analyzing the level and degree of religiousness of various sociodemographic groups, it was determined that 10 percent of the Party members consider themselves religious people. Other

supplementary indicators only reinforced our data. For instance, 3 percent of CPSU members stated that they believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, 5.5 percent regularly or occasionally pray, 11 percent attend the Polish Roman Catholic Church, and 7.5 percent go to "holy places" on religious holidays. In assessing the significance of religion's social functions, 2.8 percent of communists asserted that religion answers all questions on the development of nature and society, 32 percent acknowledged a positive emotional and psychological counteractive influence, 17 percent indicated that religion guarantees a person's morality, and 15 percent evaluated the integrative role of religion favorably. This data is typical not only for our republic, but for other regions as well. For example, a survey of workers at the Kamskiy automobile plant showed that 4.9 percent of CPSU members and 10.4 percent of the All-Union Komsomol members consider themselves religious people (Sociological Aspects of National Attitudes, Part I, Moscow, 1989, p 123).

Bearing in mind that the duty of communists to combat religious prepossessions is stated in the CPSU Rules and Program, we should attempt to explain the reasons, for which believers find themselves in the Communist Party. It may be assumed that some of the religious-minded people joined the Party because they were deprived of the opportunity to actively prove themselves in public life. Still other believers found themselves in the Party because an artificial attempt was made to maintain in it a proportion of workers and peasants, which corresponded to the sociodemographic structure of society. This view on regulating the growth of the Party rank and file encouraged unconditional fulfillment of the Party enrollment plans; and therefore the secretaries of the local Party organizations disregarded the religiousness of honest and conscientious workers and peasants because there simply were not enough confirmed atheists.

After establishing the fact that there are believers among CPSU members, it is possible to conclude that the directive of the Lithuanian Communist Party Statute consolidates a situation that already exists in reality. We should take a closer look at this question from the aspect of a Marxist Party's attitude toward religion. The thought set forth in V. I. Lenin's article, "Socialism and Religion", stating that "we can by no means consider religion a private matter with respect to our own Party" (Complete Works, Vol 12, p 143) has been offered as a definitive and incontrovertible answer to this question. Upon a careful perusal of V. I. Lenin's works, one can also find different thoughts. One need not delve deeply to show that V. I. Lenin was not consistent and did not have a firm position regarding this question. Several examples can be cited for illustration:

"...We do not and should not prohibit proletarians, who have retained some traces of the old prejudices, from rapprochement with our Party" (Complete Works, Vol 12, p 146).

"We should not only admit, but make a special case of drawing all workers, who believe in God, into the social democratic party" (Complete Works, Vol 17, p 422).

"I am in favor of expelling those who participate in religious ceremonies from the Party" (V. I. Lenin, essay, Vol 44, p 184).

"Allow, with a number of particularly restrictive conditions, the retention of believers in the Party" (Complete Works, Vol 54, p 440).

At first glance, it may appear that opposite things can be proven on the basis of these quotations, however it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the first thought was expressed under the conditions of the 1905-1907 revolution, the second—in 1909, during the period of tsarist reaction, the third—in 1919, during the period of war communism, and the fourth—in 1921, at the beginning of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Consequently, V. I. Lenin's view on the possibility for religious people to be Communist Party members depended on the specific sociopolitical conditions and circumstances. V. I. Lenin's point of view on this question was determined by the understanding that the coincidence of the ideological orientations of political organizations and their members is secondary in comparison with solving the major political and economic problems.

V. I. Lenin's historically accurate and dialectical view on the insignificance of the proletarians' various opinions of a divine paradise was forgotten during the period of Stalinism. At that time, the sole ruling political party assumed functions that were totally uncharacteristic of it. F. Engels, as if foreseeing the possible metamorphoses of the communist movement, wrote: The only service, which (...) can still be rendered to God is to proclaim atheism a compulsory symbol of faith". It is a historical paradox that the Party, proclaiming Marxism, has rendered this service to religion.

Among the numerous publicists, who have criticized Stalinism, one can find some statements to the effect that Stalinism was a specific form of religion. The so-called deformations of socialism have not yet been thoroughly studied from a theological standpoint. Such research would have been able to explain certain peculiarities of the origin and functioning of this historical phenomenon (apropos, such as fascism, Maoism, etc.). The Communist Party eventually began to not only perform the functions of a political organization, but also of religion. Especially after the last vestiges of scientific method disappeared from the doctrine of Bolshevism and after the Party began to be reigned by the dogma of Stalin's infallibility, which gave rise to a multitude of others: the intensifying class struggle, building communism within capitalist encirclement, the prosperity of nations, etc. The Party's ideology became dogmatic and gradually acquired all the basic traits characteristic of religious ideology and religious activity. These were a belief in the supernaturalness and deification of the leader and glorifying him, precepts removed from the realities of life, a

belief in the exclusivity of one's own doctrine and in the persecution of those with a different trend of thought, etc. It should be remembered that the primary distinctive feature of religious activity is symbolic, ritualistic theatrical performances, and not solving concrete practical problems. The most striking example of the religionization of the Party organizations' activities is the senseless ritual of unanimous voting, which has been practiced for decades.

It is clear that a follower of a different creed could not become a member of such a political organization for the simple reason that it is impossible to profess two different faiths at the same time.

During certain periods of societal development and especially during periods of social upheaval, political organizations, desiring to retain influence in the State, make compromises and concentrate all their forces on the attainment of principal objectives, while repudiating certain secondary principle. If the power of the political organization's influence on the State diminishes, this organization must try to unite with congeneric organizations or even with organizations advocating a different ideology. In the first place, a political party is necessary to protect the economic interests of certain social circles, while influencing the State's institutions through political means. Whereas the social organizations, which have sprung up on the basis of identical ideological convictions (religious, freethinking, etc.), are performing altogether different social functions and the economic and political interests of their followers may differ or even be antithetical. Consequently, different social needs permit the realization of various systems of social integration and differentiation, and therefore social division along political and ideological principles does not and should not coincide. F. Castro's thought that the peasants in his country worship a different God than the U.S. imperialists do, although the peasants and imperialists may profess the same religion, is instructive in this sense. The Cuban leader divides Communist Party members into two groups by ideological orientation: Marxist-Communists and Christian-Communists (Fidel and Religion, Warsaw, 1986).

The policy of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization, proclaimed by M. S. Gorbachev, is atheistic in the sense that the Communist Party is oriented toward negating dogmatism in thought and in fanatical activities, not so much with respect to any religious faith, as to its own ideology and activities. This path allows us to isolate ourselves from the tendencies, which have become stronger in the last decade, to confer a religious nature to political organizations and to politicize religious organizations. One can cite the groups of fundamentalists in the Islamic nations and the so-called theological liberation movement in Latin America as extreme examples of this trend.

Thus, the cited statute of the Lithuanian Communist Party should become the safety device, which will allow us to avoid possible deformations of the political party

arising from the possibility of certain ideological conflicts. This directive revitalizes V. I. Lenin's tolerant, democratic idea stating that "a political organization cannot examine its own members regarding a lack of contradiction between their views and the Party program" (Complete Works, Vol 17, p 422).

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Metropolitan Filaret On Religious Conflict

90UN0682B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
1 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia Filaret, patriarchal exarch of the Ukraine: "Not Create a Handful of Ashes"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The present year for me, as for all Orthodox of the Ukraine, was a year of expectations and unrealized hopes. The material situation of the people did not improve. The unbalanced economy made itself felt through ever new shortages.

Of course, man does not live by bread alone. But our morality and culture also are not up to the mark. For 2 weeks Archbishop Ivano-Frankovskiy and Kolomyyskiy Makariy has been fasting, protesting against the seizure of the Greek-Catholic Cathedral. Unfortunately, this is not the only case of extremist actions of the Greek Catholics. On 29 October they seized the Preobrazhenskiy Cathedral in Lvov by force. Quite a lot of time has passed. However, these unlawful actions have not received a principled assessment on the part of the local authorities and judicial organs. Such connivance led to the fact that, in the Lvov area alone, seizures of religious buildings have taken place in at least 50 spots. After the collision with the invaders by the side of his temple, the priest V. Bochalo died. The priest I. Stegnyy, before whose eyes the seizure of the church of Preobrazhenie took place, is in the hospital with a heart attack, two knife wounds were inflicted on the father-superior Serafim, the abbot of the Preobrazhensk Monastery, which is in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast...

Many, most likely, have read issue 38 of OGONEK. There the material of G. Rozhnov, "It Is Us, Good Heavens", was published. The author saw in the eyes of the Ukrainian Catholics standing in the Arbat "good and sorrow, as well as regret... Icons, rosary, and transparencies in their hands." And now imagine what the abbot of the Preobrazhenskiy Cathedral, the archpriest Andrey Gorak, saw in the eyes of the men, who burst into the temple with metal bars and clubs...

The complex inter-church relations in the Western eparchies of the Ukrainian exarchate are directly connected with the aggravation of inter-nationality relations. And it is no mere coincidence that the gonfalons, with which the Greek Catholics come out to demonstrations and meetings, are thickly framed with yellow-blue banners.

The Russian Orthodox Church is searching for ways of getting out of the crisis by various means, including through dialogue with the Roman Church. Several meetings have already taken place. The next one should have taken place at the end of November in Moscow. It did not take place. It has been rescheduled for the second 10-day period of January. The reason is the seizure of the Preobrazhensk Church by the Greek Catholics and other manifestations of extremism on their part.

NOT TOO LONG AGO, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church came out with a declaration. It contains the following words, pardon me, I will cite: "We are appealing to the Congress of People's Deputies, to the governments of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, to local organs of power, to the public, to the Orthodox and Catholics, and to all the believing and non-believing citizens of our country with the request to realize the full tragedy of the situation that has developed in the Western Ukraine and its possible consequences. We believe that legality, and not force, can stop the collisions and create the preconditions for the healing of the conflicts. . . . Setting our hopes on the mercy of God, we call upon both Orthodox and Catholics to pray for one another and to remember that the rights of some cannot be satisfied at the expense of the rights of others. . . ."

Thus I would like to believe that the Good will prevail in the new year. I hope that every believer and non-believer will look into his soul, that the sense of reason will prevail. We must realize high ideals, and not create a handful of ashes after us.

Religious 'Contraband' Returned to Church

90UN0682C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by N. Domkovskiy: "The Return of Treasures"]

[Text] More than 500 masterpieces of religious art have been turned over to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Cultural objects, our national property, the centuries-old wisdom of the people for a long time were exported abroad. It is bitter to recognize what truly invaluable artistic treasures have migrated from the boundaries to the halls of the European and transatlantic museums. And it could have been worse, had we not suddenly remembered...

"During the last 3 years alone," V.K. Boyarov, the chief of the Main Administration of State Customs Control at the USSR Council of Ministers, says, "as a result of the measures to put a stop to the contraband export of church valuables from the country, more than 1,500 unique objects have been confiscated. Moreover, during the past 6 months alone more than 600 of them have been confiscated. The existing procedure envisages the transfer of such types of works of church art to museums, the State Repository for Precious Metals, and the rayon financial departments—all depends on the price of the objects."

But here is the trouble: Sometimes a purely formal approach to the instructions, and at times also a simply elementary lack of responsibility of the officials leads to the damage, the destruction, and the theft of church valuables. Moreover, time and again attempts of the repeated contraband export of these valuables abroad have been stated. Naturally, this cannot but call forth concern among the customs organs of the country. And then we turned to the government with the request to turn over the valuables confiscated by customs to the churches.

At the end of the past year, the USSR Council of Ministers examined this proposal of the customs officials and decided to agree with it. And so yesterday, in the hall of the residence of the Moscow Patriarch in the Svyato-Danilov Monastery, the festive act of the transfer of the valuables of the church takes place.

On the instructions of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov, V.K. Boyarov, in the presence of the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs at the USSR Council of Ministers, Yu.N. Khristoradnov, and the USSR Minister of Culture, N.N. Gubenko, is handing over the relics and the gift certificate to the business manager of the Moscow Patriarch, Bishop [vladyka] Vladimir.

It is impossible to tear oneself away from this shining splendor: 450 icons, 28 collapsibles, 37 large crosses. . . . Filigree work, fine painting, inspired faces on icons. . . .

The Sheremetev customs office made the largest contribution. It is handing over 300 objects of religious worship. The customs officials from Chop, Grodno, Byborg, and Uzhgorod sent quite a lot.

"This gift truly is priceless," says the church censor of the artistic production association of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the archimandrite Aleksey. "How can one assess the icons of the beginning of the 18th century? And how in general is one to assess the—in terms of the spirit of creation—highest Orthodox masters?"

"Where will the gifts of the Soviet government be transmitted?" the question was put to Bishop Vladimir.

"Some part will remain here, in Svyato-Danilov Monastery," he answers. "The most interesting exhibits will be transferred to the archeological office of the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy in Troitse-Sergieva Monastery. Well, and the remaining objects we will send to the temples and monasteries that need them. I would like to say that the process of involving believers in active public life will take a turn. The Russian Orthodox Church perceives with profound gratitude the transfer of the temples by the state to us, the restoration of monasteries, the return of sacred relics, sacred books, and icons to the believers..."

"It is impossible to expunge spiritual art from the history of Russia," said the USSR Minister of Culture, N. N.

Gubenko, in conclusion. "These objects should belong to those for whom they were created. However, if the believers treat them not only as works of art, but also as their relics, then we see, above all, the works of the fine masters of the past, which revealed in these icons and jewelry the soul of the people..."

I would like to add that, as a token of gratitude, the Russian Orthodox Church yesterday gave to the Soviet government albums with colored photographs of everyone of the 546 objects. At present, the question of the possible publication of a catalogue of these gifts is being decided.

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